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Preface 
 
An orphan work has two properties: It is under copyright, and diligent effort cannot identify the copyright 
holder. The second property creates frustrating problems, because many important uses of copyrighted 
works require permission of the copyright holder. Orphan works exist in a legal limbo in which we might 
have to forgo socially beneficial uses of the work – not because the rightsholder opposes them, but because 
we cannot find the right person to ask.  
 
If orphan works were less valuable than non-orphan works, then these problems would be less 
troublesome. However, orphan status befalls works of all kinds, without regard to their quality or value. 
The publisher may have gone of business or lost its records in a fire. Its records may be intact, but they 
may not answer the narrow copyright question that would let us track down the relevant rightsholder. The 
copyright might have passed from the original rightsholder to heirs who cannot be identified or located, 
even with the help of a genealogist or private eye. 
 
This is a large, worldwide problem.  In a 2009 study, the Joint Information Systems Committee (JISC) 
estimated that 503 UK institutions could hold in excess of 50 million orphan works.i   
 
Here in the U.S., a 2005 study by Denise Troll Covey reported that Carnegie Mellon University was 
unable to find “the publishers of most of the books published between 1920 and 1930 and of almost half 
of the books published between 1940 and 1950. Publishers of more than a third of the books published 
from 1950 to 1960 and 1960 to 1970 could not be found.”ii  
 
In his 2011 study John P. Wilkin concluded: 
 
The body of orphan works — works whose rights holders we cannot locate — is likely to be 
extremely large, and perhaps the largest body of materials. If the guesses made here are right, 50% 
of the volumes [still in copyright] will be orphan works. This 50% is comprised as follows: 12.6% 
will come from the years 1923-1963, 13.6% from 1964-1977, and 23.8% from 1978 and years that 
follow…. Indeed, if this speculation is right, our incomplete collection today includes more 2.5 million orphan 
works, of which more than 800,000 are US orphans. (Emphasis added.)iii 
 
Again, if the term of copyright were short, for example 14 years and renewable once, as it was at the time 
the Constitution was ratified, then the orphan-works problem would also be less troublesome. Orphans 
                                                 
i JISC, In From The Cold: An Assessment Of The Scope Of 'Orphan Works' And Its Impact On Delivery To The Public 18 
(2009), available at http://www.jisc.ac.uk/media/documents/publications/ infromthecoldvl.pdf   
 
ii Denise Troll Covey, “Acquiring Copyright Permission to Digitize and Provide Open Access to Books” 19 (2005), available 
at http://www.clir.org/pubs/reports/pub134/pub134col.pdf 
iii John P. Wilkin, “Bibliographic Indeterminacy and the Scale of Problems and Opportunities of “Rights” in Digital 
Collection Building, Ruminations,” Feb. 2011, available at 
http://www.clir.org/pubs/ruminations/01wilkin/wilkin.html/wilkin.pdf.  
iii 
 
would be in legal limbo for a comparatively short time. But as the term of copyright has steadily grown 
longer, the problem has steady grown more severe. Orphans may remain in legal limbo for longer than the 
lifetimes of students, teachers, artists, and scholars who want to make use of them.  
 
This is a problem worth solving. As long as it remains unsolved, a significant fraction of our culture will be 
hidden or suppressed. The problem is not that we can’t put our hands on the works themselves. Most are 
sitting on library shelves, just as, conversely, most works sitting on library shelves may be orphans. The 
problem is that we are not legally allowed to make them more accessible and usable, even when the 
rightsholders would welcome us to do so. 
 
For many orphan works, there would be little to no economic harm to any person or organization in 
opening access; by contrast, there would be a great loss in the failure to provide access. If an orphan work 
is out of print, then we cannot legally reprint it. If it’s in print, we cannot legally translate it, make it into a 
movie, print 3-D models of the characters, adapt it into a Broadway musical, sample its music in a modern 
composition, assign it in an online class, or use it in a host of other ways that we cannot foresee until its 
wider availability frees users to open our eyes to the possibilities.  
 
Solving this problem would serve research, art, culture, and education. It would “promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts”iv — the very purpose of copyright spelled out in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of 
the U.S. Constitution. Solving this problem would serve copyright law itself by advancing its essential 
goals. 
 
However, copyright law is also the obstacle to solving this problem. It’s copyright law that requires us to 
seek permission from rightsholders for uses that exceed fair use. It’s copyright law that has dropped the 
registration requirement which once facilitated the search for rightsholders. It’s copyright law that has 
dramatically extended the duration of rights, and thereby raised the odds that records identifying 
rightsholders will be lost or uncertain before the rights expire.  
 
One solution is to amend copyright law. There have been many legislative approaches in many countries, 
including many in the U.S.  In the U.S. no such amendments have been adopted to date.v 
 
Another solution is to determine that some important uses of orphan works count as fair use, and 
therefore do not need the permission of copyright holders. This path is promising, even if it will only work 
for some uses and not others. Because the fair-use option has already been well studied, we focus here on a 
little-explored third option: Fair use was a judge-made exception to the US copyright statute, now 
enshrined in the statute itself. What are the prospects for other judge-made exceptions that would solve all 
or part of the orphan-works problem?  
 
In April 2015, we issued a request for proposals:  
 
                                                 
iv U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 
v See below, p. 3, “Introduction and Summary” 
iv 
 
from scholars interested in writing a comprehensive literature review on the question whether 
there are lawful or low-risk strategies to digitize orphan works for open access under US copyright 
law, with special attention to methods that do not depend on fair use.... 
 
The literature review will identify legal arguments and strategies for reducing or eliminating legal 
risk from projects to digitize orphan works for OA under US law. It will identify arguments that 
have been used in court, strategies that have been used in practice, and arguments and strategies 
proposed in the literature, giving special attention to those that do not depend on fair use. (The 
project does not assume that fair-use arguments are unpromising, merely that they have already 
been well-studied.) It will review relevant statutes, regulations, case law, and legal literature to 
evaluate the adequacy of those arguments and strategies. The study should also look at legal 
strategies adopted in other countries insofar as they suggest strategies that might work in the US. It 
should identify institutions inside and outside the US that have already digitized orphan works for 
OA, what strategies they used, and what legal consequences they faced for doing so. Whether or 
not the study uncovers no-risk methods to digitize orphan works for OA, it should identify 
methods to reduce legal risk. It should conclude with recommendations on methods or strategies, 
if any, that would be no-risk or low-risk under US law.... 
 
In addition to looking for strategies to reduce the risk of litigation or damages, it should look for 
arguments for judge-made exceptions to the statute, based on the equities and special 
circumstances of orphan works, or based on analogies to other branches of law raising like 
questions. 
 
We also encourage the author to identify promising arguments or strategies that have not already 
been tried or proposed.vi 
 
We awarded the contract to David Hansen, Clinical Assistant Professor and Faculty Research Librarian at 
the University of North Carolina School of Law. Hansen is no stranger to the orphan works problem. He 
was one of primary facilitators for a project to create the Statement of Best Practices in Fair Use of Collections 
Containing Orphan Works for Libraries, Archives, and Other Memory Institutions,vii released in December 2014, 
and a co-author on other scholarly articles such as Solving the Orphan Works Problem for the United States.viii 
 
  
                                                 
vi Harvard University Office for Scholarly Communication, “RFP: Orphan Works Project,” 
https://osc.hul.harvard.edu/programs/orphan-works/request-for-proposal  
vii Aufderheide et al., “Statement of Best Practices in Fair Use of Collections Containing Orphan Works for Libraries, 
Archives, and Other Memory Institutions” (2014), available at 
http://www.cmsimpact.org/sites/default/files/documents/orphanworks-dec14.pdf.  
viii David R. Hansen et al., “Solving The Orphan Works Problem For The United States,” 37 Colum. J.L. & Arts 1 (2013). 
v 
 
To peer-review the report before publication, we recruited a panel of experts with recognized knowledge in 
the field. Their feedback to the author and editors has improved the final edition.  The panelists were: 
 
Prof. Robert Darnton, Harvard University 
Mr. Peter Hirtle, Harvard University 
Prof. John Palfrey, Phillips Academy, Andover 
Prof. Pamela Samuelson, University of California, Berkeley 
Ms. Nancy Simms, University of Minnesota 
 
If we consider this report Phase 1 of our project to unlock orphan works, Phase 2 is to take the results and 
apply them to real-world digitization projects. Some digitization projects are proceeding with open access 
under the protection of fair use. If other projects are hesitating, and looking for stronger or supplementary 
protection, then we encourage them to study the alternative theories documented in this report. Our hope 
is that this work is not merely academic, but will help liberate the orphaned literature, art, and music of 
our culture, chunk by chunk.  
 
For future updates on this project, see the Orphan Works Project home page. 
https://osc.hul.harvard.edu/programs/orphan-works/ 
 
For real-time alerts to news and comment on the topic of open access to orphan works, follow the 
“oa.orphans” tag at the Open Access Tracking Project. (This feed is crowd-sourced, and you can make it 
more complete by taking part in the OATP.) 
http://tagteam.harvard.edu/hubs/oatp/tag/oa.orphans  
 
We thank the Arcadia Fund and Sarah Thomas for her support for this project from the beginning.  We 
also thank the entire staff of the Office for Scholarly Communication for its endless efforts, which 
included reading drafts, building websites, haranguing expert commentators, and posting the work in 
DASH, our open-access repository. 
 
Finally, we thank David Hansen for his enthusiasm for the project, tireless patience with continual edits 
and commentary, and for his masterful writing and research, which no doubt, could change the face of the 
orphan works problem here in the United States.   
 
Kyle K. Courtney and Peter Suber 
Office for Scholarly Communication 
Widener Library 
Harvard University 
Cambridge, Massachusetts  
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In the United States, the vast majority of 20th century creative expression—everything from 
books and movies to letters, emails, and notes—is protected by a copyright system that 
grants owners significant legal power to prevent use of their creations without permission. 
For a large number of works, however, users cannot locate or even identify owners to seek 
permission. These “orphan works” have, for nearly two decades, confounded librarians and 
archivists who want to provide free, online, open access to their collections. Digitizers often 
shy away from orphan works because of the perceived risk of legal action should an owner 
of one of these works later appear and sue. As the Copyright Office has observed, “the risk 
of liability for copyright infringement, however remote, is enough to prompt them not the 
make use of [an orphan] work.”  
No provision of U.S. law speaks directly to orphan works. There are, however, many legal 
defenses and risk management strategies that libraries and archives can use to provide open 
access to orphan works. A handful of those defenses and strategies, such as fair use, are 
currently used in practice. This report shines a light on the large number of other, under-
explored legal defenses and risk management strategies available to libraries and archives. 
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
In September 2015, Judge King of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California 
ruled on one of the most closely-watched copyright cases of the year: Marya v. Warner Chappell Mu-
sic Inc., a case about the ownership of the song “Happy Birthday to You”.1 The tune, one of the 
most popular of all time, was published in 1893 and the lyrics are thought to have been added 
sometime soon thereafter. For years, “Happy Birthday” has been subject to questions about its 
copyright status (shouldn’t something that old be in the public domain by now?) and ownership 
(the creators of the music are undisputed, but questions about the creation and transfer  of rights 
in the lyrics muddy the picture of who currently owns rights).2  
“Happy Birthday” generates over $2 million in royalties every year, has been sung in over 143 mov-
ies, and appears in innumerable advertisements.3 With such commercial value on the line, surely 
someone along the way would have paid enough attention to clearly document its ownership. But, 
when Judge King meticulously reviewed the song’s history in over 40 pages of judicial opinion,4 his 
conclusion was anticlimactic. There were thousands of pages of discovery, over 100 pages of brief-
ing and facts on a motion for summary judgment, and  countless hours of independent academic 
research,5 but the bottom line was uncertainty. Judge King couldn’t say who owned the rights to 
the song or, for that matter, whether the song was still protected at all.6 In other words, “Happy 
Birthday” is, for the time being, an orphan work.  
Judge King’s conclusion in the “Happy Birthday” case is as unsatisfying as it is characteristic of 
what we are able to say about the ownership of many copyrighted works. Users of copyrighted 
works frequently face questions about public domain status, ownership, and the risk of using those 
works in the face of uncertain answers to these questions. For nearly two decades, librarians and 
archivists in particular have struggled with how to make their collections containing orphan works 
(works whose owners cannot be located or identified for permission) available on an open access 
                                                 
1 For an extended account of the song’s history, see Robert Brauneis, Copyright and the World’s Most Popular Song, 
56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 335 (2009), https://perma.cc/F49P-HZBU.  
2 See Marya v. Warner Chappell Music Inc., Case No. 13-CV-04460, Opinion and Order, 131 F. Supp. 3d 975 
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2015), https://perma.cc/H6L3-625E.  
3 See id. 
4 Id. 
5 Brauneis, supra note 1. 
6 Marya, 131 F. Supp. 3d 975.  In February 2016, the parties filed a proposed class action settlement agreement 
stating that the defendant’s would not object to the plaintiff’s request that the court declare “Happy Birthday” to 
be in the public domain. The court has granted preliminary approval to the settlement agreement. Marya, Re-
vised Class Action Settlement Agreement, Dkt #312, at 20 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3,  2016), https://perma.cc/3N83-
W82F;  Marya, Order Granting Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, Dkt #316 (C.D. 
Cal. Mar. 7, 2016), https://perma.cc/ASL5-6JLG.  
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basis, for free online. Most works receive only a fraction of the attention devoted to “Happy Birth-
day,” yet questions about copyright ownership are often just as, if not more, difficult to answer. 
The problem is especially bad for the large number of unpublished works held by archives and in 
special collections. Most of these works are also far less likely to generate a legitimate dispute, 
much less protracted litigation. Yet many libraries and archives treat them as if they might. 
Orphan works make up a large part of library and archive collections—some estimates numbering 
them in the millions for some large archival collections—but only a fraction are currently available 
online. Risk and uncertainty are two of the main reasons why. Librarians, archivists, and others 
want to digitize orphan works and make them available for free online, but often don’t because of 
risks associated with legal action and, specifically, copyright infringement actions. If the 
rightsholder of a work that the digitizer thought was orphaned were to later come forward with a 
copyright infringement claim, the result could be devastating. Just defending against an infringe-
ment claim can be expensive; losing a lawsuit can be ruinous. With statutory damage awards (pre-
set damage awards of up to $150,000 per work infringed),7 large-scale digitization projects using 
thousands of copyrighted works risk exposure to astronomical monetary damage judgments, not to 
mention the significant lost funds spent digitizing and hosting works only to have that infrastruc-
ture dismantled.  
No nonprofit library or archives has ever actually incurred such a large damage award or similar 
negative outcome for the use of orphan works, but uncertainty about the risks continues to cripple 
digitizers who might otherwise make orphan works available. Nearly a decade ago, the U.S. Copy-
right Office articulated the basic problem: for many users, “the risk of liability for copyright in-
fringement, however remote, is enough to prompt them not to make use of [an orphan] work.”8  
This report is about the large number of legal strategies U.S. digitizers can use to manage the copy-
right-related risks of providing open access to orphan works9—that is, global, online access to or-
phan works that is free of charge (“gratis open access”) and with no additional restrictions on use 
imposed beyond those that already exist.10 This report is intended to help digitizers move beyond 
risk “however remote.” It instead gives an understanding of the many available legal and practical 
                                                 
7 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2015), https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6.  
8 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS 36 (2006), https://perma.cc/BM6X-WPD9  (hereinaf-
ter, 2006 ORPHAN WORKS REPORT). 
9 This report uses the term “open access” to mean global online access provided free of charge (“gratis” open ac-
cess) and with or without open licenses permitting forms of reuse beyond those already allowed by the law (“li-
bre” open access, to the extent possible). See PETER SUBER, OPEN ACCESS 1–29 (2012), https://perma.cc/G5AF-
JNND (reviewing several open access definitions and offering his own distillation: “Open access (OA) literature 
is digital, online, free of charge, and free of most copyright and licensing restrictions”).  
10 “Libre open access.” Because orphan works are by definition protected by copyright held by someone who is 
not available to grant permission, orphan works’ digitizers (who do not hold rights and therefore cannot release 
them) are typically unable to further remove permissions barriers.  
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strategies to thoughtfully and carefully manage the risks posed by using orphan works. While fac-
tual uncertainty about these works, as with “Happy Birthday,” may be irresolvable, digitizers need 
not remain so uncertain about the range of legal strategies available.  
There is no provision of U.S. law that directly addresses orphan works. There is, however, a grow-
ing body of research that addresses how existing law can be adapted to apply to orphan works uses.  
Some aspects of existing law, such as applying the doctrine of fair use to orphan works, are well 
studied and are already used by some libraries and archives. Others, such as the application of de-
fenses that are based on principles of equity and fairness, or shields from damages awards, deserve 
more discussion. So far, no one has threaded these existing-law solutions together into a compre-
hensive legal strategy for using orphan works under existing law. This report does that, with a spe-
cial emphasis on those legal doctrines that have so far received minimal attention, focusing first on 
legal defenses—justifications based in the law that allow or excuse a digitizer’s use of orphan 
works—and secondarily on risk management strategies, which include minimizing the likelihood of 
a dispute in the first place and minimizing negative outcomes in the event of a dispute over or-
phan work. The report concludes that there are a number of viable legal tools under existing law 
that can help digitizers significantly reduce and manage risk associated with making these works 
available. 11 
The remainder of this Section gives a summary of the four main parts of this report: (1) strategies 
currently used by libraries and archives, (2) strategies to maximize legal defenses, (3) strategies to 
minimize risk by reducing the likelihood of a dispute in the first place, and (4) strategies to mini-
mize risk by reducing the likelihood of adverse outcomes in the event of a dispute. That summary 
is followed by a short note on the scope and goals of the report.  
SUMMARY— CURRENT PRACTICES  
To get a sense of how legal defenses and risk management strategies might apply in practice, it’s 
helpful to start off with a brief overview of how libraries and archives are currently using orphan 
works. Despite widely shared concerns about risk, libraries and archives have already provided 
open access to many orphan works, and have done so with few negative consequences. As Appen-
dix E at the end of this report highlights, there are lots of examples of digital collections containing 
orphan works. For several, the digitizer has acknowledged that the collections contain orphans, 
and for many, the digitizer has been clear about its reliance on fair use as a justification for its use. 
Almost all of those examples are of orphan works found in digitized special collections, which are 
likely to be unregistered works and therefore pose lower risks.  Even though there are increasing 
numbers of public examples of orphan works in digitized collections, there are no public reports of 
rightsholders coming forward and aggressively challenging these uses. In fact, libraries and archives 
are seldom the subject of any type of copyright-related lawsuit.  
                                                 
11 For a more thorough introduction to the origins of the orphan works problem and attempts to legislatively 
address it, see infra Appendix A.  
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In terms of legal defenses for orphan works, libraries and archives currently rely on the copyright 
doctrine of fair use and related best practices, such as the Statement of Best Practices in Fair Use of 
Collections Containing Orphan Works for Libraries, Archives, and Other Memory Organizations, to help 
apply fair use in practice. Beyond fair use, however, digitizers of orphan works have not publicly 
identified many other legal strategies or defenses that they use in practice. A handful of libraries 
and archives have indicated that they rely in part on the statutory protections provided in Section 
108 of the Copyright Act (limitations on copyright for libraries and archives), but have not ad-
dressed how they use Section 108 for orphan works in any detail.   
In addition to fair use, managing risk is a major component of libraries’ and archives’ current or-
phan works strategies. Two strategies predominate.  The first is to conduct some limited searches 
for rightsholders before making a use, to minimize the possibility that an unknown but concerned 
rigthsholder will later emerge and initiate a dispute. Several digitizers have explained that it is often 
neither practical nor desirable in many cases to separate out orphans from the rest of their collec-
tions for individualized searches for rightsholders. Digitizers do, however, conduct searches for 
owners of individual works in some circumstances, and several libraries and archives have reported 
on their search efforts with varying degrees of success. How and when those searches are conduct-
ed tend to depend on the effort involved, the perceived likelihood of finding an owner, and the 
significance of the work used.  
The second way digitizers manage risk is by implementing takedown policies and statements that 
accompany their collections, often modeled on the familiar notice-and-takedown system that exists 
for service providers in the Copyright Act. Those statements often acknowledge the library or ar-
chives inability to identify all owners of works in a given collection and asking for owners and oth-
ers to share more information. Policies vary in how they are applied. Some organizations have de-
scribed a practice of taking down a work immediately upon request while the ownership claim is 
investigated. Others have taken a more flexible stance, stating that their policies are intended to 
initiate a conversation about the work and the library’s use of it, and that decisions about when to 
take down a work are made on a case-by-case basis. Either way, the existence of a takedown policy 
can be helpful in deescalating disputes and avoiding further risk.  
SUMMARY – LEGAL DEFENSES FOR USE OF ORPHAN WORKS 
Maximizing legal defenses for orphan works uses is a core part of any library’s or archive’s open 
access orphan works strategy. These defenses provide legal justifications for use, and they lower risk 
by underpinning efforts to avoid disputes in the first place, dissuading potential litigants from pur-
suing claims by convincing them that they have no legal basis. In some cases they can also, even 
when not completely successful, help minimize negative outcomes from a dispute. Because of their 
central importance, more has been written about legal defenses for orphan works’ uses than prob-
ably any other aspect of a legal strategy reviewed in this report.  
Fair use is undoubtedly the most important and the most relied upon justification for use of or-
phan works in practice, and has already been addressed in depth in other places. This report fo-
cuses on the other potential defenses that might apply and offers some ideas about which ones 
might be most applicable to open access orphan works uses. This section reviews seven types of 
 LEGAL STRATEGIES FOR DIGITIZING ORPHAN WORKS | 5 
defenses, beginning with those which are most immediately usable in practice, to those that would 
require more significant developments in the law.  
The first two defenses are the most promising: Section 108 library and archives exceptions to copy-
right, and equitable defenses (primarily laches). Neither has been applied directly to orphan works 
uses, but both are firmly established in the law and are immediately usable as orphan works de-
fenses. Section 108, particularly Section 108(e), which allows libraries and archives to create full-
text replacement copies of certain types of works and Section 108(h), which allows libraries to re-
produce and distribute published works in their last 20 years of protection, offer some of the most 
promising but unexplored avenues for libraries and archives to provide open access to orphan 
works.  
Section 108(e), which applies to both published and unpublished works, allows a library to repro-
duce and distribute a single copy of a work “made from the collection of a library or archives 
where the user makes his or her request or from that of another library or archives.” To trigger this 
exception, the library or archives must, among other things, first determine on the basis of a “rea-
sonable investigation” that a copy of the work cannot be obtained at a “fair price.” Neither “rea-
sonable investigation” nor “fair price” are defined in the statute or elsewhere in the law, but in 
several instances these requirements seem easy to satisfy. For example, for works for which the li-
brary or archives is known to hold the only extant copy (e.g., some unique unpublished works, 
such as personal correspondence) the investigation would likely require no additional search be-
cause there is no other copy available to be purchased.  
Section 108(h) is the second provision that can be used to justify orphan works’ uses. Created as a 
way to ameliorate the effect of the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Section 
108(h) provides that “during the last 20 years of any term of copyright of a published work, a li-
brary or archives, including a nonprofit educational institution that functions as such, may repro-
duce, distribute, display, or perform in facsimile or digital form a copy or phonorecord of such 
work, or portions thereof, for purposes of preservation, scholarship, or research.” Two significant 
limitations are that 108(h) only applies to published works, and that it only applies to works in the 
final 20 years of their copyright term. Given these limitations, the most immediate application of 
Section 108(h) is to works published between 1923 and 1941, many of which may be in the public 
domain anyway.  
The most significant potential limitation on both 108(e) and 108(h) is that Section 108(g) general-
ly permits creation of a single copy of a given work, and provides that nothing in Section 108 per-
mits systematic copying. Those provisions make application to online dissemination a challenge 
because the provision of a digital copy may require creation of temporary copies of the work to fa-
cilitate digital transmission. There are a few ways to address this limitation. One is to create the 
initial digital copy pursuant to some other limitation or exception—fair use, or another of the Sec-
tion 108 exceptions.  Second, it’s unclear from the statutory text whether 108(h) is subject either 
in whole or in part to the limitation on systematic copying at all, so 108(h) uses may have more 
flexibility than others.  
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The second of the more promising defenses for open access uses of orphan works is laches—an eq-
uitable doctrine used to limit actions by plaintiffs who have “slept on their rights,” failing to take 
action to enforce their rights to the detriment of the defendant. To assert laches, a defendant must 
show two things: 1) unreasonable delay, and 2) prejudice to itself. Laches is perhaps the most well 
understood of the equitable doctrines discussed in this report because the Supreme Court recently 
addressed how laches applies to copyrights in Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. The Court in that 
case limited the application of laches in copyright cases; it held that laches cannot be invoked to 
bar legal relief. But, the Court also pointed out several ways that laches may still be invoked to cur-
tail relief equitably available, such as the grant of court orders to destroy copies, and that consider-
ations about unreasonable delay should play into how courts assess damages.  
Applying the two elements of laches to an open access orphan work’s use, a key issue is determin-
ing whether there was a delay from when the plaintiff knew or should have known about the use.  
Notifying rightsholders who are identifiable likely requires some form of mass media. Merely pub-
licizing an orphan works project for a period of time may do enough to inform those rightsholders. 
The more public the notice and the longer it is publicized, the better. Other options include send-
ing targeted communications to groups that the digitizer might suspect have contact with 
rightsholders. Another interesting option for informing owners is to file a notice with the Copy-
right Office, which is permitted under Copyright Office rules for some works and has the benefit 
that “recordation of a document in the Copyright Office gives all persons constructive notice of 
the facts stated in the recorded document.” While recordation can pose a logistical and monetary 
hurdle, it may be worth the time and effort depending on the importance of the collection to the 
digitizer. 
Beyond Section 108 defenses and laches, there are three other potential defenses that hold some 
promise but are somewhat underdeveloped: implied license; copyright misuse; and tort-law, “fault-
based” defenses. Those three defenses hold some promise but are based on law that is not as yet 
well developed. Further study and probably some test cases are needed to understand how these 
defenses would apply to broad, open access use of orphan works.  
The remaining defenses discussed in this section of the report, abandonment or “waiver” of rights 
and adverse possession (something akin to squatters rights), pose significant challenges for applica-
tion to orphan works. Both have been discussed at length in orphan works literature, which is why 
they are addressed in this report, but neither seems immediately useful for digitizers.  
SUMMARY – REDUCING RISK BY MINIMIZING THE LIKELIHOOD OF A DISPUTE  
Moving beyond legal defenses and justifications, there are a number of practical steps that libraries 
and archives can take to reduce risk by minimizing the likelihood of a dispute in the first place. 
Two of the most important strategies are ones already used in practice: conducting limited searches 
for rights holders, and implementing a notice-and-takedown policy.  This section reviews four oth-
er strategies to reduce risk. The first two are immediately useable in practice: 1) obtaining permis-
sions through “quitclaim” grants, and 2) obtaining permissions through broader agreements.  The 
other two strategies, (3) pursuing class action claims, and (4) challenging standing of litigants, are 
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more involved and only useful for large, well-financed projects that are willing to take on other 
types of risks.  
Quitclaim grants of rights are among the most promising ideas to reduce risk by obtaining permis-
sions from individuals and publishers associated with a particular work, even if it is impossible to 
confirm that person or organization’s ownership of rights. There are a variety of reasons why own-
ership is sometimes unclear—private contracts, missing assignments, divided ownership—and they 
can all raise orphan works challenges. To address these situations, some digitizers have pursued 
more loose grants of rights in the form of a “quitclaim,” which allows, so far as the grantor is con-
cerned, the grantee organization to provide online access  and make other uses of the work. Such a 
grant does not require the grantor to warrant that it owns any rights, but merely acknowledge that, 
to the extent the grantor does own any rights, they are relinquished for uses specified in the 
agreement. The idea behind this strategy, that it is usually less risky to get permission from some-
one for some uses than to get no permission at all, is based on strengthening a digitizer’s claim to 
challenge ownership of someone who has initiated a dispute, and to bolster equitable defenses and 
fair use defenses by demonstrating a good faith pursuit of permission from the only likely 
rightsholders who were available at the time of use.  
A second strategy to reduce the likelihood of disputes is to pursue permissions on a larger scale. 
For example, one option for broad permissions might follow the pattern set out in the EU-
developed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Key Principles on the Digitization and Making 
Available Out of Commerce Works That document, shepherded by the European Commission and 
the result of an extensive stakeholder dialogue, brought together key parties to develop a frame-
work on developing agreements between rightsholder groups and library and archives digitizers 
who want to provide open access, noncommercial uses of out of commerce works. In the United 
States, digitizers might follow the EU MoU model to collectively develop a broad consensus doc-
ument with major national rightsholder groups. 
Initiating a class action lawsuit for the purposes of obtaining a binding settlement agreement is 
another way to clear rights on a mass scale. Such a strategy is highly aggressive (it certainly isn’t 
minimizing the likelihood of a dispute, but walking into one, albeit on one’s own terms) and cost-
ly. If anything, this is a strategy that is unlikely to be used except by well-resourced digitizers who 
seek broad agreements covering large numbers of works. Only one digitizer, Google, has tried it, 
with mixed results. Because of the significance of that effort, I review that effort in this Report and 
outline some of the substantial challenges to this approach. Overall, this approach is unlikely to be 
useful for most libraries and archives.  
Finally, challenging the standing of disputants to sue can also be a worthwhile strategy to cut off 
their ability to litigate. One of the risks faced by an orphan works digitizer may not come from 
suits by orphan works rightsholders themselves but from other parties who claim to represent the 
interests of orphan works owners. Among other limitations on suit, Section 501(b) of the Copy-
right Act provides that only “the legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright” 
is entitled to bring suit. For open access orphan works projects that may be threatened with litiga-
tion by an association, particularly mass digitization projects, challenging standing may be an effec-
tive way to cut off a potential lawsuit early on, avoiding costly, protracted litigation.  
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SUMMARY – REDUCING RISK BY MINIMIZING NEGATIVE REMEDIES 
Because the risk of infringement liability is one of the driving reasons why some users avoid or-
phan works, minimizing remedies has remained one of the central themes of orphan works pro-
posals, especially legislative proposals. For open access orphan works uses, digitizers can take a va-
riety of steps under existing law to minimize the likelihood of negative remedies, including mini-
mizing exposure to monetary damages, injunctive relief, attorneys’ fees and costs, and criminal 
penalties.  
Monetary damages are the most concerning for digitizers because they include potential statutory 
damage awards of up to $150,000 per work infringed. Several factors can influence whether statu-
tory damages, or any monetary damages at all, are available to potential plaintiffs. One of the most 
significant shields from all monetary relief is sovereign immunity, a doctrine that holds state ac-
tors, such as a state university library, immune from monetary judgments For state institutions, the 
strength of this shield should be acknowledged and accounted for when assessing the risk of digit-
izing orphan works. For other digitizers, shields from statutory damages can come in three ways: (1) 
from using only works that are likely to be unregistered and therefore ineligible for statutory dam-
ages under the Copyright Act; (2) by making uses for which the user “believed and had reasonable 
grounds for believing that his or her use of the copyrighted work was a fair use,” which for non-
profit libraries and archives triggers a requirement that a court not award statutory damages; and  
(3) by making uses that qualify one as an “innocent infringer,” which would most safely include 
making uses of works on which copyright notice was not attached. 
Libraries may also be shielded from strong injunctive relief, such as orders to permanently delete 
or destroy digitized works. Injunctions are within the discretion of the court and are not automat-
ic. The Supreme Court has instructed that a plaintiff must show several factors (including that the 
public interest would not be disserved) before an injunction should be granted. For digitizers, or-
phan works present a special situation under those factors and should be favored against injunc-
tions, especially when orphan works are incorporated into other works used as an integral part of 
some socially valuable work. 
SUMMARY – CONCLUSION AND PRACTICAL APPLICATION 
Each of these strategies considered below can, individually, be valuable for digitizers, and together 
can serve as a powerful set of defenses and risk management devices. To give just one example of a 
project that can combine these strategies, a digitizer could use these defenses for a group of works 
which the digitizer is reasonably confident are orphaned to create a sort of “waiting list” of or-
phans, publicized widely to enhance equitable and fair sue defenses. A cautious digitizer might also 
want to invoke Section 108 protections by first making the work available only on an as-requested 
basis, complying with the “one copy” and “non-systematic reproduction and distribution” re-
quirements of Section 108. Such a project might spend some time trying to obtain quit-claim 
rights where possible, and working with major rightsholder organizations to inform them of the 
scope of such a project and by obtaining agreements from them not to sue. It might also try to re-
duce risk by structuring the project through an organization that has sovereign immunity. It might 
also first focus on works that it believes are unregistered and therefore not subject to statutory 
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damages awards, and on works for which no notice was attached, and therefore potentially subject 
to the innocent infringer defense. This is just one example. Libraries and archives have many legal 
defenses available to defend their use of orphan works and to reduce risk in making them available 
on an open access basis.  
SCOPE OF THIS REPORT 
While there may be no explicit statutory provisions authorizing open access to orphan works, that 
does not mean that there are no legal protections available to a prospective digitizer.  There are 
relevant legal and equitable defenses, based on both statutory and case law, that can justify the dig-
itization of orphan works for open access. There are also other doctrines, currently less developed 
with respect to copyright applications, that may be amenable to judicial adaptation in orphan 
works situations, based on the equities and special circumstances of orphan works. Even for situa-
tions in which those defenses do not apply, it may be possible to lower the level of risk to a level 
that is acceptable to the institution yet still reaches the goal of providing open access to orphan 
works. This report focuses on both parts of this strategy, first to identify applicable defenses and 
justifications, and second to identify other potential risk management strategies. 
Some caveats are in order. First, this report focuses on existing law applicable in the United States, 
not on what amendments to the copyright statute would best solve the orphan works problem. 
The orphan works problem has produced a heated debate about the extent to which new copyright 
legislation should address questions such as how to determine which works are designated as “or-
phans,” who makes that determination, and what types of uses of orphans should be allowed. The 
U.S. Copyright Office has devoted significant time and energy to developing legislative recom-
mendations.12 Congress has now considered legislative proposals on several occasions, and interna-
tionally, a growing number of foreign jurisdictions have adopted orphan works legislation.  
While those legislative efforts are important, there are good reasons to further evaluate what can 
be done now, under existing law, as this report does. For one, it is increasingly unclear whether 
orphan works legislation will ever be enacted. Beyond the general political gridlock in recent years, 
there are no orphan works bills pending, and Congress has not seriously considered one for nearly 
eight years. Further, many key supporters of early orphan works bills have now changed their 
minds. Groups such as the Library Copyright Alliance, representing the American Library Associa-
tion, the Association of Research Librarians, and the Association for College and Research Librar-
ies, now argue that legislation is no longer necessary for their members’ uses because other legal 
developments, primarily in the area of copyright’s fair use doctrine, are sufficient to allow for many 
uses of orphan works. Major research libraries have spoken out against the legislation as well,13 and 
                                                 
12 See U.S. Copyright Office, Orphan Works and Mass Digitization, ORPHAN WORKS, https://perma.cc/UM5Y-
VFCH (last visited May 17, 2016).  
13 See infra Appendix A. 
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even those who in principle believe legislation is necessary oppose the specifics of the Copyright 
Office’s proposal.14 
Even if Congress does coalesce behind legislation, the leading proposal from the Copyright Office 
is unlikely to allow for large-scale open access to orphan works because of the administrative bur-
dens digitizers would face in complying with search requirements and filing a “notice of use” for 
each work. The Office itself concluded that its proposal would be inappropriate for large-scale dig-
itization projects.15 The Office’s alternative proposal for mass digitization—a second piece of legisla-
tion for a large-scale “extended collective licensing” system adapted from systems in place in Nor-
dic countries—has received a similarly chilly reception from potential library and archives users, in 
part because it would only be temporary and because it would only reach a small subset of works 
(only published works).16  
This report does not focus on new legislation. It does, however, examine existing doctrines that 
could modestly and logically be extended by the courts to address orphan works’ uses. Examples 
include extension of the law on implied licenses or application of more general doctrines of equity, 
such as laches or equitable estoppel. These are discussed in detail below.  
Second, this report is focused on legal strategies for open access to orphan works, and not mass 
digitization more generally. Given the number of orphan works, the difficulty of identifying or-
phan works from within collections that are candidates for digitization, and the nature of some 
legislative proposals for addressing mass digitization, the two issues are intertwined.17 In practice, 
many digitizers do not make a distinction between orphans and other works because of how diffi-
cult it is to separate the two, particularly where legal strategies can adequately cover uses of both 
types of works. For example, assessing how fair use applies to collections containing orphan works 
                                                 
14 See id.  
15 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPY-
RIGHTS 60 (2015), https://perma.cc/FW8Q-Y38L (hereinafter 2015 OWMD REPORT) (addressing potential ob-
jection that the “notice of use” provision “may place a significant burden on users in some instances, this is true 
principally with respect to users wishing to use a large number of orphan works related to a single project (e.g., 
the digitization of a library’s entire special collection). In many cases the mass digitization [licensing system pro-
posed by the Office] would obviate the need for individual notices in such circumstances.”).  
16 See, e.g., Society of American Archivists, Comments on Copyright Office’s Mass Digitization Pilot Program 
(Sept 23, 2015), https://perma.cc/X9PY-HXEP; American Association of Law Libraries, RE: Mass Digitization 
Pilot Program; Request for Comments (Sept. 9, 2015), https://perma.cc/UWP4-SZHZ; Boston Library Consor-
tium, Re: Mass Digitization Pilot Program: Request for Comments (Oct. 8, 2015), https://perma.cc/GQ6T-
GYJ9; Stanford University Library, Stanford University Library Comments on Orphan Works & Mass Digitiza-
tion Report (Oct. 9, 2015), https://perma.cc/VTS6-284N; Internet Archive, Re: Docket Number 2015-3, Mass 
Digitization Pilot Program (Oct. 8. 2015), https://perma.cc/8GGM-EBPU. 
17 See JENNIFER URBAN ET AL., REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS CHALLENGES FOR LIBRARIES, ARCHIVES AND OTH-
ER MEMORY INSTITUTIONS 8 (2013) (hereinafter, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS CHALLENGES), 
https://perma.cc/79TK-U4LX . I was a co-author of this report.  
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can reasonably be done in many cases without making sharp distinctions between orphans (how-
ever defined) and other copyrighted works. But, other strategies, such as reliance on some equita-
ble doctrines, are far more applicable to works for which owners cannot be identified or located.  
Third, this report focuses on works that are presumably protected by copyright. Many collections 
hold large numbers of works in the public domain either because of who the author is (e.g., U.S. 
government works),18 its content (e.g., purely factual data are not protected),19 how old it is (e.g., 
works published prior to 1923),20 or whether the rightsholder complied with formalities applicable 
at the time (e.g., renewal registration or inclusion of a copyright notice on the work). This report is 
not about how to make public domain determinations or how to reduce risks associated with those 
determinations. That said, making a public domain determination is not an exact science and can 
be fraught with as much uncertainty as making a decision about using an orphan work; it can be 
complicated and expensive, and often results in inconclusive determinations.21 Many works that 
are actually in the public domain— “Happy Birthday to You,” for example—may be treated as or-
phan works by digitizers because it is impossible to conclusively determine public domain status.  
Fourth, this report focuses on strategies for U.S. digitizers who target access of their collections to 
U.S. audiences. Online uses of copyrighted works often raise questions about cross-border applica-
tion of laws from foreign nations, since works hosted in one nation can be accessed in others.  
While some work has been done on application of cross-border availability of copyrighted works 
and the interaction with the web of foreign law approaches to orphans and to mass digitization 
generally,22 assessing how foreign law will apply is beyond the scope of this report. To a very lim-
ited extent, this report does address some strategies to minimize risk of suit in foreign jurisdictions 
where laws may be less favorable to digitizers than they are in the United States.    
                                                 
18 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2015), https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6 (U.S. Government works not protected in the United 
States). Other examples include edicts of government from local, state, or federal authors. I have briefly ad-
dressed elsewhere how state law may effectively place some state government publications into the public domain 
as well. See Brett Currier, Anne Gilliland & David R. Hansen, Copyright and the Digitization of State Government 
Documents: A Preliminary Analysis, 12 PROC. INT’L CONF. DIGITAL PRESERVATION 59 (2016), 
https://perma.cc/HPX6-95BZ.   
19 17 U.S.C. § 102(b), https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6.  
20 17 U.S.C. §§ 302–305, https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6.  
21 See, e.g., MELISSA LEVINE ET AL. FINDING THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: COPYRIGHT REVIEW MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
TOOLKIT (2016), https://perma.cc/4W47-DFMF; MENESHA A. MANNAPPERUMA, BRIANNA L. SCHOFIELD, AN-
DREA K. YANKOVSKY, LILA BAILEY & JENNIFER M. URBAN, IS IT IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN?: HANDBOOK FOR 
EVALUATING THE COPYRIGHT STATUS OF A WORK CREATED IN THE UNITED STATES BETWEEN JANUARY 1, 
1923 AND DECEMBER 31, 1977 (2014), https://perma.cc/WPQ7-STNN;  
22 See JOHN AXHAM & LUCIE GUIBAULT, CROSS-BORDER EXTENDED COLLECTIVE LICENSING: A SOLUTION TO 
ONLINE DISSEMINATION OF EUROPE’S CULTURAL HERITAGE? (2011), https://perma.cc/YNC7-P4KQ (final re-
port prepared for EuropeanaConnect).  
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Fifth, this report focuses heavily on legal strategies under existing law that are not heavily used in 
practice and that have not yet been thoroughly studied. Section 2 of this report reviews current 
practices for open access to orphan works, and highlights the important role of current uses, the 
application of fair use, and the role of searches for rightsholders. Those strategies are important 
risk management tools, but are already relatively well understood and so they receive less attention 
here.   
Sixth, this report focuses solely on risks stemming from copyright law. Providing open access to 
orphan works raises a host of other negative risks. Orphans, especially in special collections, can 
raise significant privacy and ethical concerns. Rights of publicity, torts for invasion of privacy or 
false light,23 or other less common information access laws can also pose a challenge for digitizing 
organizations. This report does not address those legal risks.  
Finally, this report is just one of the tools that digitizers should use to facilitate broader risk man-
agement.24 The idea that orphan works are a problem is premised on the idea that the copyright-
related risk of using these works is great enough to dissuade at least some productive uses of these 
works. Effective risk management, however, requires more than what this report can provide. The 
purpose of risk management, to protect value by explicitly addressing uncertainty with a systematic, 
structured, and timely analysis, requires an analysis tailored to each organization’s needs. Libraries, 
archives, and other digitizers using this report should undertake such a self-study.   
                                                 
23 See, e.g., Vanginderen v. Cornell Univ., Case No. 08CV736 BTM(JMA), Order Granting Defendant’s Special Mo-
tions to Strike, at 1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2009), https://casetext.com/case/vanginderen-v-cornell-university, aff'd, 
Case No. 09-55053, 357 F. App’x 146 (9th Cir. 2009), https://perma.cc/GS79-33ZB (defamation and false light 
lawsuit against Cornell University for posting to the library digital repository a copy of a 1983 campus newspaper 
containing information about plaintiff’s criminal history. Cornell prevailed in the suit).  
24 Using the term “risk” to mean “the effect of uncertainty on objectives.” ISO 31000:2009 - RISK MANAGEMENT: 
PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES (2009). 
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CURRENT PRACTICES 
To give some context for what is working today and how libraries and archives can adapt current 
practice to use some of the defenses and risk management strategies examined in this document, 
this Section gives a high level overview of the current state of practice for digitizers who are provid-
ing open access to orphan works already. It first summaries current uses and experiences, and then 
addresses the three main strategies that libraries and archives currently employ: reliance on (1) fair 
use and best practices as a defense,  (2) conducting searches for rightsholders, and (3) implement-
ing take-down policies in response to complaints from rightsholders and others.  
This Section is based on the large number of libraries and archives’ public comments made in re-
sponse to the Copyright Office’s 2005 inquiry on orphan works,25 its 2012 inquiry on orphan 
works and mass digitization,26 its 2015 inquiry on uses of visual works,27 and its 2015 inquiry re-
garding the development of a mass digitization extended collective licensing system.28 It also draws 
on published accounts of digitization practices in academic articles,29 issue papers,30 and in inde-
pendent reports.31 In addition, for this report I conducted several in-depth interviews with indi-
viduals from nonprofit libraries, archives, and museums, who have experience with their institu-
tions’ policies and practices regarding orphan works. Those institutions have a range of experience 
                                                 
25 Library of Cong., Copyright Office, Notice of Inquiry: Orphan Works, 70 Fed. Reg. 3739 (Jan. 26, 2005), 
https://perma.cc/2JDK-7265. Initial comments available at https://perma.cc/Q7YZ-34G4 and reply comments 
at https://perma.cc/D3LZ-RWJ7.  
26 Library of Cong., Copyright Office, Notice of Inquiry: Orphan Works & Mass Digitization, 77 Fed. Reg. 
64555 (Oct. 22, 2012), https://perma.cc/6MHS-FZAH. Initial comments available at https://perma.cc/5JAA-
XRTX, reply comments available at https://perma.cc/7CTB-UD76, and additional comments available at 
https://perma.cc/9ZTY-2GUC.  
27 Library of Cong., Copyright Office, Notice of Inquiry: Copyright Protection for Certain Visual Works, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 23054 (Apr. 24, 2015), https://perma.cc/X8VY-ZNF4. Initial comments available at 
https://perma.cc/2Z7A-3JHP and reply comments available at https://perma.cc/8F23-SFGZ.  
28 Library of Cong., Copyright Office, Request for Comments: Mass Digitization Pilot Program, 80 Fed. Reg. 
32614 (June 9, 2015), https://perma.cc/SX7H-XGWZ. Comments available at https://perma.cc/LZC4-A9LV.  
29 See, e.g., Dharma Akmon, Only with Your Permission: How Rights Holders Respond (or Don’t Respond) to Requests to 
Display Archival Materials Online, 10 ARCHIVAL SCI. 45 (2010), https://perma.cc/FB4T-W92A; Maggie Dickson, 
Due Diligence, Futile Effort: Copyright and the Digitization of the Thomas E. Watson Papers, 73 AM. ARCHIVIST 626 
(2010), https://perma.cc/QD2X-F3D8.  
30 See, e.g., Kevin L. Smith, Copyright Risk Management: Principles and Strategies for Large-scale Digitization Projects in 
Special Collections, 279 RES. LIBR. ISSUES 17 (June 2012), https://perma.cc/8LPT-KY3W.  
31 URBAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 11.  
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with orphans, from extensive to minimal. Interviewees are listed in Appendix C.32  
CURRENT USES OF ORPHAN WORKS  
Many digitizers are already thinking carefully about how to manage the risk of using orphan works 
when providing open access online. In 2013, for example, a group of prominent U.S. museums33 
explained that “[n]otwithstanding the lack of orphan works legislation, many museums have come 
to accept a certain degree of legal uncertainty by, for example, posting images of orphan works on 
their websites and using them for other mission-related purposes, if, after searching in good faith, 
no rights holder is found.”34 Several other digitizers have reported similar experiences, offering 
varying levels of detail about their approaches to assessing and managing legal risk and comfort 
with uses under existing law.35  
For example, the Triangle Research Library Network (TRLN), whose members include Duke Uni-
versity Libraries, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Libraries, North Carolina Central 
University Libraries, and North Carolina State University Libraries, has published an “Intellectual 
Property Rights Strategy for Digitization of Modern Manuscript Collections and Archival Record 
Groups,” that addresses managing copyright risks.36 Similarly, the UCLA Library has developed a 
detailed guidance document about how to assess and manage risk in special collection digitization 
projects, including use of orphans.37 UCLA Library also looks to others’ institutional policies that 
                                                 
32  A full list of interviewees and interview questions is included as an appendix to this report. The methodology 
in determining which subjects to cover in this “Current Practices” Section and which were deemed worth further 
examination in the other Sections below was primarily based on what digitizers have conveyed as defenses or risk 
management tools that they have actually relied upon in the past. So, for example, while libraries and archives 
regularly use Section 108 for other purposes and some have even discussed in passing its application to orphan 
works, no library or archive that I have found is currently relying on Section 108 protections to provide open 
access to orphan works.  
33 The Art Institute of Chicago, the J. Paul Getty Trust, the Los Angeles County Museum of Art, the Metropoli-
tan Museum of Art, the Museum of Modern Art & the Solomon Guggenheim Foundation, Orphan Works and 
Mass Digitization Response to Notice of Inquiry (Feb. 4, 2013), https://perma.cc/MCH6-KT2P.  
34 Id.  
35 See, e.g., New York Public Library, Reply Comments to Orphan Works and Mass Digitization: Notice of In-
quiry (Mar. 6, 2013), https://perma.cc/6Y69-SCBU; Duke University Libraries, Comments in Response to the 
Copyright Office’s Notice of Inquiry Concerning Orphan Works and Mass Digitization (Jan. 2013), 
https://perma.cc/WTE4-3TAP; Massachusetts Institute of Technology Libraries, Comments on Federal Register 
Document 2012-25932 (undated), https://perma.cc/4ERN-WP2D.   
36 Triangle Research Libraries Network (TRLN), Intellectual Property Rights Strategy for Digitization of Modern 
Manuscript Collections and Archival Record Groups (June 2011), https://perma.cc/4JC4-WQSH.  
37 Univ. of Cal. L.A. (UCLA) Library, Special Collections Risk Assessment Guidelines (last visited May 18, 
2016), https://perma.cc/3P88-WXYW.    
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address copyright and risk more broadly and also encompass orphan works’ uses.38 Other organiza-
tions take an even more hands-on approach. Greg Cram, Associate Director of Copyright and In-
formation Policy for the New York Public Library, explains that  
Instead of [an overarching written risk management policy], there is an entire unit 
[at NYPL] . . .,  the Copyright and Information Policy Unit . . . devoted to assessing 
copyright liability risk and providing and implementing general guidelines about 
that liability. So, no written policy for assessing copyright liability risk overall, but 
we do have written policies regarding certain classes and certain types of works. 
Digitizers also report a keen awareness of non-legal risks of using orphan works, and especially 
“mission risks” associated with failing to provide open access to their collections.39 Sharon Farb, 
Associate University Librarian for Collection Management and Scholarly Communication, UCLA 
Library, explains in an interview for this report:  
[I]n general our approach is that we look at content for content's sake . . . . So if it's 
about supporting an instructor who's trying to teach with primary sources, our first 
thing is to map to what that person and faculty member, in that case, is trying to 
accomplish. And it’s a really secondary part of our analysis about whether or not 
that thing is under copyright or what other rights issues it might present. So for the 
UCLA library first and foremost, we're about stewarding all the variety of content 
and knowledge sources we have and maximizing our ability to use them in support 
of teaching and research. 
Lending weight to the idea that digitizers are becoming more comfortable with managing these 
risks, examples of open access collections containing orphan works are now plentiful.40 Several dig-
itizers, though not all, have explicitly stated their reliance on fair use as justification for their uses. 
For example, UCLA Library has provided open access to, among others, the Walter Gordon Col-
lection, an AIDS poster collection, and a collection of Los Angeles Latino family photographs, all 
of which are believed by UCLA librarians to contain orphan works and are made available under a 
fair use rationale. Duke University Library has also provided open access to orphan works in a 
number of collections that it states “undoubtedly contain ‘orphan’ works,” and relies in part on 
the strength of its fair use position (along with a broader risk management strategy) to provide 
                                                 
38 Sharon Farb, Associate University Librarian for Collection Management and Scholarly Communication, 
UCLA Library, in an interview for this report pointed to policies from the University of California on copyright, 
ownership, and fair uses; institutional statements on orphan works; and on-the-ground risk management guid-
ance which “in aggregate . . . form the framework of the set of policies and practices that we use at UCLA” for 
orphan works).  
39 See Urban et al., supra note 31, at 7.  
40 The examples discussed in the next several paragraphs are cited fully infra Appendix E.  
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open access to these works.41 The Library of Congress has provided open access to at least sixteen 
collections containing orphan works as part of its American Memory Project. For each of these 
collections, the Library of Congress acknowledges that “[d]espite extensive research, the Library has 
been unable to identify all possible rights holders in the materials in this collection. Thus, some of 
the materials provided here online are made available under an assertion of fair use (17 U.S.C. 
107).”42 Others, such as the New York Public Library, The University of California Santa Cruz Li-
brary, and The University of Southern Mississippi Library have created digital collections with 
clear examples of orphan works.  
These examples undoubtedly make up only a subset of existing digital collections containing or-
phan works. It is beyond the scope of this report to compile a comprehensive list of all existing 
open access orphan works digital collections, but creating such a list is important to better under-
stand how these works are being used and the risks and challenges associated with providing open 
access to them. Further research is needed on this issue.  
Almost all of those examples are of orphan works found in digitized special collections. I could 
find no libraries or other digitizers that have made full-text copies of orphan works in core print 
collections available online on a large scale. The only known project that has studied making those 
types of orphan works available was the University of Michigan-HathiTrust Orphan Works Project, 
which had as its focus digitized books held by HathiTrust,43 and digitized from the core collections 
of academic and research libraries from around the United States. That project had a number of 
features that made it unique. First, it sought to provide far more limited access than what is gener-
ally provided by the examples above. Working through its own internally-developed workflow for 
orphan works identification, the project ultimately posted a list of 90 orphan works titles for which 
the Project proposed to provide full-text access to partner institutions who held print copies of 
those works in their collections.44 The purpose of posting the list was so that the community could 
examine it and identify works that were not orphans (which worked; owners of several works were 
identified). Second, it never actually provided access to any works. Before HathiTrust ever made 
orphan works titles available for full-text viewing, in October 2011, the Authors Guild filed suit 
                                                 
41 Duke University Libraries, supra note 35.  
42 See Brief of Amici Curiae American Library Association, Association Of College And Research Libraries, and 
Association of Research Libraries in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion For Partial Judgment on the Pleadings at 
10, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Hathitrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2012)  (No. 11-cv-6351), 
https://perma.cc/2LA2-53VT (listing examples contained in Appendix). 
43 Univ. of Mich. Library, Orphan Works Project, ORPHAN WORKS, https://perma.cc/XPQ8-UX63 (last visited 
May 19, 2016). 
44 Univ. of Mich. Library, Documentation, ORPHAN WORKS, https://perma.cc/WEJ2-D5PE (last visited May 19, 
2016).  
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against HathiTrust for its orphan works project and for its other mass digitization uses.45 In the 
wake of that lawsuit and discovery of several flaws in the orphan works identification process, Ha-
thiTrust suspended the project. Consequently, both the district and appellate courts concluded 
that infringement claims regarding the orphan works project were not ripe and that the plaintiffs 
had no standing to bring them.46  
Although there are many examples of open access orphan works, there are no reports of major 
challenges to these uses by rightsholders. The sole exception is the HathiTrust litigation, which as 
stated above, is somewhat exceptional. There are few formal studies on the question of how fre-
quently disputes over orphan works arise, and what evidence is available indicates that disputes are 
rare. A 2015 survey by Jennifer Urban and Brianna Schofield, for example, asked large research 
libraries about their experiences with copyright notice and takedown. Though gathering a small 
sample, those who did respond indicated that they receive few copyright-related takedown requests 
for library-digitized materials.47  
As for lawsuits actually filed, libraries and archives are seldom the target of copyright-related legal 
action, much less copyright infringement lawsuits over use of orphan works. That is remarkable 
considering that libraries and archives make use of some of the largest collections of copyrighted 
works in the world. A search of all U.S. federal district court dockets and available state court 
dockets filed in the last five years (a period when libraries and archives have been increasingly mov-
ing collections online)48 reveals 1,153 cases filed involving a defendant with a variation of “library” 
or “archives” in its name.49 Only 13 (around 1%) of those suits were designated as copyright in-
fringement lawsuits. As a point of comparison, for the same time period, there were a total of 
19,222 federal copyright cases filed against all types of defendants.50 For orphan works specifically, 
                                                 
45 Authors Guild, Inc., 902 F. Supp. 2d 445, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), https://casetext.com/case/authors-guild-inc-v-
hathitrust,  aff'd in part, vacated in part, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014), https://casetext.com/case/authors-guild-inc-v-
hathitrust-1. 
46 Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 104 (2d Cir. 2014), https://casetext.com/case/authors-guild-inc-
v-hathitrust-1. 
47 Brianna L. Schofield & Jennifer M. Urban, Takedown and Today's Academic Digital Library (Univ. of Cal. Berke-
ley, Public Law Research Paper No. 2694731, Nov. 2015) (Nov. 2015), https://perma.cc/686D-ETF4. 
48 For example, a 2009-2010 report of 197 research libraries indicated that 97% had completed one or more dig-
itization projects. JACKIE M. DOOLEY AND KATHERINE LUCE, TAKING OUR PULSE: THE OCLC RESEARCH SUR-
VEY OF SPECIAL COLLECTIONS AND ARCHIVES (Oct. 2010), https://perma.cc/4ZMC-SJF6. 
49 Of course, some libraries and archives do not have those terms in their name, and some parties who use those 
terms would not ordinarily be considered a library or archive. Search conducted on Dec. 15, 2015 using Bloom-
bergLaw Litigation & Docket Search. Coverage includes almost all federal cases filed over the five-year time peri-
od and scattered coverage of state court filings. See Bloomberg Law, DOCKETS SEARCH https://perma.cc/WS8R-
FL5T (last visited May 19, 2016).   
50 As of this writing, copyright cases filed December 1, 2010 to December 1, 2015.  
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the number of cases looks to be similarly small. There are only eight judicial opinions that use the 
term “orphan works,” though of course courts may discuss the concept without using that term. 
Only two cases come close to directly addressing questions about use of orphan works, Authors 
Guild v. Google Inc.51 and Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust.52 A search for all filed copyright cases, 
January 1, 2000 to present (including cases with no judicial resolution), reveals only two other cas-
es that include the term “orphan work” in any of the available case filings. Neither suit was about 
the use of orphan works.53  
All of this is not to say that orphan works uses are risk free, but that for uses made so far, which 
again, are primarily uses of special collections materials, digitizers have not reported that 
rightsholders are coming forward and pursuing legal action.  
FAIR USE AND BEST PRACTICES  
Over the last several years, fair use has emerged as one of the leading tools used by nonprofit digi-
tizers to support providing access to orphan works online. No court has directly addressed how fair 
use will apply to orphan works, but a growing number of academics,54 librarian and archivist 
membership associations,55 and libraries and archives themselves, individually56 and collectively57 
                                                 
51 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015), https://casetext.com/case/guild-v-google-inc-1.  
52 Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 104 (2d Cir. 2014), https://casetext.com/case/authors-guild-inc-
v-hathitrust-1.  
53 Of course, cases may address orphan works’ uses without using the term. The two additional cases that do use 
the term are Kressman-Backmeyer Publ’g, LLC v. Woodhams, No. 13-cv-00364 (W.D.N.C. June 13, 2013) and Be-
tween the Lines Prods., L.L.C. v. Lions Gate Entm’t Corp. et al, No. 13-cv-05699 (C.D. Cal. July 8, 2013).  
54 Jennifer Urban, How Fair Use Can Help Solve the Orphan Works Problem, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1379 (2012), 
https://perma.cc/C7KT-GLAK; see also David R. Hansen et al., Solving the Orphan Works Problem for the United 
States, 37 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 1 (2013), https://perma.cc/87DQ-44J2; William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, 
Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of Eldred, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1639, 1639–61 (2004), 
https://perma.cc/WQ34-TRJF.  
55 See, e.g., Library Copyright Alliance, Response of the Library Copyright Alliance to the Copyright Office’s Or-
phan Works Report (June 15, 2015), https://perma.cc/3HV2-B6NL (responding to criticism of the fair use ap-
proach to orphan works). 
56 See e.g., Stanford University Library, Comments on Orphan Works & Mass Digitization Report (Oct. 9, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/GUL4-YJB4 (recognizing importance of fair use rationale for orphan works’ uses but advocat-
ing for a further legislative solution to supplement fair use); New York Public Library, supra note 35. See also 
Smith, supra note 30, at 21 (Fair use “is probably itself the best ‘solution’ to the orphan works problem, at least 
in the context of large-scale digitization of library collections.”). 
57 See, e.g., STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE OF COLLECTIONS CONTAINING ORPHAN WORKS FOR 
LIBRARIES, ARCHIVES, AND OTHER MEMORY INSTITUTIONS 7 (2014), https://perma.cc/JU4L-Q5CB. The Au-
thor of this report contributed to facilitating those discussion group sessions and in drafting this best practices 
document.   
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have written about how fair use can support open access to orphan works. For open access to or-
phans, the fair use defense is among the most frequently cited as being used in practice. It is likely 
to remain a critical part of any strategy to address orphan works, particularly for open access uses 
aimed at promoting research and scholarship.  
Fair use is a flexible limitation on copyright which “permits and requires courts to avoid rigid ap-
plication of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that 
law is designed to foster.”58 It is a complete defense to a claim of infringement; if fair use is found, 
it is, according to the Copyright Act, “not an infringement of copyright.”59 Developed by judges, 
the fair use defense was recognized early on by American courts.60 Like for many judge-made doc-
trines, American courts over time honed their analysis to focus on a set of four key factors, which 
are now codified in the Copyright Act: 1) the purpose and character of the use, 2) the nature of 
the work copied, 3) the amount and substantiality of the work used, and 4) the effect on the mar-
ket for the original. 61 
The first fair use factor, “purpose and character of the use,” is illustrated by the examples that ac-
company it in the statute: criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship or research. 
As the Supreme Court has explained, “The central purpose of [the first factor] investigation is to 
see . . . whether the new work merely ‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation, or instead 
adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new ex-
pression, meaning, or message. It asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new work is 
‘transformative.’”62 The rationale is that “ the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is 
generally furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such works thus lie at the heart of the 
fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright.”63 Thus, courts 
sometimes also consider other things that relate both positively and negatively to copyright’s over-
                                                 
58 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994), https://casetext.com/case/campbell-v-acuff-rose-
music-inc  (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990), https://casetext.com/case/stewart-v-abend).  
59 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2015), https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6. See also Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 801 F 3d 1126, 
1132–33 (9th Cir. 2015), https://casetext.com/case/lenz-v-universal-music-corp-17 (fair use is “distinct from af-
firmative defenses where a use infringes a copyright, but there is no liability due to a valid excuse” such as copy-
right misuse or laches).  
60 Some aspects of the doctrine were imported from early English decisions, mostly addressing “fair abridge-
ment.” See Mat Sag, The Prehistory of Fair Use, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1371 (2011), https://perma.cc/G4BB-W4HM. 
See also Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841), https://perma.cc/FQT7-4LSK. 
6117 U.S.C. § 107, https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6.   
62 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579, https://casetext.com/case/campbell-v-acuff-rose-music-inc.  
63 Id.  
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arching purpose, such as commercialism (a negative)64 or the benefit of the use to the public (a 
positive),65 as relevant under whether the purpose or character of the use is favored.   
The second factor operates on the idea that certain types of works are more amenable to fair uses 
than others because they are closer to the core of the Copyright Act’s purpose, incentivizing the 
creation and distribution of creative works. Thus, courts have assessed under this factor whether a 
work is more factual in nature (weighing more in favor of fair use) or more creative (weighing 
against fair use), or whether the work was published (generally weighing in favor of the use) or 
not.66 Similarly, some courts have also concluded that a work not unavailable on the market or out 
of print67 may also weigh this factor in favor of fair use, a consideration that is important for or-
phan works uses.  
The third factor focuses on the amount and substantiality of the original work copied.68 Though it 
requires assessment of “how much,” this factor requires a qualitative assessment too. Lower courts 
have been chided for applying this factor mechanically (a bright-line rule of “one chapter” or 
“10%” is generally not permissible),69 and in several instances the courts have made clear that cop-
                                                 
64 See id.  
65 See Sundeman v. Seajay Soc'y, Inc., 142 F.3d 194, 203 (4th Cir. 1998), https://casetext.com/case/sundeman-v-
the-seajay-society-inc (Courts may “consider the public benefit resulting from a particular use notwithstanding the 
fact that the alleged infringer may gain commercially.” This public benefit typically involves “the development of 
art, science, and industry.”). See also Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523 (9th Cir. 1992), as 
amended (Jan. 6, 1993), https://casetext.com/case/sega-enterprises-ltd-v-accolade-inc-2. 
66 See, e.g., Campbell , 510 U.S. at 586. See also Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opin-
ions: 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 610–15 (2008), https://perma.cc/V3GS-TVEB. 
67 See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 553 (1985), 
https://casetext.com/case/harper-row-publishers-inc-v-nation-enterprises (“If the work is ‘out of print’ and una-
vailable for purchase through normal channels, the user may have more justification for reproducing it.”); Peter 
Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., 533 F.3d 1287, 1313–14 (11th Cir. 2008), 
https://casetext.com/case/peter-letterese-assoc-v-world-inst-of-scient (“[D]efendants characterize the book as out 
of print, which would tend to favor their claim of fair use”); Triangle Publ’ns, Inc. v. Knight–Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 
626 F.2d 1171, 1176 n.14 (5th Cir. 1980), https://casetext.com/case/triangle-publications-v-knight-ridder (“[I]f 
the copyrighted work is out of print and cannot be purchased, a user may be more likely to prevail on a fair use 
defense.”)  
68 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 565.  
69  Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1272 (11th Cir. 2014), https://casetext.com/case/cambridge-
univ-press-oxford-univ-press-inc-v-patton. 
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ying the entirety of a work is permissible so long as that is the amount necessary to serve the pur-
pose of the use.70  
The fourth factor looks at the effect of the use on the market. This analysis “requires courts to 
consider not only the extent of market harm caused by the particular actions of the alleged infring-
er, but also whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant 
would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market for the original.”71 Courts 
have held that the analysis “requires a balancing of ‘the benefit the public will derive if the use is 
permitted and the personal gain the copyright owner will receive if the use is denied.’ ”72 Thus, for 
example, this factor can also weigh how the proffered market for the work relates to the overall 
purpose of the Copyright Act, to incentivize creation of works.73 Finally, in terms of assessing the 
factors together, the Supreme Court has instructed that  “all are to be explored, and the results 
weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”74   
Fair use analysis is highly dependent on the facts of a particular case,75 but several studies have 
shown that there are discernable patterns in the cases that can help predict outcomes.76 Professor 
Pamela Samuelson, building on earlier empirical studies of fair use cases, conducted her own qual-
itative review of a large number of fair use cases and identified several “policy-relevant clusters” 
that further helps explain the reasoning and outcome of these cases. She concludes that “fair use 
                                                 
70 See Bill Graham Archives, LLC v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 613 (2d Cir. 2006), 
https://casetext.com/case/bill-graham-archives-v-dorling-kindersley; see also Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 
F.3d 87, 96 (2d Cir. 2014), https://casetext.com/case/authors-guild-inc-v-hathitrust-1.  
71 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590.  
72 Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 613 (quoting MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981), 
https://casetext.com/case/mca-inc-v-wilson). See also Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 756 F.3d 73, 
90 (2d Cir. 2014), https://casetext.com/case/swatch-grp-mgmt-servs-ltd-v-bloomberg-lp-4. 
73 See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1994), https://casetext.com/case/fogerty-v-fantasy-inc (quot-
ing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975), https://casetext.com/case/twentieth-
century-music-corp-v-aiken-2).  
74 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 (1994). 
75 Because fair use is a flexible doctrine, developed by courts rather than set out more specifically in statute, it is 
sometimes criticized as being unpredictable. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 187 (2004), 
https://perma.cc/K9SQ-JAXK; Thomas F. Cotter, F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93 IOWA L. 
REV. 1271, 1284 (2008), https://perma.cc/4JRE-Y3PD (“Fair use . . . remains fairly unpredictable and uncertain 
in many settings . . . .”). The Copyright Office has taken this position, stating in its 2015 Orphan Works and 
Mass Digitization Report that “because of its flexibility and fact-specific nature, [fair use is] a less concrete foun-
dation for beneficial use of orphan works than legislation and is always subject to change. . . .” U.S. COPYRIGHT 
OFFICE, supra note 15, at 41–43. 
76 See, e.g., Beebe, supra note 66; Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47 (2012), 
https://perma.cc/QQ3D-FXTK.  
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law is both more coherent and more predictable than many commentators have perceived once 
one recognizes that fair use cases tend to fall into common patterns.”77   
One common pattern—one of the reasons why more digitizers have been willing to adopt fair use 
as a solution for online orphan works uses—is the number of cases over the last decade or so in 
which courts have found in favor of fair use for full-text digitization or reuse of works for uses that 
promote searching for and finding information, especially those uses that provide broad public 
benefits. A central theme of those decisions has been that courts have found that the first fair use 
factor, purpose and character of the use, weighed in favor of the use because it was transformative. 
This list of cases showing this common pattern now spans over a decade and includes cases in mul-
tiple circuits.78  
For libraries and archives seeking to provide open access to orphan works, the case that provides 
the most useful guidance is Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, a suit that figures prominently on that 
list of transformative use cases. Brought by the Authors Guild against the HathiTrust digital library 
and five university libraries that had contributed scans to HathiTrust, the case focused on Ha-
thiTrust’s digital library of several million volumes, comprised of both public domain works and a 
large number of in-copyright books, many digitized by Google. For public domain volumes, Ha-
thiTrust allowed users to search, view and read the whole work. For in-copyright works, however, 
HathiTrust provided only limited uses in three ways. First, the public could search its corpus of 
digitized works, and HathiTrust would return a list of pages of the book on which the search terms 
appeared. Second, HathiTrust allowed for full-text access for certain blind and print-disabled users 
with a documented disability. And third, HathiTrust allowed for creation of replacement copies 
for contributing member libraries that could show that their copies were lost, stolen, or destroyed, 
and for which a replacement copy was not available at a “fair price.” As discussed above, Ha-
thiTrust had also proposed allowing for a fourth use, limited full-text access for certain authenti-
                                                 
77 Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2539, 2541 (2009), https://perma.cc/YQZ8-
MZNB.  
78  See, e.g., Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 216 (2d Cir. 2015), https://casetext.com/case/guild-v-
google-inc-1; Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 97 (2d Cir. 2014), https://casetext.com/case/authors-
guild-inc-v-hathitrust-1 (“[C]reation of a full-text searchable database is a quintessentially transformative use”); 
Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 756 F.3d 73, 85 (2d Cir. 2014), https://casetext.com/case/swatch-
grp-mgmt-servs-ltd-v-bloomberg-lp-4; A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 639 (4th Cir. 2009), 
https://casetext.com/case/av-ex-rel-vanderhye-v-iparadigms-llc; Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 
1165 (9th Cir. 2007), https://casetext.com/case/perfect-10-v-amazoncom; Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 
819 (9th Cir. 2003), https://casetext.com/case/kelly-v-arriba-soft-corp; Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 
124 F. Supp. 3d 325 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2015), https://casetext.com/case/fox-news-network-llc-v-tveyes-inc (cit-
ing Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 43 F.Supp.3d 379 (S.D.N.Y.2014), https://casetext.com/case/fox-
news-network-llc-v-tveyes); White v. W. Pub. Corp., 29 F. Supp. 3d 396, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), 
https://casetext.com/case/edward-l-white-edward-l-white-pc-v-w-publg-corp; Am. Inst. of Physics v. Winstead PC, No. 
3:12-CV-1230-M, 2013 WL 6242843, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 2013), https://casetext.com/case/am-inst-of-
physics-v-winstead-pc..   
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cated users to works identified as orphan works. That project was suspended before the court ruled 
in the lawsuit.   
The Authors Guild contended that all of these uses were infringements, that fair use arguments 
were largely unavailable to HathiTrust because Section 108 (library and archives exceptions to cop-
yright) should apply instead, and that even if fair use was available as a defense, these uses did not 
qualify. At both the trial court and on appeal, the courts roundly rejected the idea that libraries 
and archives must rely solely on Section 108 statutory exceptions to copyright to the exclusion of 
fair use. Pointing out that Section 108 contains an explicit savings clause that states “Nothing in 
this section in any way affects the right of fair use as provided by section 107....,”79 the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals had little to say beyond that and resolved the question in a footnote.  
On fair use, the case focused heavily on the first fair use factor, purpose and character of the use, 
and whether HathiTrust’s search functions were transformative. The district court noted positively 
HathiTrust’s non-profit, educational focus, and observed that “[w]here the purpose of the use is for 
scholarship and research—uses explicitly mentioned in the preamble to Section 107—the Second 
Circuit has concluded that the first factor “tilt[s] in the defendants' favor.”80 It also held that the 
search capabilities—using works verbatim but for an entirely different purpose—was transformative. 
The Second Circuit largely agreed with this analysis, holding that “the creation of a full-text 
searchable database is a quintessentially transformative use.”81 
In contrast, the Second Circuit held that creating full-text copies of works for blind and print-
disabled users was not a transformative use, but was fair use nevertheless. The court reasoned that  
providing expanded access to the print disabled is not ‘transformative.’ . . . [A] 
transformative use adds something new to the copyrighted work and does not 
merely supersede the purposes of the original creation. The Authors state that they 
“write books to be read (or listened to).” By making copyrighted works available in 
formats accessible to the disabled, [HathiTrust} enables a larger audience to read 
those works, but the underlying purpose of the HathiTrust’s use is the same as the 
author’s original purpose.82  
The court nonetheless held that these uses were fair, in part because of the special market situa-
tions that blind users face when trying to purchase accessible copies. The court explained that the 
market for these works was “so insignificant” that authors would regularly forego royalties for 
                                                 
79 HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 94 n.4.  
80 HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).  
81 HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 97.  
82 Id. at 101. 
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books manufactured for the blind.83 The court also relied heavily on the positive benefits—
bolstered by support for such goals from the Americans with Disabilities Act—assessed under the 
first fair use factor, purpose and character of the use. 
For open access to orphans, HathiTrust lends significant weight to a two-pronged argument. The 
first prong is that non-profit open access uses by libraries and archives will generally be favored 
under the first fair use factor, “the purpose and character of the use,” because they have broad 
public benefits,84 promote research and scholarship (uses identified in the fair uses’ statutory pre-
amble),85 and because in many instances they would be transformative as the purpose of the use is 
different from that of the original (e.g., home photographs held in a special collection, which were 
never created to be used in a historical digital collection to highlight a particular time, place, or 
other subject).86 
The second prong of the fair use argument relies on the nature of orphan works themselves, that 
owners cannot be identified or located. Professor Jennifer Urban, who wrote one of the most in-
fluential explanations on how fair use can apply to orphan works, explains that this nature of or-
phan works should weigh positively for analysis under both the second fair use factor (“the nature 
of the copyrighted work”) and the fourth factor (“the effect of the use upon the potential market” 
for the original). For the nature of the work, orphan works’ uses should be viewed positively for 
two reasons, she explains: “[f]irst, the ‘orphan’ aspect of a work's nature strongly suggests that it 
was not sufficiently available on the market to support copyright's dissemination goals. As such, 
considering orphan status under this factor would be analogous to some courts' treatment of works 
whose nature includes being unavailable on the market.”87 So, for example, works created with en-
tirely different purposes and incentives in mind—for example, meeting notes, personal correspond-
ence, emails, home photographs, and various other materials that are commonly found in special 
collections—would weigh even more in favor of use.  
For market harm analysis, orphan works present a unique and compelling case. The distinctive 
feature of orphans—that owners are unidentified or unlocatable—necessarily means that there is 
likely no current market for use of the work. No matter how much the work is worth or how much 
                                                 
83 Id. 
84 Sundeman v. Seajay Soc’y, Inc., 142 F.3d 194, 203 (4th Cir. 1998), https://casetext.com/case/sundeman-v-the-
seajay-society-inc (“Courts should also consider the public benefit . . . [which] typically involves the development 
of art, science, and industry” (citations omitted)). 
85 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2015), https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6 (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes 
such as . . . teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringe-
ment of copyright.”)  
86 Urban, supra note 54, at 1417.  
87 Id. at 1394. 
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the user would be willing to pay for a license, one is not obtainable. The same is true of a future 
market developing at the time of the use by the digitizer.  
For applying fair use, practitioners have looked to best practice guides that help explain communi-
ty norms in applying fair use in specific, common applications.  For open access to orphan works, 
there are two fair use best practice guides that apply. The first is the Association of Research Li-
braries 2012 Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for Academic and Research Libraries.88 It explains a gen-
eral principle that  “[i]t is fair use to create digital versions of a library’s special collections and ar-
chives and to make these versions electronically accessible in appropriate contexts.” The Code then 
gives several limitations and enhancements to that general statement. The most relevant for or-
phan works is that this general principle is enhanced when using works that are not currently 
commercially exploited and whose owners likely could not be located for permission.  
The second guide, the 2014 Statement of Best Practices in Fair Use of Collections Containing Orphan 
Works for Libraries, Archives, and Other Memory Organizations is more specifically designed to address 
open access orphan works’ uses.89 Developed by a group of researchers at American University and 
the University of California Berkley, the Statement is based on input from over 150 librarians and 
archivists from around the United States, and was endorsed upon its release by several of the larg-
est U.S. libraries and archives. It specifically focuses on archival and special collections that contain 
orphan works. For providing access to these collections, the Statement gives a general statement of 
applicability to providing access to collections containing orphan works, followed by several more 
specific practices that apply to the lifecycle of a digital access project, covering acquisition, clear-
ances, selective exclusions from access, curation, conditions on availability, dialogue with the pub-
lic, and providing copies to members of the public.90  Among those principles are several that re-
late to orphan works, such as situations in which searches for rightsholders should be conducted 
(e.g., works created in the last 25 years, or works with apparent commercial value), and in having a 
communication mechanism with the public and potential rightsholders.  
OTHER LEGAL DEFENSES 
Beyond fair use, digitizers of orphan works have not publicly identified many other legal strategies 
or defenses that are currently used in practice. Greg Cram, for the New York Public Library, for 
example, explains that  
The exceptions and limitations that [New York Public Library relies on] the most . . 
. is fair use. And we think that our use of the orphan works in these ways is con-
sistent with fair use.  . . . To some extent we use §108(h) [a statutory limitation that 
                                                 
88 ASSOC. RESEARCH LIBRARIES, CODE OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE FOR ACADEMIC AND RESEARCH LIBRAR-
IES (2012), https://perma.cc/JHX2-DR9Q.  
89 STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE OF COLLECTIONS CONTAINING ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 57.  
90 Id. at 27.  
 LEGAL STRATEGIES FOR DIGITIZING ORPHAN WORKS | 26 
allows for library and archives uses of published works in their last 20 years of copy-
right term] to bolster our arguments. . . . It’s not always clear when we have a pub-
lished work or not, so when we're dealing with older works that are likely within 
the last 20 years of their copyright status, if they were published, then we feel more 
comfortable making those things available through §108(h). But to be honest, 
108(h) is more of a backstop for us. Fair use is our main argument for many of 
these orphans. [In addition], for damages, under §504(c)(2), if libraries have a rea-
sonable belief that their use is a fair use then statutory damages can be taken off the 
table and judges can remit damages down to nothing. In those cases that makes us. 
. .  more comfortable. 
Others report similar reliance on fair use supplemented by Section 108. For example, in another 
interview for this report, Sharon Farb and Heather Briston, of UCLA Library explained a similar 
strategy that focused on fair use while recognizing Section 108’s limited, but potential, application:  
108 is important and in particular I think if it's a textual... A lot of the kind of work 
that we're looking at would fall sadly outside of 108. But I think if you are talking 
about a textual work, we would definitely look at 108 if we can use it. So I think 
108 [statutory library and archives exceptions], 107 [fair use] go together.  
Strategies to minimize damages also play a factor. Peter Hirtle of Cornell Library explained that 
undergirding an assertion of fair use for certain collections  
[there is] an implicit recognition of 17 USC § 412: that unregistered materials are 
not likely to present much of a financial threat to the institution. You could make 
the same argument with published foreign works that are out of commerce.  It is 
unlikely that they have been registered in the US and so would not be eligible for 
statutory damages, but only actual damages.  If the work is out-of-commerce, that 
would be low.”  
Aside from fair use, librarians or archivists have cited application of Section 108, efforts to mini-
mize negative remedies by employing protections against statutory damages in Section 504(c)(2), 
and protection from statutory damages by using unregistered works. They have publicly cited few 
other legal doctrines that they are relying on to make open access uses of orphan works.  
SEARCHES FOR RIGHTSHOLDERS 
Searching for rightsholders has long been an important part of the ongoing discussion about or-
phan works solutions and is a critical part of a risk management strategy. Some treatments of the 
orphan works problem, such as in the EU, address searches for rightsholders as a definitional is-
sue; a work is only considered an orphan under its terms if “none of the rightholders in that work . 
. .  is identified or, even if one or more of them is identified, none is located despite a diligent 
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search for the rightholders.”91 While other approaches to orphan works are more flexible,92 search-
ing for rightsholders has remained a central concept in both legislative proposals and as part of 
solutions proposed under existing law. 
Several digitizers have explained that it is often neither practical nor desirable in many instances to 
separate out orphans from the rest of their collections for individualized searches for rightsholders. 
This is particularly true for digitization of special collections. The University of California Council 
of Librarians, for example, explains that keeping collections together is important in its own right: 
“the ability to digitize entire collections and keep all of the materials of a creator or collector to-
gether both preserves the original material and provides the context necessary for thorough re-
search and complete understanding of the collection’s subject.”93 The Council goes on to explain 
that singling out individual works for investigation is also typically not practical.  
A diligent item-by-item search is not a practical solution . . . Even in those instances 
where an author and publisher are clearly indicated, determining the copyright sta-
tus and the identity of the copyright holder can pose difficulties . . . . Imagine, 
therefore, how much more difficult a search can be when there is no identifying in-
formation at all.94  
Digitizers do, however, conduct searches for owners of individual works in some circumstances. 
Several have reported on their search efforts, which have achieved varying degrees of success. Most, 
again, have focused on special collections. The criteria for when to conduct a search and how ex-
tensive that search should be is not well defined, but may be driven by factors such as the type of 
work (e.g., some works, such as unmarked photographs, are more difficult than others), an infor-
mal assessment of risk, how the work will be used, and how defenses, particularly fair use, would 
                                                 
91 Directive 2012/28/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of October 25, 2012, on Certain Per-
mitted Uses of Orphan Works, art. 2, 2012 O.J. (L 299) 5, 9, https://perma.cc/3C5G-PNYU.  
92 For example, the Copyright Office defines an “orphan work” to mean “any original work of authorship for 
which a good faith prospective user cannot readily identify and/or locate the copyright owner.” U.S. COPYRIGHT 
OFFICE, supra note 15, at 9.  
93 The Council of University Librarians at the University of California, Statement Concerning Orphan Works 
Notice of Inquiry (Feb. 2013), https://perma.cc/9WPF-CY55.  
94 Id. See also STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE OF COLLECTIONS CONTAINING ORPHAN WORKS, 
supra note 57, at 10 (“discussions began with a focus on orphan works as such, deliberative groups quickly made 
clear that the nature of most digitization projects—especially those on a larger scale—meant that librarians and 
archivists had little practical way of addressing individual orphan works separately from the collections of which 
they are a part. As a result, the conversation in most deliberative group sessions soon shifted to how fair use sup-
ports the digitization of collections that are believed to contain orphan works.”).  
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be affected.95 For example, Polina Ilieva, Archivist for the University of California San Francisco 
Library, explains her organization’s general practice that  
If it’s a well-known person we usually write to estate or the person and check the 
status of the copyright and make sure that we will be able to provide some access 
online to a letter. . . . If that's like a manuscript by someone else. . . we usually will 
check for the copyright status. And in most of the cases we have been successful be-
cause we did receive responses from the estates.  But we didn't send that many let-
ters. 
Greg Cram, New York Public Library, explains similarly that “if we've got a collection of let's say 
12,000 photos that likely have a single rightsholder, we're probably going to put a good amount of 
time into that because divided over 12,000 photos, the cost is actually pretty light for us. But if 
we're only looking at a single photo where we want to use a photo in an exhibition book, for ex-
ample . . . We may tell the curator or the person who's in charge that we think that it's going to 
require more time and see if they're willing to find something else.”  
Some organizations have reported assessing larger numbers of potential orphan works in their col-
lections. For example, Mikka Gee Conway, Assistant General Counsel for the J. Paul Getty Trust, 
reports that as of late October 2015, for the 99,415 works cataloged in the J. Paul Getty Museum 
collection, the museum has worked to identify 1,701 as orphans. For 1,698 of those works, the 
orphan work determination was made because a rightsholder was not identifiable. In only three 
cases were works deemed to be orphaned because rightsholders could not be located.  
In other countries, orphan works users are more regularly reporting on searches for rightsholders. 
The European Union, for example, has created an EU-wide Orphan Works Directive that allows 
certain cultural heritage institutions to make certain uses of orphan works after those users con-
duct a ‘diligent search” and record their efforts in a centralized orphan works database.96 Since 
that Directive entered into force in 2012, however, users to date have identified and recorded only 
1,724 works as orphans in that registry from searches conducted across the EU.97  
                                                 
95 For some helpful ideas on how to think about when and how to conduct a search, see Victoria Stobo with Ro-
nan Deazley & Ian G. Anderson, Copyright & Risk: Scoping the Wellcome Digital Library Project (Centre for Copy-
right and New Business Models in the Creative Economy (CREATe), Working Paper No. 10, 2013), 
https://perma.cc/Z7XL-89XM (UK).  
96 Directive 2012/28/EU, supra note 91. 
97 Orphan Works Database, EUROPEAN UNION INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, 
https://oami.europa.eu/orphanworks/#search/basic/all  (last visited May 19, 2016).  
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For conducting searches, digitizers can now look to a variety of tools to help guide their efforts.98 
In the United States, the Society of American Archivists has published its Orphan Works: Statement 
of Best Practices, which gives guidance both on how to assess what effort to expend on a search and  
where to search for identifying and then locating rightsholders.99 In the European Union, the Or-
phan Works Directive gives specific instructions on minimum information users must gather and 
use in searching for owners of four content types: published books, newspapers and periodicals, 
visual works, and audiovisual works.100  
EU members have now implemented the Orphan Works directive in their national legislation,101 
and most have made only a handful of changes to the search requirements. Italy, for example, 
adopted the Directive’s search guidance but also requires searchers to consult with the Registro 
Pubblico Generale delle Opere protette (public register of works) established at the Italian Ministry 
for Cultural Activities and to publicly post the list of proposed orphans for 90 days before they can 
be used.102  Other nations have merely added country-specific databases, such as the German Film 
Institute holdings for audiovisual works in Germany.103 The United Kingdom has produced what 
is probably the most thorough set of search guidelines, offering a 44 page guide to searching for 
owners of film and sound,104 a 50 page guide to searching for owners of literary works,105 and a 46 
                                                 
98 A handful of library and information science articles address how to conduct searches. See, e.g., Carol Ebbing-
house, Due Diligence in Searching for Orphan Work Creators, SEARCHER: THE MAG. FOR DATABASE PROFS., May 
2012, at 42; Drew Smith, Finding Parents for Orphan Works: Using Genealogical Methods to Locate Heirs for Obtaining 
Copyright Permissions, 41 J. ACAD. LIBRARIANSHIP 280 (2015).  
99 SOCIETY OF AM. ARCHIVISTS, ORPHAN WORKS: STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES 2 (2009), 
https://perma.cc/RWH7-2HE2.  
100Directive 2012/28/EU, supra note 91, at Appendix A.  
101 EU Orphan Works Directive Implementation, MANAGING ALTERNATIVES FOR PRIVACY, PROPERTY AND IN-
TERNET GOVERNANCE POLICY OBSERVATORY, https://perma.cc/LN9A-ALGW (last visited May 19, 2016).  
102 See Decreto Legislativo 10 novembre 2014, n.163, G.U. Nov. 11, 2014, n.261,  https://perma.cc/STU3-E2Y9 
(It.).  
103 See Gesetz zur Nutzung verwaister und vergriffener Werke und einer weiteren Änderung des Urheber-
rechtsgesetzes, Oct. 8, 2013, BGBL I at 
3728,http://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?startbk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&jumpTo=bgbl113s3728.pdf 
(Ger.). 
104 INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, ORPHAN WORKS DILIGENT SEARCH GUIDANCE: FILM AND SOUND, (Nov. 17, 
2015),  https://perma.cc/8UV4-BJ4U (UK).  
105INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, ORPHAN WORKS DILIGENT SEARCH GUIDANCE: LITERARY WORKS (Nov. 17, 
2015),  https://perma.cc/L2B6-7BPX (UK). 
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page guide to searching for owners of still visual art.106  Each document is updated annually and is 
accompanied by a short checklist for users.107  
Those EU search guidelines have been subject to criticism—one recent three-year study concluded 
that the search requirements as implemented in the UK, the Netherlands, and Italy “pose [a] sig-
nificant burden to would-be users of orphan works.”108 Nevertheless, digitizers may find these for-
eign guides to diligent search useful both for finding owners of works published abroad or created 
by foreign authors, and for use as a framework to adapt for a search process for U.S. works.  To the 
extent that they are too onerous for application to every work, these guides can be augmented by 
looking to guides such as the SAA Orphan Works Best Practices and other documents that relate 
searches for rightsholders to specific defenses, such as fair use best practices discussed below, that 
help explain in what circumstances searches are most necessary and expenditure of effort is appro-
priate.  
TAKEDOWN POLICIES 
A second practical strategy currently used by libraries and archives to reduce risk is to implement a 
responsive notice-and-takedown mechanism that allows purported rightsholders to make claims 
known and to initiate a conversation with the digitizer about permissions and licensing for the 
works in their collections. For example, the TRLN document cited above109 explains that  
The TRLN member libraries will respond to all complaints arising from the digiti-
zation and online presentation of the manuscript collections/archival record 
groups. Each library’s website will include a statement about intellectual property 
along with contact information. Each library will review complaints for materials 
on its site, and, if warranted, will remove the digital objects associated with the 
complaints. 
Take-down policies of this sort can vary in terms of how they are applied, depending on 
how responsive the organization wants to be to complaints. Some, like the TRLN model, 
allow for more discretion as to whether an item will be removed upon complaint. Another, 
                                                 
106 INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, ORPHAN WORKS DILIGENT SEARCH GUIDANCE: STILL VISUAL ART (Nov. 17, 
2015), https://perma.cc/2R8Z-H9HX (UK).  
107 INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, supra note 104; INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, supra note 105; INTELLECTUAL 
PROP. OFFICE, supra note 106.  
108 Press Release, Enhancing Access to 20th Century Cultural Heritage through Distributed Orphan Works 
Clearance (EnDOW), Research Backs up the Overly Burdensome Nature of the “Diligent Search” Requirement 
for Cultural Insts. Willing to Make Use of Orphan Works (Feb. 5, 2016), https://perma.cc/C7MH-QXP2 (EU); 
see also  ENDOW, REPORT: REQUIREMENTS FOR DILIGENT SEARCH IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE NETHER-
LANDS, AND ITALY (2016), https://perma.cc/3KTD-B5ZX.  
109 TRLN, supra note 36. 
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from the Wellcome Trust Digital Library Project (subject to UK law), for example, takes the 
approach that the “policy is designed to be quick response: the material is removed imme-
diately on receipt of a takedown request, and a review panel assesses the requests on a case 
by case basis, returning a decision within four weeks.”110  
It’s also worthwhile to recognize that these policies, modeled loosely on the system that ex-
ists within the Copyright Act to provide safe harbors for internet service providers, do not 
provide any special legal protection.111 There is neither a guarantee that a rightsholder 
whose material was removed pursuant to one of these polices would not sue, nor any legal 
obstacle imposed by a take-down policy to doing so. However, the loose modeling on the 
Copyright Act take-down model tends to show good faith and gives both rightsholders and 
libraries and archives a familiar model from which to operate to address complaints before 
they escalate into a more serious dispute.112  
  
                                                 
110 Stobo with Deazley & Anderson, supra note 95, at 40. 
111 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2015), https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6. 
112 Schofield & Urban, supra note 47.  
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LEGAL DEFENSES FOR USE OF ORPHAN WORKS 
Maximizing legal defenses is a core part of any strategy for reducing the legal risk associated with 
using orphan works for open access. These defenses underpin efforts to avoid disputes in the first 
place, dissuading potential litigants from pursuing claims by convincing them that such claims 
have no legal basis. In some cases they can also, even if unsuccessful, help minimize negative out-
comes from a dispute.113  Because of its central importance, more has been written about legal de-
fenses for orphan works uses than about probably any other aspect of a legal strategy reviewed in 
this report. Much of the literature on legal defenses focuses on proposals for new legislation, but 
some also touches on solutions under existing law to justify certain uses of orphan works.  
The strength and certainty of these defenses under existing law varies widely. Some, such as fair 
use, are based on a well-developed body of case law and are already used in practice. Others, such 
as the statutory uses permitted by the Copyright Act’s library and archives exceptions under Sec-
tion 108, offer specific guidelines but remain seldom used and applicable in only a narrow set of 
circumstances. Other justifications, such as laches and adverse possession, are regularly applied in 
other areas of the law but have a limited history of uses with copyrighted works, and have never 
been applied to orphan works uses specifically.  
Of the defenses available for open access to orphan works, fair use is undoubtedly the most im-
portant in current practice. As explained in the section on Current Practices, because of its flexibil-
ity, for many open access uses of orphan works, applying fair use is and will likely remain a major 
part of practice. This is especially true for digitized special collections containing orphan works, 
though the doctrine has application to other types of orphan works too, including application as a 
defense for use of orphan works that are part of core library print collections.   
This section reviews other potential defenses and offers some ideas about which ones might be 
most applicable to open access orphan works uses. This section reviews seven types of defenses, 
roughly in order of which are most immediately viable as defenses for library and archive digitizers. 
The first two, (1) Section 108 library and archives exceptions and (2) equitable defenses, primarily 
laches, are well-studied and based on an established body of law. Neither has been applied directly 
to orphan works uses, but their application is clear. Three others, (3) implied license; (4) copyright 
misuse; and (5) tort-law derived defenses; are promising potential defenses that deserve further 
study. For all three, the law is insufficiently developed to make a good assessment of how these de-
fenses would apply to broad, open access use of orphan works. The remaining defenses discussed 
                                                 
113 The strength of legal justifications may also be important from an institutional, cultural or moral perspective. 
As Peter Hirtle, Senior Policy Advisor for Cornell University Library, explains: “[I]t seems to me that there is a 
huge world of difference between saying “This is not an infringement because of X” and saying “This is an in-
fringement, but the likelihood that we will be sued or face serious damages is low.”  Cornell has a policy that it 
will not engage copyright infringement.  The policy does not say that ‘We will not engage in copyright infringe-
ment only when the risk of damages is high.’ ” 
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here, (6) abandonment or waiver; and (7) adverse possession; are more challenging to apply to or-
phan works uses. Both have been discussed at length in orphan works literature, which is why they 
are addressed here, but neither is immediately useful for digitizers.  
Of these categories of defenses, Section 108 defenses and the equitable defense of laches are the 
most promising, though both are subject to some limitations. Section 108, for example, is limited 
because its relevant exceptions cannot be used for systematic copying; its provisions only allow for 
production of “a copy” of a work in most cases. That means that digital reproduction and distribu-
tion systems that depend on making multiple copies must rely on other defenses for creation of 
those additional copies.  
I conclude that adverse possession and abandonment, though frequently mentioned and an ap-
pealing analogy, are unlikely to be viable defenses for most uses under current law. Finally, the 
doctrine of copyright misuse presents some interesting options for digitizers, but the state of the 
law is still developing and it is uncertain how misuse would apply to orphan works. 
SECTION 108 LIBRARY AND ARCHIVE EXCEPTIONS 
Section 108 of the U.S. Copyright Act—“Limitations on exclusive rights: Reproduction by libraries 
and archives”—allows qualifying libraries and archives to make limited uses of copyrighted works.114 
Section 108 is the workhorse for many common library and archives’ uses of copyrighted works, 
including the creation of analog replacement copies and creation and distribution of copies for 
interlibrary loan and document delivery.115 Section 108 uses to date have been relatively “safe”; 
there are no instances of a non-profit library asserting Section 108 in court and losing. There are 
only a handful of Section 108 cases citing to Section 108 at all.116 Librarians and archivists have 
long lamented, however, that Section 108 is inadequate to allow for modern digital uses.117 While 
Section 108 has been studied, at the request of the Register of Copyrights, for changes to bring it 
up to date,118 no legislative changes have been made or formally proposed by the Copyright Of-
fice.119 Perhaps because of its perceived limited application to digital uses, few have singled out 
                                                 
114 17 U.S.C. § 108, https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6.  
115 See David R. Hansen, Copyright Reform Principles for Libraries, Archives, and Other Memory Institutions, 29 BERKE-
LEY TECH. L.J. 1559, 1579 (2014), https://perma.cc/59KM-Z87N.  
116 See id. at 1572–73.  
117 See e.g., Laura N. Gasaway, Amending the Copyright Act for Libraries & Society, 70 ALBANY L. REV. 1331, 1339–42 
(2007), https://perma.cc/QPE4-KPSC; Peter Hirtle, Digital Access to Archival Works: Could 108(b) Be the Solution?, 
COPYRIGHT & FAIR USE, STANFORD UNIV. LIBRARIES (Sept. 24, 2006), https://perma.cc/9R8F-E8M8; Issue 
Brief: Archivists and Section 108 of the Copyright Act, SOC’Y OF AM. ARCHIVISTS (May 2014), 
https://perma.cc/E9HL-AE3W.  
118 The Section 108 Study Group, LIBRARY OF CONG., https://perma.cc/9ZRF-WVYP (last visited June 6, 2016).   
119 SECTION 108 STUDY GROUP REPORT 25 (2008), https://perma.cc/63GM-SFG6 (concluding that orphan 
works should not be addressed by the Study Group).  
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Section 108’s existing provisions as being particularly helpful for providing open access to orphan 
works or mass digitization more generally.120 Some provisions of Section 108 are worth discussing 
as tools that can be used by digitizers of orphan works. As discussed above, a few libraries have 
pointed to Section 108 as being of some limited use for orphan works, but no one has explained 
in any detail how they would plan to use it in practice. 
OVERVIEW OF SECTION 108 
Like fair use, Section 108 is a complete defense to copyright infringement. Uses under its provi-
sions are “not an infringement of copyright,” and the Section operates alongside other limitations 
and exceptions, such as fair use.121 Section 108 allows for library and archives’ copying in five situ-
ations: 
1) Section 108(b) allows for making and distributing full-text preservation copies of un-
published works;  
2) Section 108(c) allows for making full-text replacement copies of published works that are 
lost, stolen, damaged, deteriorating, or in obsolete formats;  
3) Section 108(d) allows for making and distributing copies of excerpts of works (for exam-
ple, an article or other small part of a copyrighted work) for distribution to patrons;   
4) Section 108(e) allows for reproduction and distribution of the full-text of works for dis-
tribution to patrons; and  
5) Section 108(h) allows for full-text reproduction and distribution of published works in 
the final 20 years of their copyright term.  
All of these provisions are subject to several important limitations. For one, not all digitizers will 
qualify to use Section 108. Section 108(a) limits its application to only “library or archives,” and 
only if 1) the copying and distribution is done “without any purpose of direct or indirect commer-
cial advantage”122 and 2) if the collections of the institution are open to the public or at least avail-
                                                 
120 See James Aaron, The Authors Guild v. Hathitrust: A Way Forward for Digital Access to Neglected Works in Libraries, 
16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1317, 1329 (2012), https://perma.cc/5F45-WMQ7 (“In short, the section 108 de-
fenses likely provide no relief.”); Peter B. Hirtle, Undue Diligence?, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 55, 56 (2010), 
https://perma.cc/KVB4-NPJE (“Current § 108, however, does not allow archivists to use the modern day micro-
film equivalent--digital technologies--to provide distributed access to archival repositories.”); Pamela Samuelson, 
Legislative Alternatives to the Google Book Settlement, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 697, 715 (2011), 
https://perma.cc/TV5F-EB2B (suggesting Congress should broaden Section 108 to allow for more mass preser-
vation).  
121 17 U.S.C. § 108(f)(4) (2015), https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6 (“Nothing in this section . . . in any way affects 
the right of fair use as provided by section 107, or any contractual obligations assumed at any time by the library 
or archives when it obtained a copy or phonorecord of a work in its collections.”); see also Authors Guild, Inc. v. 
HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 94 n.4 (2d Cir. 2014), https://casetext.com/case/authors-guild-inc-v-hathitrust-1.  
122 17 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1). 
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able to researchers in a specialized field.123 These terms would seem to disqualify commercial digi-
tizers.124 Some have also suggested that these terms might prevent online-only libraries and archives 
from using Section 108.125 Museums and other types of cultural heritage institutions are not ex-
plicitly mentioned and so may also fall outside of the ambit of Section 108.126  
The second major limitation is that uses under Section 108 “extend to isolated and unrelated re-
production or distribution of a single copy of the same material.” 127 Section 108 does not allow for 
“related or concerted reproduction or distribution of multiple copies of the same material . . . .”128  
The third limitation is that Section 108 generally limits distribution of full-text copies of works. 
Section 108(d) allows for distribution of interlibrary loan copies, but limits those copies to only 
small or partial copies—one article, a selection from a contribution, or a small part of any other 
type of work.129 Subsections (b) (preservation of unpublished works) and (c) (preservation of pub-
lished works) permit full-text copying, but only subsection (b) allows for distribution to the public. 
Even then, distribution of preservation copies in digital formats is explicitly restricted. The statute 
provides that “[a]ny such [preservation] copy or phonorecord that is reproduced in digital format is 
not otherwise distributed in that format and is not made available to the public in that format out-
side the premises of the library or archives.”130 Only Subsections (e) (full-text copies for patrons) 
and (h) (works in their last 20 year of term) permit full text reproduction and distribution, and 
those provisions are subject to special requirements discussed below.  
                                                 
123 17 U.S.C. § 108(a)(2) (i) & (ii).  
124 See New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 503 (2001), https://casetext.com/case/new-york-times-co-v-
tasini (“The Publishers have frequently referred to their products [compiled as a LEXIS/NEXIS database] as 
‘electronic libraries.’ We need not decide whether the Databases come within the legal coverage of the term “li-
braries” as used in the Copyright Act. For even if the Databases are ‘libraries,’ the Copyright Act's special author-
izations for libraries do not cover the Databases' reproductions. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1) (reproduction au-
thorized ‘without any purpose of direct or indirect commercial advantage.’ ”).  
125 A 2001 U.S. Copyright Office Report cast doubt on whether Section 108 would allow for provision of digital 
copies to patrons, and an earlier Senate Committee Report (on Section 108 revisions contained in the DMCA) 
suggested that Section 108 would not apply to “online digital ‘libraries’ and ‘archives’ that exist only in the virtu-
al (rather than the physical) sense.” S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 62 (1997), https://perma.cc/M2SL-FXJ5. I have ar-
gued elsewhere that neither assertion has much basis in the text of the statute. See Hansen, supra note 115, at 
1581–82.  
126 See SECTION 108 STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 119, at 31.  
127 17 U.S.C. § 108(g).  
128 Id.  
129 17 U.S.C. § 108(d).  
130 17 U.S.C. § 108(b)(2). See also 17 U.S.C. § 108 (c)(2).  
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Finally, the fourth limitation is that provisions for copies made for patrons, under Subsections (d) 
and (e), only apply to a subset of copyrighted works: “The rights of reproduction and distribution 
under this section do not apply to a musical work, a pictorial, graphic or sculptural work, or a mo-
tion picture or other audiovisual work other than an audiovisual work dealing with news . . . “131 
except for pictorial or graphic works that are included as illustrations in other works that are cov-
ered, such as books or articles.  
SECTION 108(E) AS APPLIED TO ORPHAN WORKS 
Despite its narrow focus, Section 108 retains some potential for open access to orphan works. Be-
cause open access generally requires full-text reproduction and distribution of works online, two 
provisions stand out: Section 108(e) (provision of full-text copies for patrons) and Section 108(h) 
(works in their last term). Both of these provisions allow for both reproduction and distribution of 
full-text copies online, and both have special rules that are uniquely suited to orphan works appli-
cations.  
Section 108 (e) provides that “[t]he rights of reproduction and distribution under this section ap-
ply to the entire work . . . made from the collection of a library or archives where the user makes 
his or her request or from that of another library or archives,” subject to meeting these three con-
ditions:  
(1) “if the library or archives has first determined, on the basis of a reasonable in-
vestigation, that a copy . . . of the copyrighted work cannot be obtained at a fair 
price;” 
(2) “the copy . . . becomes the property of the user, and the library or archives has 
had no notice that the copy . . . would be used for any purpose other than private 
study, scholarship, or research;” and  
(3) “the library or archives displays prominently, at the place where orders are ac-
cepted, and includes on its order form, a warning of copyright.” 132 
In addition to these three restrictions are the two more general limitations noted above, that  Sec-
tion 108 in general does not apply to systematic reproduction and distribution of works; and that 
this section generally does not apply to uses of a “musical work, a pictorial, graphic or sculptural 
work, or a motion picture or other audiovisual work other than an audiovisual work dealing with 
news. . .”133 
                                                 
131 17 U.S.C. § 108(i).  
132 Id.  
133 17 U.S.C. § 108(g).  
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There is little guidance on applying Section 108 to orphan works’ uses.134 Many of the challenges 
are definitional, however, and some reasonable interpretation is possible.  For open access to or-
phan works, the “reasonable investigation” required under 108(e) to determine that a copy could 
not be obtained at a “fair price” poses a challenge for potential users. Neither of those terms are 
further defined in the statute nor have they been interpreted by any court. The legislative history 
provides only scant guidance, though it does give some clues about what might satisfy the “reason-
able investigation” requirement. The House Committee Report that accompanied passage of the 
1976 Copyright Act gives some explanation for searches under 108(e), explaining that “[t]he scope 
and nature of a reasonable investigation to determine that an unused copy cannot be obtained will 
vary according to the circumstances of a particular situation. It will always require recourse to 
commonly-known trade sources in the United States, and in the normal situation also to the pub-
lisher or other copyright owner (if the owner can be located at the address listed in the copyright 
registration), or an authorized reproducing service.”135   
One idea would be to consider adapting some of the standards outlined in the Section on “Cur-
rent Practices” for diligent search guidelines. Those guidelines are geared toward identifying own-
ers, while Section 108(e) requires investigation into whether a copy is available at a fair price. In 
some cases, this would mean that the 108(e) search could be less extensive than a search for the 
owner. For example, for works for which the library or archive is known to hold the only extant 
copy (e.g., some unpublished works, such as personal correspondence) the investigation would 
likely require no additional search.   
For published works, such as monographs, the search may require more work. There is some con-
flicting guidance about whether 108(e) requires a search for a new copy or merely any copy, new or 
used. The text of the statute simply says “copy,” but the Senate Report, printed with the Act and 
quoted above, contemplates searches for an “unused” copy. Assuming a conservative approach of 
searching for a copy new or used could mean searching normal commercial channels (e.g., Ama-
zon, AbeBooks, addall.com, or ViaLibri) for both new and used copies.  
The further requirement, that a copy is not available at a “fair price,” also requires some work to 
understand how to apply it. Legislative history gives no real guidance as to what this means. Other 
areas of the law—such as the Uniform Commercial Code—are, however, regularly used to resolve 
questions about transactions with unstated prices, typically with reference to market rates.136 
Commentators tend to agree, stating that market rates—determined, perhaps, by the retail value of 
                                                 
134 None of the literature discussing Section 108 application to orphan works has offered ideas about implemen-
tation.  See, e.g., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 8, at 45-46; Christina M. Costanzo, Have Orphan Works 
Found A Home in Class Action Settlements?, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 569, 575 (2011), https://perma.cc/4KE4-Q6LQ; 
Olive Huang, U.S. Copyright Office Orphan Works Inquiry: Finding Homes for the Orphans, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
265, 273 (2006), https://perma.cc/5RGU-Q6K8.  
135 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 76 (1976), https://perma.cc/ZU93-JG87. 
136 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-305 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002), https://perma.cc/3FWG-YWLB.  
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the work when new and not by any accrued special collector’s value137—are good reference points. 
For unique works, comparing to average prices in a particular subject area may be another way to 
determine “fair price,”  with reference to guides such as the Library Book Trade Almanac.138  
Finally, and most significantly, digitizers must also address limitations on the number of copies 
produced and the Section 108(g) limitation on systematic copying. Libraries and archives are only 
permitted to make a single copy of a work under Section 108(e), and so they must look to either 
technological solutions or to other limitations or exceptions to make additional copies. As the Sec-
tion 108 Study Group noted when it assessed how these provisions might apply to digital copies, 
the single-copy limitation makes application to online dissemination a challenge because the provi-
sion of a digital copy may require creation of temporary copies of the work to facilitate digital 
transmission.139 Moreover, for works currently in analog form, digitization and dissemination to 
users would require two permanent copies—the copy created on the digitizer’s end and the copy 
retained by the users. Section 108 could only be used to make one of those copies.  
There are a few ways to address this limitation. One is to create the initial digital copy pursuant to 
some other limitation or exception—such as fair use or another of the Section 108 exceptions, for 
example a Section 108(c) replacement copy of a book. A second option, or perhaps just another 
way of articulating the same result, is to rely on fair use to justify substantial compliance with the 
statute. The purpose of the one copy limit in Section 108(e) seems to be to avoid proliferation of 
copies and dilution of the market for the original work. A temporary copy made only for the pur-
pose of transmitting the work would seem to fall outside the rationale for limiting additional cop-
ies.  Thus, as some have argued, fair use’s flexibility could be used to allow the substantially-
complying Section 108 use anyway.140  
                                                 
137 See N.Y. UNIV. LIBRARIES, VIDEO AT RISK: STRATEGIES FOR PRESERVING COMMERCIAL VIDEO COLLECTIONS 
IN LIBRARIES 22 (2013), https://perma.cc/2Z9N-7SLT.  
138 See LISA MACKLIN, EMORY UNIV. SCHOLARLY COMMC’NS OFFICE (formerly the Intellectual Prop. Rights Of-
fice), CAN I MAKE A DIGITAL PRESERVATION COPY UNDER SECTION 108? (Oct. 14, 2010), 
https://perma.cc/M6HS-CEM6. 
139 See SECTION 108 STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 119, at 100. Since the time of the Section 108 Study 
Group’s report in 2008, cases in the Second Circuit and elsewhere have challenged the idea that temporary cop-
ies necessary for digital transmission are sufficiently fixed to be considered “copies.” See, e.g., Cartoon Network LP 
v. CSC Holding, Inc., 536 F. 3d 121, 129–30 (2d Cir. 2008), https://casetext.com/case/cartoon-network-v-csc-
holdings (holding that a copy held in RAM memory for 1.2 seconds was not sufficiently fixed to be considered a 
copy). Cf. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Comput. Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993) (RAM reproductions are copies), 
https://casetext.com/case/mai-systems-corp-v-peak-computer-inc.  
140 Jonathan Band, The Impact of Substantial Compliance with Copyright Exceptions on Fair Use, 59 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC'Y U.S.A. 453, 466–67 (2012), https://perma.cc/B6TM-SETU (“Section 108(d) by its terms allows reproduc-
tion and distribution for the purpose use of private study, scholarship, and research. Emailing the user a PDF 
achieves this purpose, too, thus tilting the first factor towards fair use. Although the user could forward the email 
of the PDF to others, the widespread availability of scanners means that a user who received a photocopy of the 
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What would open access to orphan works under Section 108(e) look like in practice? One could 
imagine a library “virtual reading room,” for example, for the types of content covered by 108(e) 
(primarily textual published and unpublished material, excluding “musical work, a pictorial, graph-
ic or sculptural work, or a motion picture or other audiovisual work other than an audiovisual 
work dealing with news”). Users searching a catalog or otherwise discovering the texts could then 
make a request for a digital copy after being presented with the appropriate copyright warning no-
tice, and after being informed or warned that use of the works is only available for “study, scholar-
ship, or research.”141  
SECTION 108(H) AS APPLIED TO ORPHAN WORKS 
Section 108(h) is the second provision that may have some application to orphan works uses.142 
Created as a way to ameliorate the effect of the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 
which lengthened terms by 20 years, Section 108(h) contains the only statutory provision with or-
phan works issues explicitly in mind (it was amended and expanded in scope by the “Preservation 
of Orphan Works Act”).143 Section 108(h) provides that “during the last 20 years of any term of 
copyright of a published work, a library or archives, including a nonprofit educational institution 
that functions as such, may reproduce, distribute, display, or perform in facsimile or digital form a 
copy or phonorecord of such work, or portions thereof, for purposes of preservation, scholarship, 
or research.” 144  
Like 108(e), Section 108(h) has several significant limitations. It only applies if the library or ar-
chives is able to determine, based on a “reasonable investigation,” that none of the following ap-
ply: that the work is subject to “normal commercial exploitation,” that a copy can be obtained at a 
“reasonable price,” or that “the copyright owner or its agent provides notice pursuant to regula-
tions promulgated by the Register of Copyrights that either” of the preceding conditions apply.145  
                                                                                                                                                             
article by regular mail could also easily scan and retransmit the article. Thus, the difference in the market impact 
between mailing a hard copy and emailing a PDF is slight.”) 
141 17 U.S.C. § 108(e) (2015).  
142 Several commentators have specifically pointed to Section 108(h) as a potential partial solution, but without 
much further analysis. See Erez Rosenberg, An Audio-Visual Notice of Use Database: A Solution to the Orphan Works 
Problem in the Internet Age, 22 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 95, 108 (2014), https://perma.cc/AZW5-4WVL. See also, U.S. 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 8, at 45–46.  
143 Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, § 401, 119 Stat. 218, 226 (2005), 
https://perma.cc/BZD8-YPS2.  
144 17 U.S.C. § 108(h).  
145 Id. As of September 2015, no rightsholder has ever filed a Section 108(h) notification of use since this provi-
sion was enacted in 1998. See Email from Abioye Oyewole, Attorney-Advisor, U.S. Copyright Office, to author 
(Sept. 28, 2015), https://perma.cc/KQ6F-ZBVJ.  
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Understanding most of the terms in 108(h) regarding searches and reasonable investigation can be 
resolved similarly to the analogous 108(e) terms. It’s important to note, however, that the search 
required is likely broader; libraries and archives must look not only for whether a copy is available 
“at a reasonable price,” but also whether it is subject to “normal commercial exploitation.” Pre-
sumably, normal commercial exploitation would include things such as whether the work is availa-
ble to be licensed, for example through the Copyright Clearance Center or through other aggre-
gated sources of licensing, or if the work is currently performed or displayed commercially.  
The other two significant limitations are that 108(h) only applies to published works, and that it 
only applies to works in the final 20 years of their copyright term. Determining publication status 
itself is difficult,146 as is determining the time at which copyright expires.147  Given these limita-
tions, as the chart below illustrates, the most immediate application of Section 108(h) is to works 
published between 1923 and 1941. Many of those works, at least those published in the U.S.,  are 
likely in the public domain anyway for failure to comply to formalities applicable at the time.148 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
146  Deborah R. Gerhardt, Copyright at the Museum: Using the Publication Doctrine to Free Art and History, 61 J. COP-
YRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 393 (2014), https://perma.cc/ZS7C-4UKR (discussing challenges of determining publica-
tion status).  
147 See MANNAPPERUMA ET AL., supra note 21.  
148 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 UNIV. CHICAGO L. REV. 471, 
499 (2003), https://perma.cc/92CG-EJNS.  
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Date of first publication Ordinary date of copyright expiration 108(h) usage date 
1923 to Dec. 31, 1977 95 years from the date of first publication  75 years from the date of first pub-
lication (as of this writing, works 
published before 1941) 
Created and published Jan. 1, 1978 
to present 
70 years from death of author 
 
 
 
For corporate works, the shorter of 95 years 
from publication or 120 years from creation 
50 years from death of author. 
The year 2029 is the first year that 
108(h) would be applicable for 
these works (for works whose au-
thors died in 1978).  
For corporate works, the shorter of 
75 years from first publication or 
100 years from creation. For works 
published in 1978, the year 2054 
would be the first year 108(h) 
would be applicable for these 
works.  
Created before Jan 1,1978 but first 
published on or after Jan. 1, 1978 
The greater of either December 31, 2047, or 
70 years from death of the author.  
 
For corporate works, the shorter of 95 years 
from publication or 120 years from creation 
The greater of December 31, 2027 
or 50 years from the death of the 
author (2029 for authors who died 
in 1978).  
For corporate works, the shorter of 
75 years from publication or 100 
years from creation. As of this writ-
ing, 108(h) would first apply to 
works created before 1916.   
Table 1. Section 108(h) Dates Applicable 
Finally, applying 108(h) to open access orphan works uses may also encounter some of the same 
“single copy” and “systematic copying” limits that inhibit use of Section 108(e).149 It’s unclear 
whether Section 108(h) is subject to those same limitations. Section 108(h) seems intended to 
make works broadly available to the public, which to be meaningful would require making more 
than a single copy of a work. Further, it behaves differently from all other provisions granting 
rights under 108. For example, the provisions of Section 108(b)-108(d) allow, variously, for librar-
ies to either “reproduce” or both “reproduce and distribute” works, while 108(g) limits “the rights 
of reproduction and distribution under this section” to not extend to systematic copying. Section 
108(h), however, is broader in the exercise of rights it permits; libraries and archives are permitted 
under it to “reproduce, distribute, display, or perform in facsimile or digital form,” leaving some 
room to argue that the 108(g) limitation on reproduction and distribution does not apply or does 
                                                 
149 17 U.S.C. § 108(g).  
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not apply to all Section 108(h) uses. Should it not apply, 108(h) could play an important role in 
providing access to older, published works online.  
Section 108 has significant untapped potential for serving as a legal justification for providing 
open access to orphan works.  As the review above demonstrates, many of the terms of 108 are 
ambiguous and have not been defined either in the statute, in legislative history, or by the courts. 
This means that the meaning is uncertain, but it also presents an opportunity for libraries and ar-
chives to work within the statute to make reasonable interpretations that can both comply with the 
law and further their missions by providing open access to orphans in their collections. One ex-
ample of a useful pattern for group action might be that spearheaded by NYU’s Tisch School of 
the Arts, which brought together stakeholders to help answer how to apply Section 108’s preserva-
tion and replacement provisions, Section 108(b) and (c), to VHS preservation. That project created 
a set of guidelines, Copyright Guidelines: Video at Risk, Strategies for Preserving Commercial Video Collec-
tions in Libraries, which details how those Section 108 provisions might apply to specific formats for 
specific preservation activities.150  
LACHES AND OTHER EQUITABLE DEFENSES 
Some of the most interesting but under-developed defenses for open access use of orphan works 
are equitable in nature, often drawing on other areas of the law of generally applicability. Equity, 
broadly defined, allows for an interpretive stance that permits courts to avoid rigid application of 
the law when it would result in an injustice.151  Though copyright law is primarily defined in stat-
ute by the 1976 Copyright Act, courts have continued to apply uncodified doctrines to copyright 
uses, 152 in some cases importing doctrines, such as “misuse,” that were previously unrecognized in 
copyright law.153 Many other aspects of copyright require courts to define or even create tests that 
are not identified in the statute itself. In other cases, courts are asked to substantially define con-
cepts that are mentioned only briefly in statute; courts fill those gaps with what some have termed 
“equitable interpretation” or “the equity of the statute.” 154Fair use, for instance, has been de-
                                                 
150 See N.Y. UNIV. LIBRARIES, supra note 137. 
151 See, e.g., 30A C.J.S. Equity § 2 (2015); ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, at 99 (L. Brown ed., D. 
Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press rev. ed. 2009) (c. 384 B.C.E.) (“The nature of the equitable is a correction of law 
where it is defective owing to its universality.”).  
152 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Gideon Parchomovsky, Equity's Unstated Domain: The Role of Equity in Shaping 
Copyright Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1859, 1860 (2015), https://perma.cc/S56H-3ASA (arguing that rules of equi-
table interpretation have been “deeply influential in the construction and operationalization of copyright doc-
trine.”).  
153 See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977 (4th Cir. 1990), https://casetext.com/case/lasercomb-
america-inc-v-reynolds.   
154 Balganesh & Parchomovsky, supra note 152. 
 LEGAL STRATEGIES FOR DIGITIZING ORPHAN WORKS | 43 
scribed as an “equitable rule of reason,”155 that courts should use to avoid rigid application of the 
copyright statute when that would fail to fulfill its purpose.156 For more than a century, fair use 
remained an uncodified but critical part of U.S. copyright law.  
Looking to equitable doctrines for relief in orphan works cases is natural, given the mismatch be-
tween goals of copyright and an orphan works situation that prevents beneficial public use of 
works without any benefit to owners. Although the letter of the Copyright Act may state that these 
works are broadly protected from use, that stance does not match up with the underlying policy of 
the Copyright Act. Register of Copyrights Maria Pallante explains that 
We seem to have general agreement that in the case of a true orphan work, where 
there is no copyright owner and therefore no beneficiary of the copyright term, it 
does not further the objectives of the copyright system to deny use of the work, 
sometimes for decades. In other words, it is not good policy to protect a copyright 
when there is no evidence of a copyright owner.157 
The orphan works literature reviews a large number of potential equitable defenses for addressing 
uses of orphan works. Laches, equitable estoppel, and misuse have all been proposed as potential 
solutions, along with similar other defenses that are not strictly equitable but are similar in type, 
such as implied license, adverse possession, prescriptive easement, and abandonment, applied ei-
ther through judicial extension of those doctrines or through explicit legislative action.158   
The equitable doctrines of most direct application to orphan works are those that focus on the 
passage of time, implicit consent of the rightsholder, or at least notice to the owner of the pro-
posed use. These doctrines, applied broadly in other areas of the law, place weight on the basic 
idea that when owners sleep on their rights, especially in light of a user’s efforts to notify the owner 
about prospective uses over a long period of time, that should give the user a valid excuse for mak-
ing the use. These general principles were recognized in some early copyright cases, such as in Law-
rence v. Dana (1869), stating that 
                                                 
155 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), https://perma.cc/ZU93-JG87.  
156 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994), https://casetext.com/case/campbell-v-acuff-rose-
music-inc (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990), https://casetext.com/case/stewart-v-abend).  
157 Maria A. Pallante, Orphan Works & Mass Digitization: Obstacles and Opportunities, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1251, 1251 (2012)., https://perma.cc/59ET-UXDV. 
158 See also Orphan Works: Proposals for a Legislative Solution, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2 (2006) (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, Subcomm. on Intel-
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 cases frequently arise in which, though there is some injury, yet equity will not in-
terpose by injunction to prevent the further use, as where the amount copied is 
small and of little value, if there is no proof of bad motive, or where there is well-
founded doubt as to the legal title, or where there has been long acquiescence in 
the infringement, or culpable laches and negligence in seeking redress, especially if 
it appear that the delay has misled the respondent.159 
Despite early recognition that these doctrines should apply, they have not been addressed much by 
the courts over the last century. In part, that may be because copyright terms were shorter and 
owners were required to communicate about their ownership claims by placing a notice on the 
work itself, and by filing a renewal registration with the Copyright Office for any protection be-
yond the initial 28 year term.160 As discussed in Appendix A to this report, the elimination of 
those requirements has played a key role in exacerbating the orphan works problem.161 Those 
changes have also led some scholars and courts to conclude that, in general, a copyright owner may 
now “sit back and do nothing” with her works without repercussion.162 Others have questioned 
that position, and observe that with long copyright terms and no notice requirement for copyright, 
equitable defenses that rely on passage of time or acquiescence by the rightsholder may be more 
viable now, as the equities in information about ownership of works have shifted.163 While an 
owner who “sits back and does nothing” is largely insulated from unauthorized uses of her works, 
the doctrines reviewed below illustrate how that statement of the rule may be incomplete.  
THE COPYRIGHT ACT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Before getting into equitable defenses themselves, it’s helpful to understand how another tool to 
limit old or stale actions, the Copyright Act’s statute of limitations, works and why it is mostly un-
accommodating for online access projects. For copyright suits, Congress has provided that a plain-
tiff must file a copyright action “within three years after the claim accrued.”164  As Justice Breyer 
                                                 
159 Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 61 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869), https://perma.cc/G9SM-NGLK.  
160 See Jessica Litman, What Notice Did, 96 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), https://perma.cc/Q7K7-MCLH 
(highlighting the importance of the notice requirement on copyright ownership).  
161 See also Pamela Samuelson, Notice Failures Arising From Copyright Duration Rules, 96 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 
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162 Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 669–70 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), https://casetext.com/case/guild-v-
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163 See Brauneis, supra note 1, at 340; see also Ariel Katz, The Orphans, The Market, And The Copyright Dogma: A 
Modest Solution for A Grand Problem, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.  1285, 1309–14 (2013), https://perma.cc/TU8D-
PYCT.  
164 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2015), https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6 (limitations on civil actions).  
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recently observed, however, “[t]he 3–year limitations period under the Copyright Act may seem 
brief, but it is not.165 This is for two reasons. One, claims do not always immediately ‘accrue’ when 
the infringing action occurs.  While some jurisdictions have adopted the rule that a claim accrues 
when the plaintiff first was able to bring suit (i.e., when the infringing act first occurred), in nine 
Circuits the “discovery rule” applies, which states that a copyright claim accrues when the “the 
plaintiff discovers, or with due diligence should have discovered, the injury that forms the basis for 
the claim.”166  
Second, whenever the claim accrues, all circuits have adopted two adjunct rules, the “continuing 
violation” and the “separate accrual” rules, that together convert the statute of limitations into a 
rolling limitations period for many types of uses. For continuing violations, “where a plaintiff . . . 
challenges . . .  an unlawful practice that continues into the limitations period, the complaint is 
timely when it is filed within [the limitations period, measured from] the last asserted occurrence 
of that practice.” 167   For separate accrual, “when a defendant commits successive violations, the 
statute of limitations runs separately from each violation. Each time an infringing work is repro-
duced or distributed, the infringer commits a new wrong. Each wrong gives rise to a discrete 
‘claim’ that ‘accrue[s]’ at the time the wrong occurs. In short, each infringing act starts a new limi-
tations period.”168   
Applied to a variety of traditional uses of copyrighted works, such as creation and distribution of 
derivative works such as a movie based on a book, both rules are problematic for users. Each new 
sale of a copy of the work is a “distribution” of the work and therefore a new and separate infring-
ing act to restart the three-year limitations clock. Damages within those last three years are recover-
able by plaintiffs. For “continuing violations,” the limitations period is extended to the very last 
day on which the work was infringed.  
For online open access to orphan works, the separate accrual and continuing violation rules are 
even more problematic for digitizers. Simple maintenance of preservation copies requires creating 
multiple new copies, each a reproduction that would restart the limitations clock. Similarly, every 
new download or view of the work online would constitute a new public distribution or public 
                                                 
165 Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1979 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting), 
https://casetext.com/case/petrella-v-metro-goldwyn-mayer-inc.   
166 See Polar Bear Prods. v. Timex Corp., 384 F.3d 700, 707 (9th Cir. 2004), https://casetext.com/case/polar-bear-
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“storm warnings” of suspicious conduct, may be sufficient to put plaintiffs on notice of possible infringement 
and to start the statute of limitations three-year period. See William A. Graham Co. v. Haughey, 568 F.3d 425, 438 
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display of the work,169 also resetting the statutory limitations period to the last date on which the 
work was distributed.  
LACHES 
Laches also limits the ability of plaintiffs to bring old or stale actions, though its purpose is differ-
ent and its application more flexible than the Copyright Act’s statute of limitation. The doctrine of 
laches is an equitable doctrine used to limit actions by plaintiffs who have slept on their rights, to 
the detriment of the defendant. The basic rationale for applying laches in copyright suits was ex-
plained by Judge Learned Hand:  
“it is inequitable for the owner of a copyright, with full notice of an intended in-
fringement, to stand inactive while the proposed infringer spends large sums of 
money in its exploitation, and to intervene only when his speculation has proved a 
success. Delay under such circumstances allows the owner to speculate without risk 
with the other's money; he cannot possibly lose, and he may win.”170 
Several commenters have suggested that laches may apply for orphan works uses. Professor Lydia 
Loren, for example, argues that the “[l]aches doctrines could come into play when a work is identi-
fied as a hostage [orphan] work and made available in a publicly accessible and searchable reposito-
ry and no copyright owner has surfaced. A copyright owner who waits to surface until someone 
else makes a new derivative work should trigger a strong laches defense.”171 Other commenters 
have briefly touched on using laches for orphan works, but have offered little analysis of how it 
would apply in practice.172 
To assert laches, a defendant must show two things: (1) unreasonable delay, and (2) prejudice to 
itself.173 The relevant period for delay is typically “from when the plaintiff knew (or should have 
                                                 
169 But see Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 1997), 
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able to the public is a distribution). See also infra notes 420–21 and accompanying text. 
170 Haas v. Leo Feist, Inc., 234 F. 105, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), https://perma.cc/RTS4-VJKS.  
171 Lydia Pallas Loren, Abandoning the Orphans: An Open Access Approach to Hostage Works, 27 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1431, 1469 (2012), https://perma.cc/XY5W-39PL.  
172 See, e.g., Aaron, supra note 120, at 1346 (suggesting that “If HathiTrust were to post notice of its intent to pro-
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prejudiced by the author's delay, because it would materially change its position in reliance.”); Katz, supra note 
163, at 1316 (briefly suggesting application of laches in limiting remedies available against orphan works users).  
173 See Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 950–51 (9th Cir. 2001), https://casetext.com/case/danjaq-llc-v-
sony-corporation.  
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known) of the allegedly infringing conduct, until the initiation of the lawsuit in which the defend-
ant seeks to counterpose the laches defense.”174  For “prejudice,” courts have weighed a variety of 
factors, including the time, investment, and expense of the defendant in making use of the 
work.175 A more descriptive and generalized explanation, as the Sixth Circuit explains, is that “[a] 
party asserting laches must show: (1) lack of diligence by the party against whom the defense is as-
serted, and (2) prejudice to the party asserting it.”176 Thus, as courts in that Circuit have explained, 
“laches does not result from a mere lapse of time but from the fact that, during the lapse of time, 
changed circumstances inequitably work to the disadvantage or prejudice of another if the claim is 
now to be enforced. By his negligent delay, the plaintiff may have misled the defendant or others 
into acting on the assumption that the plaintiff has abandoned his claim, or that he acquiesces in 
the situation, or changed circumstances may make it more difficult to defend against the claim.’ 
”177 
Laches is perhaps the most well understood of the equitable doctrines discussed here, in part be-
cause the Supreme Court recently addressed laches in Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.178 Petrella 
was about a dispute over Raging Bull, the critically acclaimed boxing film produced by Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. (MGM) and released in 1980. The move was based in part on a 1963 screen-
play, the rights to which were initially owned jointly by boxing champion Jake LaMotta (also the 
subject of the film) and his friend Frank Petrella, who helped him write the screenplay.179  
Though MGM obtained an initial assignment of rights in the 1970s, rights in the screenplay re-
verted to Petrella’s daughter (Frank died in 1981) upon her filing a renewal registration in 1991. 
Seven years later, in 1998, Petrella, through her attorney, informed MGM that she had obtained 
rights in the screenplay, but she took no action at the time. Then, eleven  years after that, in 2009, 
Petrella filed an infringement suit against MGM, seeking injunctive and monetary relief for 
MGM’s continued distribution and sale of the film. MGM argued that laches bared Petrella’s re-
lief; Petrella had delayed in bringing suit and MGM had been harmed because it had invested 
heavily in distribution and sale of the film. Petrella argued, among other things, that the laches 
defense was unavailable because the Copyright Act’s three-year statute of limitations was the sole 
mechanism for ensuring that suits are brought in a timely manner.  
                                                 
174 Id. at 952. 
175 See, e.g., id.  
176 Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys., Inc., 474 F.3d 227, 231 (6th Cir. 2007) (citations and quotations omitted), 
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179 Id. at 1970–71.  
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The Supreme Court agreed with Petrella, holding that laches cannot act as a complete bar to Pet-
rella’s copyright infringement suit because it was brought within the three-year statutory period.180 
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, explained, that “Congress’ time provisions secured to 
authors a copyright term of long duration, and a right to sue for infringement occurring no more 
than three years back from the time of suit. That regime leaves little place for a doctrine that would 
further limit the timeliness of a copyright owner’s suit;”181 “laches cannot be invoked to bar legal 
relief.”182   
Application of laches and other similar equitable doctrines in copyright cases is not, however, a 
dead letter. The Court was careful to carve out several limits on its broader holding. For one, the 
majority pointed out that equitable doctrines not based on time limitations may still apply: “when 
a copyright owner engaged in intentionally misleading representations concerning his abstention 
from suit and the infringer detrimentally relies on the copyright owner’s deception, the doctrine of 
estoppel may bar the copyright owner’s claims completely.”183 Importantly, “[d]elay may be in-
volved, but it is not an element of the defense,” as contrasted to laches, for which delay is an essen-
tial element.184   
Second, the Court also stated that “[in] extraordinary circumstances . . . the consequences of delay 
in commencing suit may be of sufficient magnitude to warrant at the very outset of litigation, cur-
tailment of relief equitably available.”185 The Court cited two example cases of “extraordinary cir-
cumstances” that are worth discussing, Chirco v Crosswinds Communities, Inc.186  and New Era Publi-
cations International v. Henry Holt & Co.187 Both involved situations which would have worked an 
“unjust hardship upon the defendants and third parties” or required “total destruction of the 
work.”188 
Chirco involved a defendant who was alleged to have used without permission architectural designs 
in the design and construction of a housing development.189 The court concluded that the plaintiff 
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182 Id. at 1974.  
183 Id.  
184 Id. at 1977.  
185 Id.  
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189 Chirco, 474 F.3d at 235–36.  
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likely had actual knowledge or constructive knowledge of the defendant’s use, which thus triggered 
the start of the delay period. The court explained that “the developments being marketed by the 
plaintiffs and by the defendants were located in the general vicinity of Detroit; consequently, ar-
duous and expensive travel would not have been necessary to observe the activities that were being 
undertaken.” Despite those and other warnings that indicated actual knowledge, the court ex-
plained, “[s]till, for 18 more months, Chirco . . .  took no overt steps to halt the defendants’ con-
struction project. . . .”190Ultimately, the plaintiff didn’t bring suit until over 168 units were built 
and 109 of them occupied.  The court in Chirco explained that “[M]ore than two-and-one-half years 
after having plans for [defendant’s project] in their files, did the plaintiffs see fit to file their copy-
right infringement suit, requesting not only money damages and an injunction against future in-
fringement, but also the destruction of “all architectural works which have been built using plans 
which infringe the Copyrighted Materials.” “[S]uch a request smacks of [] inequity . . . [and] plain-
tiffs’ inordinately lengthy delay in filing this suit makes any effort to procure the destruction of 
buildings already occupied, sold, or substantially constructed unduly prejudicial to the defend-
ants.191 
In the second “extraordinary” case, New Era Publications, the plaintiff requested less dramatic but 
still destructive relief. In that case, New Era Publications, holder of copyrights in several of L. Ron 
Hubbard’s works, sought court-ordered destruction of thousands of copies of a book produced by 
Henry Holt & Co., which had incorporated several of Hubbard’s unpublished writings. New Era 
knew of the impending publication of the book in 1986, but did not file suit until 1988. The Sec-
ond Circuit, upholding in part the lower court, noted that “If New Era promptly had sought an 
adjudication of its rights, the book might have been changed at minimal cost while there still was 
an opportunity to do so. At this point, however, it appears that a permanent injunction would re-
sult in the total destruction of the work since it is not economically feasible to reprint the book 
after deletion of the infringing material. Such severe prejudice, coupled with the unconscionable 
delay already described, mandates denial of the injunction for laches and relegation of New Era to 
its damages remedy.192 
Finally, even in the absence of those extraordinary circumstances, the Supreme Court in Petrella 
instructed that the lower court should consider delay when it assesses damages and injunctive re-
lief. The Court instructed that the district court should consider factors such as  
MGM's early knowledge of Petrella's claims, the protection MGM might have 
achieved through pursuit of a declaratory judgment action, the extent to which 
MGM's investment was protected by the separate-accrual rule, the court’s authority 
                                                 
190 Id.  
191 Id.  
192 New Era Publ’ns Int'l, ApS, 873 F.2d at 584–85.  
 LEGAL STRATEGIES FOR DIGITIZING ORPHAN WORKS | 50 
to order injunctive relief ‘on such terms as it may deem reasonable,’ and any other 
considerations that would justify adjusting injunctive relief or profits.193  
Thus, delays in suits can and should effect the calculation of damages. Several lower courts had 
already so concluded, such as the Eleventh Circuit, which had held (though probably subject to 
some modification after Petrella) that “The effect of laches is merely to withhold damages for in-
fringement which occurred prior to the filing of the suit,” and that it should not be used to bar 
prospective relief, such as injunctive relief.194 
It is too early to tell how lower courts will respond to Petrella and the limitations it places on laches 
and other equitable defenses. Although Petrella limited use of the doctrine, it also solidified its 
availability in some circumstances and made clear that the delay in general should be considered 
when assessing remedies. 195  
For applying laches to orphan works’ uses, especially online uses, the initial reaction to Petrella was 
that it would negatively impact orphan works’ users,196 primarily because such uses will almost al-
ways fall within the statutory limitations period. Nevertheless, laches remains a viable defense in 
those extraordinary cases and a tool to minimize negative remedies against defendants.  
Applying the two elements of laches, 1) unreasonable delay, and 2) prejudice,197 to an open access 
orphan work’s use, a key issue is determining whether there was a delay from when the plaintiff 
knew or should have known about the use. How does one devise a way to notify rightsholders who 
are not identifiable or locatable? As one commenter has suggested, merely publicizing an orphan 
works project for a period of time may do enough to inform those rightsholders.198 The more pub-
lic the notice and the longer it is publicized, the better. Other options might be to send targeted 
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communications to groups that the digitizer might suspect have contact with rightsholders. This 
might include collective rights organizations or publishers. Another more targeted strategy would 
be to send (and document sending) letters or other communications to individuals or organiza-
tions who are known to be associated with particular works.  
Another interesting option for informing owners is to file a notice with the Copyright Office. The 
Copyright Act provides that “Any . . .  document pertaining to a copyright may be recorded in the 
Copyright Office if the document filed for recordation bears the actual signature of the person 
who executed it . . . .”199  A notice about proposed uses of orphan works is certainly “pertaining to 
a copyright” and therefore the Copyright Office would allow it to be filed.200  
Recording with the Copyright Office a list of orphan works has two benefits. First, it is an addi-
tional way to put owners on actual notice, should they be active rightsholders who are using the 
Copyright Office registration and recordation catalog. Second, and what makes the Copyright Of-
fice recordation particularly interesting, is that the Copyright Act specifically provides that “re-
cordation of a document in the Copyright Office gives all persons constructive notice of the facts 
stated in the recorded document.”201  
To achieve constructive notice by recordation, the statute states that two criteria must be met: 1) 
“the document, or material attached to it, specifically identifies the work to which it pertains so 
that, after the document is indexed by the Register of Copyrights, it would be revealed by a rea-
sonable search under the title or registration number of the work;” and 2) “registration has been 
made for the work.”202 Those two limitations mean that constructive notice through recordation 
would likely only be possible for works that have a title. So, for example, unsigned photographs 
may be ineligible because they cannot reasonably be found by searching by title. Further, construc-
tive notice will only be effective if “registration has been made for the work.” This means that no-
tice by recordation is limited mostly to works that were once commercially valuable enough for 
rightsholders to register them.  
                                                 
199 17 U.S.C. § 205 (a) (2015), https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6.  
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Another hurdle to Copyright Office recordation is the cost. The current recordation fee is $105 
per recordation filing plus $30 per group of ten titles, but worked out across large numbers of 
works, those fees may be manageable for some projects. For example, registration of 1000 titles 
would incur a fee of $3605, or roughly $3.60 per title.203  For special collection digitization projects 
involving thousands of works, many of which are likely unregistered and would be difficult to in-
dex and search in Copyright Office systems, recordation may not be a cost-effective strategy. But, 
for digitizers seeking to make use of a limited number of works that are likely to be registered al-
ready (e.g. a selected set of published books from a library’s core collection) the extra fees to record 
a document pertaining to those works may be worthwhile to ensure the broadest and most effec-
tive notification to rightsholders about proposed uses of the work   
Finally, in addition to those showing notice and unreasonable delay, a laches defense required a 
showing of harm to the party who relied on the delay. For orphan works projects, examples of 
harm might be shown by demonstrating investment in technical infrastructure to scan and host 
digital copies of works. Another common example might be harm caused if a significant portion of 
a collection would have to be removed, thus damaging the overall usefulness of the collection.  
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 
A second equitable defense for orphan works is equitable estoppel.  Equitable estoppel applies 
where “the enforcement of the rights of one party would work an injustice upon the other party 
due to the latter's justifiable reliance upon the former's words or conduct.”204  Equitable estoppel is 
an affirmative defense that can be used to bar all relief, including monetary and injunctive relief.205 
As the court in Petrella explained, “the test for estoppel is more exacting than the test for laches, 
and the two defenses are differently oriented. The gravamen of estoppel, a defense long recognized 
as available in actions at law . . .  is misleading and consequent loss.”206 Equitable estoppel may be 
asserted even within the statutory three-year limitations period. 207 
The elements of estoppel vary in their precise formulation from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but the 
basic rule is that “a party can be estopped from pursuing a claim where: (1) the party makes a mis-
representation of fact to another party with reason to believe that the other party will rely on it; (2) 
                                                 
203 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CALCULATING FEES FOR RECORDING DOCUMENTS AND NOTICES OF TERMINA-
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the other party relies on the misrepresentation to his detriment.”208 For misrepresentation, 
“[s]ilence alone is rarely a basis for finding equitable estoppel, but ‘where a party has a legal duty to 
speak, silence can constitute an affirmative ‘misrepresentation.’ ”209 So, for example, one court has 
held that equitable estoppel did not apply because, although “a holding out may be accomplished 
by silence and inaction,” that a copyright owner had clearly printed the required (at the time) no-
tice on its work “in strict accordance with statutory requirements” was enough action to make clear 
that it intended to assert all rights.210 To the second factor, the defendant’s reliance on misrepre-
sentation, courts have held that such reliance must be reasonable and that “[r]eliance is not justifi-
able if the party invoking estoppel ‘had the means by which with reasonable diligence he could ac-
quire the knowledge so that it would be negligence on his part to remain ignorant by not using 
those means.’ ”211  
Successful equitable estoppel defenses in copyright suits are rare,212 in large part because the de-
fense requires hard-to-obtain evidence about the intent on the part of the rightsholder. For orphan 
works, at least one observer has suggested that equitable estoppel may be a useful approach,213 but 
a closer examination of the defense’s elements suggests that it may only be helpful in a handful of 
unique situations. These would primarily include cases where there is evidence of an intent on the 
part of the copyright holder to permit use of the work. An example might include works long-ago 
donated to a library or archives by a now-unlocatable owner who gave the works with the express 
intent that they be used by researchers. Even in the absence of a formal license or grant of rights to 
the library, the representation that the works are for research may be enough to justify reliance on 
that expressed intent to reformat the work into digital formats now commonly used by researchers.  
                                                 
208Marvel Characters, Inc., 310 F.3d at 292. The Ninth Circuit, for example, spells out the requirements more spe-
cifically, requiring that “(1) The party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct 
shall be acted on or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it is so intended; (3) the 
latter must be ignorant of the true facts; and (4) he must rely on the former's conduct to his injury.” Hampton v. 
Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 104 (9th Cir. 1960), https://casetext.com/case/hampton-v-paramount-
pictures-corporation.  
209 Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), 
https://casetext.com/case/associated-press-v-meltwater-us-holdings-inc (citing Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology 
Assocs., P.C., 274 F.3d 706, 725 (2d Cir. 2001), https://casetext.com/case/kosakow-v-new-rochelle-radiology-
associates).   
210 Hampton, 279 F.2d at104. 
211 In re Becker, 407 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 2005), https://casetext.com/case/in-re-becker-4.  
212 See 6 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 20:58 (2015) (listing cases).   
213 Orit Fischman Afori, Flexible Remedies as A Means to Counteract Failures in Copyright Law, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 1, 34 (2011), https://perma.cc/6HXJ-38BJ (“By applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel to cases 
where the owner of an orphan work ultimately makes himself known, a court could grant a monetary remedy 
and deny an injunction on the grounds that the defendant acted reasonably in relying on the absence of the 
owner.”). 
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Another example, which may also raise an implied license defense discussed below, would be the 
creation of copies of content that was intentionally and openly shared by the creator online. For 
both of those examples, a digitizer asserting equitable estoppel would also need to show reasonable 
reliance, which may assess whether the digitizer could better determine the rightsholder’s intent 
through “reasonable diligence.” Thus, a digitizer may need to conduct a search for rightsholders or 
make other efforts to communicate with them (e.g., through publicity of the use, similar to what 
might be used with a laches defense).  
IMPLIED LICENSE 
Several commenters have discussed implied license as possibly applicable to orphan works uses. 214 
Like equitable estoppel, implied license looks to whether there was some expression of implication 
of intent on the part of the rightsholder to allow a given use. The party asserting the license bears 
the burden of proving it exists, 215 and, as one court recently observed, “that burden is not easy to 
meet.”216 “[I]mplied licenses are [not] an everyday occurrence in copyright matters. . . implied li-
censes are found only in narrow circumstances.”217 In general, an implied license not accompanied 
by payment or other consideration is revocable.218  
An “implied license” is an affirmative defense that typically requires the asserting party to show 1) 
that the licensee requested the work, 2) that the creator or rightsholder made and delivered that 
work, and 3) that the creator or rightsholder intended that the licensee would copy and make use 
of the work.219  Those factors, however, are somewhat malleable; an implied license may exist “in 
other circumstances where the totality of the parties' conduct supported such an outcome.”220  The 
                                                 
214 Bingbin Lu, The Orphan Works Copyright Issue: Suggestions for International Response, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 
U.S.A. 701, 724 (2013), https://perma.cc/S46B-6EXP; See also Kevin J. Hickey, Consent, User Reliance, and Fair 
Use, 16 YALE J. L. & TECH. 397, 440 (2014), https://perma.cc/Z386-JMKG (discussing implied consent, impos-
sibility, and application of the doctrine of those concepts through the fair use doctrine to orphan works).  
215 Bourne v. Walt Disney Co., 68 F.3d 621, 631 (2d Cir. 1995), https://casetext.com/case/bourne-v-walt-disney-co.  
216 Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 80 F. Supp. 3d 535, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), 
https://casetext.com/case/flo-eddie-inc-v-sirius-xm-radio-inc.  
217  Estate of Hevia v. Portrio Corp., 602 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir. 2010), https://casetext.com/case/estate-of-hevia-v-
portrio-corp.  
218  See 2 PATRY, supra note 212 § 5:132 (2015) (explaining the need to, in some cases, examine state law).  
219 See Nelson–Salabes, Inc. v. Morningside Dev., LLC, 284 F.3d 505, 514 (4th Cir. 2002), 
https://casetext.com/case/nelson-salabes-v-morningside-development; Estate of Hevia., 602 F.3d at 41; SmithKline 
Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 211 F.3d 21, 25 (2d Cir. 2000), 
https://casetext.com/case/smithkline-beecham-cons-hc-v-watson-pharm (quoting Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 
F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir.1990), https://casetext.com/case/effects-associates-inc-v-cohen.  
220 Baisden v. I'm Ready Prods., Inc., 693 F.3d 491, 501 (5th Cir. 2012), https://casetext.com/case/baisden-v-im-
ready-prods-inc.  
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First Circuit has explained that, “the touchstone for finding an implied license . . . .is intent. We 
ask whether the totality of the parties’ conduct indicates an intent to grant such permission.”221  
To determine that intent, courts are free to look at statements of the parties as well as, or in some 
cases especially, at their conduct. Courts have held that merely handing over physical copies of a 
work does not manifest the necessary intent,222 but that in some cases, such as with purchasing a 
CD containing software, transfer does convey an implied license to make reproductions to make 
use of the work, e.g., by making internal RAM copies of software on a computer,223 but only for 
that limited purpose.  
Mere silence and delay is typically not enough, but in some cases “[c]onsent for an implied license 
may take the form of permission or lack of objection.”224  Field v. Google Inc., is among the most 
relevant cases illustrating this. Field, an author of copyrighted works made available to the public 
on his webpage, sued Google for indexing and saving cached copies of his website. Google assert-
ed, among other things, that Field had granted an implied license to Google to index and archive 
his pages because Field knew and chose not to use industry-standard metatags that would have in-
structed Google’s crawlers to ignore his pages. The court explained that “[c]onsent . . . may be in-
ferred based on silence where the copyright holder knows of the use and encourages it,”225 and 
went on to analyze Field’s conduct in that light:  
A Web site publisher can instruct a search engine not to cache the publisher's Web 
site by using a “no-archive” meta-tag . . . the “no-archive” meta-tag is a highly publi-
cized and well-known industry standard. Field concedes he was aware of these in-
dustry standard mechanisms, and knew that the presence of a “no archive” meta-tag 
on the pages of his Web site would have informed Google not to display “Cached” 
links to his pages. Despite this knowledge, Field chose not to include the no-archive 
meta-tag on the pages of his site. He did so, knowing that Google would interpret 
the absence of the meta-tag as permission to allow access to the pages via “Cached” 
links. Thus, with knowledge of how Google would use the copyrighted works he 
placed on those pages, and with knowledge that he could prevent such use, Field 
                                                 
221 Estate of Hevia, 602 F.3d at 41.  
222See Effects Assocs., Inc. 908 F.2d at 558. But see Hunn v. Dan Wilson Homes, Inc., 789 F.3d 573, 587 (5th Cir. 
2015), https://casetext.com/case/hunn-v-dan-wilson-homes-inc.  
223 Holtzbrinck Pub. Holdings, L.P. v. Vyne Commc’ns, Inc., No. 97 CIV. 1082 (KTD), 2000 WL 502860, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2000). 
224 Baisden, 693 F.3d at 500–01.,  
225 Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1116 (D. Nev. 2006), https://casetext.com/case/field-v-google-inc.  
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instead made a conscious decision to permit it. His conduct is reasonably interpret-
ed as the grant of a license to Google for that use.226 
Applying implied license to orphan works, one straightforward application is web archiving, pre-
serving and providing access to webpages while respecting rightsholders’ choices to use “no-
archive” tags when those sites are collected. Those uses would seem to fall squarely within the ac-
tivities that courts have already approved of in Field and elsewhere. 
Beyond web archiving, several commenters have suggested that the law of implied license is ripe 
for expansion, particularly to deal with reusing user-generated content online.227 Digitizers might 
think more broadly about how to assess whether a particular use was likely consented to by the 
rightsholder. Such considerations might focus on the type of the work and how it was distributed. 
For example, a digitizer considering a political poster freely distributed in print with the intent of 
achieving wide circulation might reasonably conclude that the rightsholder has consented to fur-
ther distribution online. Digitizers might also consider “industry standards,” like those that played 
a key role in Field. One author suggests the creation of a public registry of orphan works, which 
could in time be considered a standard, so that rightsholders can expect that works listed on that 
registry will be used by digitizers. Like the website owner in Field,  if a rightsholder knew that its 
work was listed on that registry and did nothing, a digitizer could infer consent “based on silence 
where the copyright holder knows of the use and encourages it.”228 Similarly, a digitizer who en-
gages in efforts to notify the rightsholders, using strategies similar to those that might be used to 
support a laches defense, such as publicity campaigns, sending targeted notices, or recording doc-
uments with the Copyright Office, might be able to argue similarly.  
COPYRIGHT MISUSE 
Copyright misuse is an equitable defense, imported from patent law, that allows defendants to 
challenge copyright owners who assert rights beyond those which the law has properly granted 
them. The doctrine was only recently adapted by courts in copyright cases and may have some ap-
                                                 
226 Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.  See also Parker v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. CIV.A. 07-2757, at *9-10 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 
2008), https://casetext.com/case/parker-v-yahoo (concluding similarly).  But see Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. 
Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), https://casetext.com/case/associated-press-v-meltwater-
us-holdings-inc.  
227  Steven Hetcher, User-Generated Content and the Future of Copyright: Part Two-Agreements Between Users and Mega-
Sites, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 829, 859 (2008), https://perma.cc/ZN6Q-W8WR; see 
also Orit Fischman Afori, Implied License: An Emerging New Standard in Copyright Law, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUT-
ER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 275, 325 (2009), https://perma.cc/9NS3-A375; Michael Grynberg, Property Is A Two-Way 
Street: Personal Copyright Use and Implied Authorization, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 435, 495 (2010), 
https://perma.cc/FSF5-R93G.  
228 Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1116. 
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plicability to orphan works-type situations, though how it would be used is not entirely clear.229  
The Fourth Circuit in Lasercomb America, Inc., v. Reynolds, quoting extensively from the seminal pa-
tent misuse case, explains the doctrine’s purpose:    
The grant to the [author] of the special privilege of a [copyright] carries out a public 
policy adopted by the Constitution and laws of the United States, “to promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to [authors] ... 
the exclusive Right ...” to their [“original” works]. United States Constitution, Art. 
I, § 8, cl. 8, [17 U.S.C.A. § 102]. But the public policy which includes [original 
works] within the granted monopoly excludes from it all that is not embraced in 
the [original expression]. It equally forbids the use of the [copyright] to secure an 
exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by the [Copyright] Office and 
which it is contrary to public policy to grant.230 
Cases in which copyright misuse assertions were successful tend to address antitrust concerns, typi-
cally situations where plaintiffs used copyright to stifle competition or facilitate tying arrange-
ments.231 “The defense of copyright misuse, however, is not limited to discouraging anti-
competitive behavior. Indeed, ‘[t]he question is not whether the copyright is being used in a man-
ner violative of antitrust law, ... but whether the copyright is being used in a manner violative of 
the public policy embodied in the grant of a copyright.’”232 Recently, the Ninth Circuit, recogniz-
ing that it has so far “applied the doctrine sparingly,” and that misuse is a defense, “the contours of 
which are still being defined,”233 stated that the defense can apply in three situations, where a de-
fendant can prove “1) a violation of the antitrust laws; (2) that the copyright owner otherwise ille-
gally extended its monopoly; or (3) that the copyright owner violated the public policies underlying 
the copyright laws.”234 
Leaving aside antitrust violations, the second and third situations are probably of most direct ap-
plication to orphan works. Judge Posner in Ty, Inc. v. Publications International Ltd. gives an example 
of attempts to gain editorial control over another’s work as one type of illegal extension,235 and he 
                                                 
229 See Patry & Posner, supra note 54, at 911. 
230 Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977 (4th Cir. 1990), https://casetext.com/case/lasercomb-
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costco-wholesale-corp-2 (quoting Lasercomb, 911 F. 2d at 978).  
233 Omega S.A., 776 F.3d at 700. 
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235 Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int'l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 520 (7th Cir. 2002), https://casetext.com/case/ty-inc-v-publications-
intern-ltd (“Ty [creator of Beanie Babies] doesn't like criticism, and so the copyright licenses that it grants to 
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has written elsewhere on how “overclaiming” copyright might fall into the same trap. For example, 
asserting rights over works that are in the public domain, or asserting that clear cases of users’ limi-
tations and exceptions, such as fair use, do not apply would be instances of “overclaiming.”236 Pos-
ner and William Patry argue that “courts must be careful not to place copyright owners on a razor's 
edge . . [b]ut where the warning grossly and intentionally exaggerates the copyright holder's sub-
stantive or remedial rights, to the prejudice of publishers of public-domain works, the case for in-
voking the doctrine of copyright misuse seems to us compelling.”237 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit 
has held that an assertion of rights over data which is clearly not protectable can amount to misuse 
because “for a copyright owner to use an infringement suit to obtain property protection, here in 
data, that copyright law clearly does not confer, hoping to force a settlement or even achieve an 
outright victory over an opponent that may lack the resources or the legal sophistication to resist 
effectively, is an abuse of process.”238 
Beyond illegal extension, it’s somewhat unclear what other things might so “violate[] the public 
policies underlying the copyright laws” to amount to copyright misuse. As stated above, in a sense 
the entire orphan works situation is at odds with the purpose of the Copyright Act and may make 
a compelling case for a misuse defense. Until courts give more definition to that aspect of the cop-
yright misuse test, it is unclear how it might apply to orphan works. In the meantime, copyright 
misuse may still be a useful defense in orphan works access projects, for example as a defense 
against litigants who clearly don’t hold the rights in the works at issue but bring suit anyway “hop-
ing to force a settlement or even achieve an outright victory over an opponent that may lack the 
resources or the legal sophistication to resist effectively.” 
TORT-LAW BASED DEFENSES 
Another area that holds some promise for open access to orphan works is tort-law based defenses. 
There is a developing body of legal scholarship that addresses copyright from the perspective of 
tort law, looking closely at whether certain aspects of copyright infringement, particularly the idea 
that copyright is a “strict liability” tort, should be refocused given how ubiquitous copyright pro-
tection is and how dramatic the consequences can be for infringement. Copyright law today is 
                                                                                                                                                             
those publishers whom it is willing to allow to publish Beanie Baby collectors' guides reserve to it the right to 
veto any text in the publishers' guides. It also forbids its licensees to reveal that they are licensees of Ty. Its stand-
ard licensing agreement requires the licensee to print on the title page and back cover of its publication the fol-
lowing misleading statement: ‘This publication is not sponsored or endorsed by, or otherwise affiliated with Ty 
Inc. All Copyrights and Trademarks of Ty Inc. are used by permission. All rights reserved.’ Notice the analogy to 
a publisher's attempting to use licensing to prevent critical reviews of its books – an attempt that the doctrine of 
fair use blocks.”)  
236 Patry & Posner, supra note 54, at 1654.  
237 Id. at 1659. 
238 Assessment Techs. of WI, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2003), 
https://casetext.com/case/assessment-technologies-of-wi-llc-v-wiredata.  
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general thought of as a strict liability tort—that is, an infringer of copyright is liable whether inten-
tional or not; if one makes copies, regardless of the reason. A number of scholars in recent years 
have pointed out that strict liability in copyright is at odds with developments in many other areas 
of tort law, where strict liability has given way to fault-based standards of liability, such as reckless-
ness or negligence. 239 Building on those developments, some have argued that copyright liability 
should be reformed to build in concepts such as fault, while others have argued that the law al-
ready does so, or is at least capable of doing so without changes to current law.240  
For orphan works in particular, consideration of concepts of fault and standards of conduct, such 
as negligence, can help to ameliorate the strict requirements of a statute that grants broad and 
long-lasting rights. Given the often uncertain reach of copyright protection to a large number of 
works, Patrick Goold and Oren Bracha have argued persuasively that copyright law ought to take 
fault into account by failing to find liability in cases of “copyright accidents.”241 They argue more 
specifically that a negligence standard should apply in copyright cases, which would ask courts to 
examine what a reasonable person would do in the circumstances. The famous “Hand Formula” 
puts a finer point on the well-known concept, that the injurer is only liable if he failed to take a 
cost-justified preventative measure, or in other words, if B (burden to the defendant) is greater 
than the P (the probability of harm occurring to the plaintiff) multiplied times L (the magnitude of 
the loss to the plaintiff): B>PL.  
For orphan works, in applying the Hand formula, one would need to ask, does the burden of 
searching and attempting to license the work outweigh the potential harm to the rightsholder, 
when considering the probability that any harm would occur at all. As Goold and Bracha explain 
Given the status of the works as orphan[s], there is only a probability that a particu-
lar work is under copyright, that there exists an owner with viable interest in the 
work, and that such an owner objects to the use. The expected harm of the use, 
which is probably small to begin with, has to be discounted to account for this. As 
the expected harm is small, the potential precautionary measure of forgoing the use 
appears to fail the Hand formula. The opportunity cost associated with forgoing 
this socially valuable project would seem to outweigh any small expected harm to 
the copyright owners.242 
                                                 
239 See, e.g., Oren Bracha & Patrick R. Goold, Copyright Accidents, 96 B.U. L. REV. 943 (2015), 
https://perma.cc/8XNA-LTY2; Dane S. Ciolino & Alvin R. Christovich, Questioning Strict Liability, 54 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 351 (2002), https://perma.cc/Q45H-UUPG; Steven Hetcher, The Immorality of Strict Liability in Copyright, 
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240 Patrick Goold, Is Copyright Infringement a Strict Liability Tort?, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 305 (2015), 
https://perma.cc/5E43-KKWQ.  
241 Bracha & Goold, supra note 239. 
242 Id. at 1001–02.  
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Applying tort-law, fault-based analogies opens up discussion of tort-based defenses as well, such as 
the concept of implied consent and privilege as affirmative defenses, as in the case of a physician 
who is commonly held immune from liability for the tort of battery to an unconscious person to 
whom a physician is rendering care.243 The law allows for some relief from obtaining consent in 
circumstances where consent cannot be obtained but failing to act without consent would be 
harmful both for the individual and for society more broadly. One might argue that courts ought 
to accord the same type of privilege to certain activities involving orphan works that have broad 
benefits, such as using orphan works for the purpose of attempting to identify those works’ own-
ers.  
An open question is how to operationalize these theories of fault-based liability. Goold and Bracha 
suggest that courts currently have leeway to do so by modifying their approaches to the fair use 
analysis, using it as the point of flexibility in the Copyright Act needed to import considerations of 
fault. Fair use may well be the most immediately viable option, but courts have sometimes been 
hesitant to venture far beyond the four factors listed in the statute. Thus, this area of law is among 
the least well-developed among those discussed here, but holds significant promise for open access 
to orphans because, like the doctrines of equity reviewed above, it would ask courts to look more 
closely at the purpose and reasoning behind uses that are largely beneficial to the public and for 
which harm to owners is likely minimal.  
 ABANDONMENT OR WAIVER 
Some authors have also mentioned abandonment or waiver as another type of equitable defense 
that might in some circumstances justify uses of orphan works.244 While the concept may have 
some application to a limited number of open access orphan works’ uses, it is not broadly useful 
for digitizers. Waiver is “the intentional relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its 
existence and the intent to relinquish it.”245 It is closely related to the doctrine of abandonment;246 
                                                 
243 Peter Suber, Open Access for Digitization Projects, in GOING DIGITAL: EVOLUTIONARY AND REVOLUTIONARY 
ASPECTS OF DIGITIZATION 70, 89 (Nobel Foundation, 2011), https://perma.cc/2GEJ-723P.    
244 See Loren, supra note 171, at 1443; see also Matthew W. Turetzky, Applying Copyright Abandonment in the Digital 
Age, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV., No. 19, https://perma.cc/V6WD-PYPY.  
245 United States v. King Features Entm’t, Inc., 843 F.2d 394, 399 (9th Cir. 1988), https://casetext.com/case/us-v-
king-features-entertainment-inc (citing CBS, Inc., v. Merrick, 716 F.2d 1292, 1295 (9th Cir. 1983), 
https://casetext.com/case/cbs-inc-v-merrick). See also 31 C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver § 85 (Westlaw 2016) (Waiv-
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246 Nimmer views abandonment as a special species of waiver that applies in the copyright context. See 4 MEL-
VILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.06 (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.) (2015). 
Courts sometimes do discuss the two as distinct and equally applicable doctrines, but the distinctions make little 
difference for this analysis. Further, the distinction of one from the other is sometimes based on varying state law 
formulations for the elements of waiver, which can overlap with abandonment. A way to think about the general 
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“[i]n copyright, waiver or abandonment of copyright ‘occurs only if there is an intent by the copy-
right proprietor to surrender rights in his work.’ ”247 Though the concept of abandonment or 
waiver is generally appealing as an analogy to what owners have in effect done with their orphan 
works, under current law the doctrine of abandonment or waiver is unlikely to apply to many open 
access orphan works uses.  
Waiver itself is an equitable concept, but it is commonly asserted in the context of contract dis-
putes.248 It is clear, however, that “a party may waive any provision, either of a contract or statute, 
intended for his benefit,”249 such as those rights granted to copyright owners. Waiver may be ap-
plied to all rights held, or limited in application to particular parties or for particular rights.250 The 
affirmative defense of waiver is “not favored,”251 and the asserting party bears a heavy burden to 
sustain it.252 In general, one may not revoke a waiver,253 especially not as against a party that has 
already relied upon it.254   
In the copyright context, courts have been especially strict about only applying the doctrine when 
there is clear knowledge and intent on the part of the waiving party.255 The first element of waiver, 
an intent to waive, can be shown in a variety of ways; a waiver need not be in writing, or even ex-
pressed as such at all.256 The classic formulation of the test is that the copyright owner must engage 
                                                                                                                                                             
difference between the two is that “[w]aiver, properly construed, refers only to a decision not to enforce rights 
against a particular party and may be contrasted with abandonment, which concerns a decision to relinquish all 
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in “some overt act which manifests his purpose to surrender his rights in the ‘work,’ and to allow 
the public to copy it.”257 Beyond intent, much of the waiver defense turns on proof about 
knowledge that the waiving party had about his rights  (limiting waiver to only a “known right with 
knowledge of its existence”).258 Case law suggests that at least two types of knowledge may be re-
quired to abandon copyright: (1) knowledge of the legal rights available in general, and (2) 
knowledge of the actual existence of rights held by the person waiving. Both are difficult to show.   
A good example is in Capitol Records, Inc., v. Naxos of America, Inc.,259 in which the Second Circuit 
was asked to decide whether a foreign owner had effectively waived its rights under a common law 
copyright for a pre-1972 sound recording. Given the complex set of laws that apply to pre-1972 
sound recordings,260 the court explored whether the plaintiff had the requisite knowledge about 
the legal rights available to him. The defendants in Naxos made use of a work whose foreign owner 
had stated in a letter to a third-party (a Yale University archivist) that “no permission would be 
necessary” for certain uses of the sound recordings based on the owner’s understanding of U.S. 
copyright law.261 The owner admitted in the letter that he was “not . . . conversant in American 
copyright law,” and so the court concluded that, under New York law,262 he was “unaware of the 
nature of [the] rights under law (federal or state) in the United States,” and so “could not have in-
tended to relinquish a known right.”263 The court also rejected the notion that the owner had any 
duty to investigate his rights under U.S. law.264 
                                                                                                                                                             
purpose to waive the legal rights involved.”); see also Adidas Am., Inc. v. Payless Shoesource, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 2d 
1215, 1256 (D. Or. 2007), https://casetext.com/case/adidas-america-inc-v-payless-shoesource-inc.  
257 Nat'l Comics Publ'ns, Inc. v. Fawcett Publ'ns, Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 598 (2d Cir. 1952), 
https://casetext.com/case/national-comics-pub-v-fawcett-pub-2.  
258 United States v. King Features Entertainment, Inc., 843 F.2d 394, 399 (9th Cir. 1988), 
https://casetext.com/case/us-v-king-features-entertainment-inc. 
259 Capitol Records, Inc., v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 372 F.3d 471, 482 (2d Cir. 2004), 
https://casetext.com/case/capitol-records-v-naxos-of-america.  
260 See REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, FEDERAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR PRE-1972 SOUND RECORDINGS 82–
89 (2011), https://perma.cc/EFQ7-XQUS (describing problems of certainty and consistency with the application 
of state-law copyright).  
261 Naxos, 372 F.3d at 474.  
262 Except in a combined breach of contract action or, as with Naxos, a common-law copyright case, waiver would 
most likely be considered an issue of federal law. However, “waiver under state law does not differ, in practical 
effect, from waiver under federal law. Indeed, if state law were to create a standard for waiver of a federal claim 
more easily met than the federal standard, then . . . we would be required to consider whether the state statute as 
applied conflicts with important federal regulatory interests.” Mooney v. City of New York, 219 F.3d 123, 131 (2d 
Cir. 2000), https://casetext.com/case/mooney-v-city-of-new-york-2 (internal citations omitted).   
263 Naxos, 372 F.3d. at 482.   
264 Id.  
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While not all cases that address “waiver” state it so explicitly, some courts in the copyright context 
have required both knowledge of the law and knowledge that the person waiving actually held 
rights in the work. In Hustlers, Inc. v. Thomasson,265 for example, the defendant, a singer and record-
ing artist, contractually assigned copyright in his songs to his former record label, Hustlers, Inc.266 
Before that contract expired, however, Thomasson began a new project and claimed to assign 
rights in those songs to his own newly-created record company. At trial, Thomasson claimed that 
Hustlers had waived rights in the new project because, when asked, Hustlers did not assert rights 
in the new project songs, stating that it “had no knowledge of the songs and did not want to assert 
a claim to them in [its] ignorance of their history.”267 On a motion for summary judgment, the 
court held that there was at least a genuine issue of fact regarding Hustlers’ knowledge of its rights; 
“while there is evidence that [Hustlers] did not believe [it] had rights in Thomasson’s . . . songs, 
there is no evidence in this case that [Hustlers] made this putative waiver with knowledge of the 
existence of [its] rights.”268   
For open access to orphan works, these requirements make application of waiver difficult, at least 
under current law. Evidence that orphan works’ rightsholders have taken verifiable overt acts to 
surrender their rights is likely to be rare. Even if they had, or such acts could be inferred from their 
actions, there will rarely be evidence that those acts were accompanied by knowledge about the 
scope of rights in question and the existence of those rights. At least one author has proposed an 
adapted theory of “orphan abandonment” to overcome these issues. It would, in effect, transfer a 
work into the public domain upon a court finding two elements: “1) The copyright is owned by an 
individual or entity that could not be identified in three years; 2.) through the reasonable exercise 
of due diligence.”269 While such a rule is appealing for would-be orphan works users, it seems un-
likely to be adopted given how far removed it is from the current strict approach to waiver, which 
strongly disfavors taking rights from copyright owners without clear and unequivocal indications 
that the owner intended such a surrender.  
ADVERSE POSSESSION  
Adverse possession has drawn a great deal of commentary about its potential application as an or-
phan works solution.270  Adverse possession is a doctrine, like latches, that focuses on delay: it pro-
                                                 
265 Hustlers, Inc. v. Thomasson,307 F. Supp.2d 1375 (N.D. Ga. 2004), https://casetext.com/case/hustlers-inc-v-
thomasson.  
266 Id. at 1377.  
267 Id.  
268 Id. at 1379.  
269Turetzky, supra note 244, at 18.  
270 See, e.g., Megan L. Bibb, Applying Old Theories to New Problems: How Adverse Possession Can Help Solve the Orphan 
Works Crisis, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 149 (2009), https://perma.cc/S49B-WDSJ; Katherine Moran Meeks, 
Adverse Possession of Orphan Works, 33 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1 (2013); Aryeh L. Pomerantz, Obtaining Copyright 
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vides that an owner of property cannot assert rights against another who is in possession of his 
property after a certain period of time. Adverse possession has its roots as a real property doctrine, 
and generally requires that  “a successful adverse possession claimant must establish, by clear and 
convincing evidence, possession of another’s land for the prescribed statutory limitation period, 
and that possession may be characterized as: (1)hostile (sometimes under a claim of 
right); (2)exclusive; (3)open and notorious; (4)actual; and (5)continuous for the requisite statutory 
period.”271 A successful claimant gains whatever interest the owner held at the time the adverse 
possession began. Unlike laches and several of the other judge-made doctrines discussed here, ad-
verse possession is in equal parts a creature of state statutory law and judge-made law.272  
Because adverse possession is referenced so frequently in the literature, I address it at length here, 
but warn that it faces significant challenges to be applied to orphan works uses. The first challenge 
is that, like laches, a major element of the doctrine is delay. As such, the Supreme Court’s guid-
ance in Petrella, that Congress has, through the Copyright Act’s three-year statute of limitation, al-
ready spoken to the issue of delay applies directly. Thus, adverse possession may not be available to 
usurp rights within the limitations period. 
Second, even if the statute of limitations is not an obstacle, many commentators suggest that ad-
verse possession typically would not apply to copyrights for other reasons. Professor Brauneis ex-
plains that “[c]opyright law has never had any version of adverse possession or prescriptive ease-
ments, arguably because the limited term of copyright protection itself served the function of clear-
ing title and balancing the interests of the inattentive owner and the productive user.”273 Leading 
treatises assert that adverse possession cannot apply, though they disagree on why. William Patry 
says “no” because it is a state law grant of rights that is preempted.274 Nimmer on Copyright states 
that, at least within the confines of statutory prohibition on certain types of involuntary transfers, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Licenses by Prescriptive Easement: A Solution to the Orphan Works Problem, 50 JURIMETRICS J. 195 (2010), 
https://perma.cc/6HZ5-L3PD.  See also Michael James Arrett, Adverse Possession of Copyright: A Proposal to Com-
plete Copyright's Unification with Property Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 187 (2005), https://perma.cc/WY7N-2RC8; Con-
stance E. Bagley & Gavin Clarkson, Adverse Possession for Intellectual Property: Adapting an Ancient Concept to Resolve 
Conflicts Between Antitrust and Intellectual Property Laws in the Information Age, 16 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 327 (2003), 
https://perma.cc/F7XG-HFL7; Matthew W. Daus, The Adverse Possession of Copyright, 13 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 45 
(1992), https://perma.cc/BSV5-TCDX.  
271 16–91 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 91.01 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., LexisNexis Matthew Bender) (2015). 
272 Id.  
273 Brauneis, supra note 1, at 340.  
274  2 PATRY, supra note 212 § 5:1 (“In Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc. v. Leach, 466 F. Supp. 2d 628, 634 (D. 
Md. 2006), the court properly rejected the defendant's completely frivolous argument that he could obtain rights 
in plaintiff's work through adverse possession.”);  
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adverse possession cannot apply.275 Goldstein on Copyright says “no” because copyrights cannot be 
“possessed” as required by the adverse possession doctrine.276  
There are only two cases that directly address adverse possession of copyright,277 but both are help-
ful in understanding the challenges associated with this doctrine. The first is Gee v. CBS, Inc.,278 
which was a case about rights to a song, “At the Christmas Ball,” originally recorded by Bessie 
Smith in 1925 and “rejected” by Columbia at the time. After Smith’s death, in 1951, Columbia 
issued the recording, and then reissued it again in 1972.279 Years later, one of Smith’s heirs 
brought suit, and Columbia asserted several defenses, including that it had adversely possessed 
Smith’s rights in the song because it had, for years, represented that it had owned those rights. Ul-
timately, the court accepted Columbia’s adverse possession claim.  
The primary difficulty that the court addressed was whether adverse possession could apply to per-
sonal property (as opposed to real property), and whether still it could apply to intangible personal 
property, such as a copyright right. Few states have concluded that adverse possession can apply to 
intangible property, and some even prohibit application to personal property. The Gee court, how-
ever, concluded that Pennsylvania and New York, the relevant states whose law was at issue,280 like-
ly would recognize adverse possession of intangibles. New York, the court noted, had previously 
recognized adverse possession of a “chose in action.”281 In other states, however, this poses a chal-
lenge. In Louisiana, for example, adverse possession requires “the ‘detention’ of a ‘corporeal thing’ 
. . .  Therefore, the incorporeal thing or incorporeal movable in this action cannot be corporeally 
                                                 
275 3–10 NIMMER, supra note 246 § 10.04. 
276 PAUL, GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 5.1 (2015) (Forms of Transfer). 
277 A third, Zuill v. Shanahan, 80 F.3d 1366, 1370 (9th Cir. 1996), as amended (June 14, 1996), 
https://casetext.com/case/zuill-v-shanahan, is a Ninth Circuit decision addressing timing and delay in claims 
about co-ownership of a copyright. The court concluded that the normal statute of limitations for infringement 
does not apply to late-coming claims of co-ownership, but that laches might serve to cut off such claims. Plaintiffs 
argued that such a rule would apply “something like adverse possession of copyright ownership.” The court 
agreed, but took the analogy no further. Id.  
278 Gee v. CBS, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 600 (E.D. Pa. 1979), https://casetext.com/case/gee-v-cbs-inc-2.  
279 Id. at 609.  
280 As one commenter has observed, it is unclear throughout Gee whether the court is applying state common law 
or just using those cases to inform its own formulation of a federal common law doctrine of adverse possession. 
See Daus, supra note 270, at 55–56. 
281 Gee, 471 F. Supp. at 654 (citing Lightfoot v. Davis, 198 N.Y. 261, 91 N.E. 582 (1910), 
https://casetext.com/case/lightfoot-v-davis).  
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possessed or detained by another.” Thus, for example, one could not adversely possess a partner-
ship interest in Louisiana.282  
The other case on point was a 2006 district court opinion in Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc. v. 
Leach,283 which gives some helpful insight into other challenges, as well as a glimpse at the Copy-
right Office’s views on this question. Advance Magazine (the corporate owner of Conde Nast) 
brought the infringement suit against David Leach, who began in the 1990s to scan stories from 
magazines published in the 1930s and 40s, such as The Shadow, Doc Savage and The Avenger (about 
500 in total), and offered the full text to the public on his websites in ad-supported formats and for 
sale, including as reprints through Amazon.com.284 Leach operated the websites for at least eight 
years, and offered the reprints for sale for nearly six years before Advance filed suit. 285 Advance 
Magazine claimed ownership as successor in title to the magazines. Leach, proceeding pro se, filed 
an answer (of sorts) contesting ownership by asserting that he had acquired rights through adverse 
possession.286  
Included with his short answer, Leach attached a copy of a letter he sent to the Copyright Office 
requesting a recordation of transfer based on adverse possession.287 Though the Office did not ac-
tually record Leach’s requested documents (he sent a check that was $20 short of the required fee), 
the Office went to the trouble of writing back and disavowing the idea that the it recognizes or has 
ever recognized adverse possession as applying to copyrights.288 The letter plainly stated that “[t]he 
Copyright Office applies no doctrine of adverse possession, and I am personally unaware of any 
                                                 
282 Grosjean v. Grosjean, 50 So. 3d 233, 241 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2010), https://casetext.com/case/grosjean-v-grosjean-
45529-laapp-2-cir-101310.  
283 Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc. v. Leach, 466 F. Supp. 2d 628 (D. Md. 2006), 
https://casetext.com/case/advance-magazine-publishers-inc-v-leach.  
284 Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 2d at 632. 
285 Id. 
286 Id.  
287 Id. at 633. In the letter, Leach asserted without citing support that the Office had, in the past, recognized ad-
verse possession transfers. 
288See Letter from Kent Dunlap, Principal Legal Advisor for the General Counsel, U.S. Copyright Office to Da-
vid Leach, Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc,, 466 F. Supp. 2d  (No. DKC 2006-0522), https://perma.cc/L8B8-
RPSZ (hereinafter Dunlap Letter). The Office later refused to register his claim of copyright as derivative works 
because “the Copyright Office does not recognize [adverse possession] as applying to intellectual property. There-
fore, it does not appear that [Leach] has permission to use the magazines in preparing derivative works.” Letter 
from Susan Todd, Section Head, Literary Section, U.S. Copyright Office to David Leach, id., 
https://perma.cc/Z8QM-BBX6.  
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authoritative case which supports application of such a doctrine in the context of a copyrighted 
work. ”289  
Like the Copyright Office, the court rejected Leach’s adverse possession claim, concluding that 1) 
federal law preempts application of the state-law doctrine of adverse possession, so it could not ap-
ply, and 2) if Leach was asserting some sort of federal common law doctrine of adverse possession 
or transfer “by operation of law,” statutory limitations on involuntary transfers of rights foreclosed 
recognition of such a doctrine. 290 
The court raised two of the most significant challenges for adverse possession of copyright. First, 
on federal preemption, the Advance court pointed to Section 301(a) of the Copyright Act, which 
provides that  
all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within 
the general scope of copyright [as specified in federal law] . . . are governed exclu-
sively by this title. . . . no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in 
any such wok under the common law or statutes of any State.”291 
The court reasoned that “application of the doctrine of adverse possession would transfer all of the 
original owner’s rights to the adverse possessor. Therefore, the rights that would be acquired . . . 
would be equivalent to those [granted under federal law]”292 which is expressly preempted by Sec-
tion 301.293  
One counterargument to that preemption analysis is that, in most states, transfer of rights by ad-
verse possession does not grant adverse possessors with a set of state-created “equivalent rights,” 
but in fact grants the exact same rights that federal law provides to owners. The doctrine merely facil-
itates a transfer of those rights from one owner to another. For that, use of state law to effectuate 
transfers of federal rights is expressly contemplated by the Act. For example, in Section 201, ad-
dressing transfer of rights by operation of law, the Copyright Act provides that “the ownership of a 
copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of 
law, and may be bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate 
succession.”294 Courts regularly look to state law as the governing law for interpreting contracts 
transferring ownership of rights, and the effectuation of transfer of copyright by will or intestate 
succession is also accomplished by means of state law. However, that counterargument is some-
                                                 
289 Dunlap Letter, supra note 288.  
290 Advance Magazine Publishers, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 633. 
291 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2015), https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6.   
292 Advance Magazine Publishers, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 635.  
293 Id.  
294 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1), https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6.   
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what weak because it depends on how the law of each state characterizes adverse possession; is it 
merely a transfer of rights, or a grant of new rights? Further, a federal court would likely feel free to 
look beyond how a state characterizes transfers of rights and decide for itself whether the adverse 
possession doctrine is a mere transfer, or something more that is in conflict with federal policy. 
The second reason cited by the court for denying the adverse possession assertion was that the 
Copyright Act prohibits involuntary transfers of rights. The court referenced Section 201(e) of the 
Copyright Act, which states that “[w]hen an individual author’s ownership of a copyright, or of any 
of the exclusive rights under a copyright, has not previously been transferred voluntarily by that 
individual author, no action by any governmental body or other official or organization purporting 
to seize, expropriate, transfer, or exercise rights of ownership with respect to the copyright, or any 
of the exclusive rights under a copyright, shall be given effect under this title . . . .”295  
There is little case law on copyright transfer “by operation of law” and what might constitute an 
involuntary transfer.296 A close reading of the statute would indicate that not all involuntary trans-
fers are prohibited, but only those situations in which the copyright “has not previously been 
transferred.” Nevertheless, in many situations, Section 201(e) would pose another significant hur-
dle because no potential library or archives assertor would have ex ante access to the information 
needed to know which works were subject to prior transfers and therefore free of the 201(e) re-
striction.  
Overall, adverse possession, if it is available at all after Petrella’s reading of the Copyright Act’s 
statute of limitations, faces significant challenges. As some commenters have noted, effectively us-
ing adverse possession for orphan works would likely require some additional help and modifica-
tion through legislation from Congress.297  
  
                                                 
295 17 U.S.C. § 201(e), https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6. 
296 Soc'y of Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory, 689 F.3d 29, 41 (1st Cir. 2012), 
https://casetext.com/case/socy-of-the-holy-transfiguration-monastery-inc-v-denver (noting “a desert of case law on 
the issue of copyright transfers by operation of law”). 
297 See, e.g., Pomerantz, supra note 270.  
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REDUCING RISK BY MINIMIZING THE LIKELIHOOD OF A DISPUTE 
The threshold risk that someone will come forward to contest the use of an orphan work is one of 
the most significant and important risks for digitizers to address. Regardless of the legitimacy of a 
claim or the ability of a claimant to recover anything from the digitizer, the mere existence of a 
dispute itself can be costly. Copyright litigation is expensive. In 2013, the American Intellectual 
Property Law Association (AIPLA) reported that the median cost of litigating even a small-stakes 
copyright infringement suit was around $150,000 through to the discovery process.298 Even just 
hiring a lawyer to respond to a dispute that never results in a lawsuit can be costly. The 2013 aver-
age billable rate for a relatively inexperienced intellectual property attorney was over $250 per 
hour.299 Should a suit be initiated, ending it quickly is important too. AIPLA reports that the me-
dian cost for small-stakes suits that drag on and are litigated all the way through discovery and to 
the end of the litigation is around $300,000.300  
One of the most meaningful ways to reduce the likelihood of a dispute is to do what many digitiz-
ers are already practicing: screening their collections before digitization to identify works that 
might require further research, and then, in some cases, conducting searches for rightsholders of 
those works. While searches are not necessary in every situation, it can help confirm that the work 
is truly orphaned and thus lower the risk that an owner will come forward and sue. Searches for 
rightsholders also have other benefits, such as bolstering a fair use defense and showing good faith. 
Searches may even be necessary for assertion of some of the defenses reviewed above, such as as-
serting a defense under the Section 108 library and archives exceptions.  
This Section builds on the existing practice of conducting searches for rightsholders and identifies 
four additional strategies that might be used to further minimize the likelihood of a dispute and, 
should a dispute arise, to quickly dispense with it. Like the previous Section, this Section is orga-
nized in order of those strategies most immediately useful in practice to those that would require 
more work, more resources, and more significant legal developments. It addresses four strategies: 
(1) using quitclaim grants to obtain partial permissions from authors and others; (2) obtaining 
broader voluntary permissions from larger rightsholders or collective organizations; (3) using class 
action lawsuits to clear rights in large numbers of works; and (4) challenging standing of potential 
litigants. 
The two strategies of most immediate use are (1) using quitclaim grants to obtain partial permis-
sions from authors and others; (2) obtaining broader voluntary permissions from larger rightshold-
                                                 
298 Defined as a lawsuit with less than $1 million at stake. AIPLA, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 36; I–175 
(2013).  
299 Id. at I–48 (2012 survey reporting that mean billable hour rate for an IP associate at a private firm with fewer 
than five years of experience was $271).  
300 Id. at 36.  
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ers or collective organizations. Obtaining quitclaim grants is probably of the most limited use (it 
would only apply when a person or organization associated with a particular work is located, but 
that person is not necessarily the rightsholder) but it is also among the simplest for digitizers to 
employ. Broader grants of permission, while helpful for large-scale projects that might affect larger 
groups of rightsholders, are likely to be more difficult and costly to negotiate and develop consen-
sus, but would provide far wider coverage for more works.  
In addition, this Section covers two other strategies that are discussed in the literature but unlikely 
to be immediately useful for most digitizers. They are (3) using class action lawsuits to clear rights 
in large numbers of works; and (4) challenging standing of potential litigants. Class action lawsuits 
are themselves risky to initiate and are likely only useful for the most well-resourced digitization 
projects.  Challenging standing is likely most useful for large-scale access projects that may generate 
disputes with groups of plaintiffs, such as professional associations or in class action lawsuits, as 
has been the case in suits such as Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust and Authors Guild v. Google, Inc. 
The risk in those type of cases is that an association, claiming to represent the rights of its mem-
bers (which may include rightsholders of orphan works), will allege harm from the whole mass dig-
itization project and therefore ask a court for relief by enjoining the entire project, rather than re-
lief related to specific individual works. Challenging standing of associations to bring those types 
of lawsuits against orphan works mass-digitization projects can limit the ability of associations or 
class action plaintiffs to litigate those claims and obtain such broad relief.   
QUITCLAIMS AND PARTIAL PERMISSIONS 
At first blush, obtaining permissions seems inapposite for orphan works, works for which owners 
cannot be identified or located. But, some orphans do have locatable individuals or organizations 
associated with the work, just not individuals who can be confirmed as rightsholders. These situa-
tions arise because of the way copyrights are commonly created and transferred. Rights in works 
may be distributed among a variety of known and unknown parties via private contracts or other 
legal instruments, the terms of which are not often made public. Copyrights can be subdivided 
amongst an almost infinite number of owners, any number of whom might be necessary to con-
tact, or at least investigate, when seeking to reuse a particular work.301  Author-publisher agree-
ments vary greatly from publisher to publisher, and often contain terms that allocate rights to dif-
ferent owners over time.302 The scope of those rights—especially with respect to “new uses,”303 such 
                                                 
301 The 1976 Copyright Act introduced so-called “divisible” copyright, which increases the number and kind of 
ownership interests that can bring an infringement suit. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (2015), 
https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6; See also Jessica Litman, supra note 160 (describing how the elimination of notice 
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https://perma.cc/MMQ4-C3NC (describing the problem as it related to film ownership).  
302 See SHERPA/RoMEO Publisher Copyright Policies & Self-Archiving, SHERPA, https://perma.cc/FK84-67EA (last 
visited May 22, 2016) (categorizing over 1000 unique publisher-author contracts, many of which contain com-
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as conversion of print books into electronic versions—is difficult to determine even with access to 
private contracts because the contractual terms themselves can be unclear. The allocation of e-book 
rights is particularly unclear, because early contracts did not necessarily use the terms that have 
come to describe modern electronic publishing of books. For example, a recent case involved allo-
cation of rights in the well-known children’s novel Julie of the Wolves.304 That case revolved around 
interpretation of a 1971 publishing contract between the author, Jean Craighead George, and her 
original publisher, Harper & Row, which granted it the authority to “publish” the work “in book 
form.” Based on several other terms in a somewhat lengthy contract, the court concluded that the 
parties had intended to partially transfer the e-book rights to her original publisher. Notably, the 
outcome in this case differed significantly from an earlier case from the same jurisdiction, Random 
House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books, LLC, in which the court held that a contract to “publish, print, or sell” 
a work “in book form” was held to not include e-book rights. 305   
Courts have split on how to deal with “new uses” cases like these.306 Some say that rights remain 
with the original owners, but others say that contracts should be construed broadly, often in favor 
of publishers. Clarity about ownership of these works is further complicated by the fact that con-
tracts often contain reversion clauses, that the Copyright Act allows authors to terminate transfers 
of rights after a period of time, and that some works  are potentially subject to the “work for hire” 
doctrine,307 and other statutory provisions that alter the normal allocation of rights.308 Without 
                                                                                                                                                             
plex grants of rights and reversions to and from publishers, often subject to a variety of triggering mechanisms 
(e.g., reversion of some self-archiving rights after a six month period)).  
303See Pamela Samuelson, The Google Books Settlement as Copyright Reform, 2011 WISC. L. REV. 479, 496, 
https://perma.cc/UPC7-S2L8 (discussing the problem of “new uses,” such as e-book creations, that impede mass 
digitization projects such as Google Books Search).   
304 HarperCollins Publishers LLC v. Open Road Integrated Media, LLP, 7 F.Supp. 3d 363, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), 
https://casetext.com/case/harpercollins-publishers-llc-v-open-rd-integrated-media (interpreting 1971 contract to 
have granted e-book rights to original, print publisher). 
305 See Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books, LLC, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002), https://casetext.com/case/random-
house-inc-v-rosetta-books-llc (e-book rights remained with the author under contract that granted rights to “print, 
publish, and sell” “in book form”).  
306 Compare Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988), 
https://casetext.com/case/cohen-v-paramount-pictures-corp (favoring ambiguity in favor of the grantor) with 
Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 1968), https://casetext.com/case/bartsch-v-
metro-goldwyn-mayer-inc-2 (“[L]icensee[s] may properly pursue any uses which may reasonably be said to fall 
within the medium as described in the license.”); see also Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers v. Walt Disney Co., 
145 F. 3d 481 (2d Cir. 1998), https://casetext.com/case/boosey-hawkes-music-publishers-v-walt-disney (con-
trasting the approaches). 
307 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2015), https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6 (“In the case of a work made for hire, the employ-
er or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title . . . .”). 
308 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 201(c), https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6 (“Copyright in each separate contribution to a 
collective work is distinct from copyright in the collective work as a whole, and vests initially in the author of the 
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clear public documentation, digitizers have difficulty finding the appropriate party from which to 
seek permission for any given use.309 
Take, for example, the common situation of an author who published her work long ago with a 
publisher that no longer exists and the distribution of whose assets upon dissolution is not clear. 
Who owns the rights to that work is likely unclear, but there are two primary culprits: the publish-
er or the author. The publisher cannot be found, but the author can. The alternative, finding a 
publisher or other organization, but not the author who is no longer affiliated with the organiza-
tion, can also occur. Further, some works fall within the orphan category not because there are no 
identifiable parties who may hold rights, but because there is no one confident enough to grant 
permission. With poor record keeping and complex copyright transfers, individuals and organiza-
tions associated with a given work are sometimes uncertain of the scope of rights that they retain, 
if any. Added to that, rights can pass by bequest or by state intestacy laws to heirs who may not be 
certain about the scope of the rights that they inherited,310 if they are aware of the rights at all. 
Even for individuals who support providing open access to those works, they may remain uneasy 
about granting permission if they are uncertain of the scope of the rights they hold and their abil-
ity to provide warranties about the necessary rights, as many standard form-licenses require.311  
To address these situations, some digitizers have pursued looser grants of rights in the form of a 
“quitclaim,” which allows, so far as the grantor is concerned, the grantee organization to provide 
online access  and make other uses of the work.312 Such a grant does not require the grantor to 
warranty that it owns any rights, but merely acknowledge that, to the extent the grantor does own 
any rights, they are relinquished for uses specified in the agreement. The principle behind this 
                                                                                                                                                             
contribution. In the absence of an express transfer . . . the owner of copyright in the collective work is presumed 
to have acquired only the privilege of reproducing and distributing the contribution as part of that particular 
collective work . . . .”). See also N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001), https://casetext.com/case/new-york-
times-co-v-tasini (application of 201(c) to electronic versions of compilations).   
309 See Samuelson, supra note 303, at 498—502.  
310 17 U.S.C. § 201(d), https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6.   
311 See, e.g., University of Michigan Permissions Agreement, HATHITRUST, https://perma.cc/ZWD3-HA9X (last visited 
May 22, 2016) (asking authors to “represent and warrant to the University of Michigan that I am a copyright 
holder of the Work with the right to make this authorization because [of a selection of a variety of copyright ar-
rangements].”). To the extent that the author actually did assign or license away rights exclusive rights, the author 
cannot continue to exploit or authorize others to exploit those rights without an express reservation of rights to 
herself. See Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 654 F. Supp. 1129, 1131 (N.D. Cal. 1987), https://casetext.com/case/fantasy-
inc-v-fogerty (“A copyright owner can infringe upon any exclusive right which he transfers or grants to another.”); 
Dodd, Mead & Co., Inc. v. Lilienthal, 514 F. Supp. 105, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), https://casetext.com/case/dodd-
mead-co-inc-v-lilienthal (publishers “alleged failure to meet the public demand did not permit [the author] to 
publish his own copies in contravention of the contract between the parties.”). 
312 See, e.g., N.Y. Pub. Library Quitclaim, infra Appendix B.   
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strategy, that it is usually less risky to get permission from someone for some uses than to get no 
permission at all, is largely sound. Here is why:  
First, a quitclaim can help a digitizer challenge claims of ownership. In any copyright infringement 
suit, the plaintiff must allege and prove two basic elements: “(1) ownership of a valid copyright, 
and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.”313 Should a dispute arise 
with a third party, a digitizer with a quitclaim can immediately challenge the sufficiency of a plain-
tiff’s ownership claim by interjecting the quitclaim permissions it already obtained from some oth-
er party associated with the work. This may be particularly useful to dissuade potential litigants 
who may have even less certain ownership claims, particularly those who might try to assert rights 
on behalf of orphan works’ owners but with little documentation about those individual owner-
ship rights.  
For challenging ownership, obtaining quitclaim grants of rights from authors is probably the most 
worthwhile tactic, because authors hold a special presumption about ownership of their works un-
der the Copyright Act. 314 It states simply that “[c]opyright in a work . . .  vests initially in the au-
thor.”315 Because of that presumption that ownership vests in an author, a non-author plaintiff, 
such as a publisher or a rightsholder association, would need to establish ownership by referring to 
external evidence. It can do this either by offering a registration certificate in its own name, which 
constitutes prima facie evidence of ownership if registered within five years after first publication,316 
or by bearing the burden of proving its chain of title.317 Because the exclusive rights under copy-
right are freely divisible among many owners,318 the plaintiff would need to show that chain of title 
for the particular rights that it alleges to be infringed. For open access to orphan works, this would 
                                                 
313 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991), https://casetext.com/case/feist-
publications-inc-v-rural-telephone-service-company-inc; see also Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 372 F.3d 
471, 481 (2d Cir. 2004), https://casetext.com/case/capitol-records-v-naxos-of-america.  
314 See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Author Autonomy and Atomism in Copyright Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 549 (2010), 
https://perma.cc/VU5X-BMN7. In the words of former Register of Copyrights Barbara Ringer, the modern 
Copyright Act represents a “break with the two-hundred-year-old tradition that has identified copyright more 
closely with the publisher than with the author.” See Letter from M. Peters to Rep. McGovern, reprinted in 147 
CONG. REC. 2062–64 (2001) (quoting Barbara Ringer, First Thoughts on the Copyright Act of 1976, 22 N.Y. L. S. L. 
REV. 477, 490 (1977)), https://perma.cc/D3H9-JN34.  In addition to the general tone, set on this course by the 
1976 Copyright Act, technological advances have further empowered individual authors in the creation and 
management of their copyright interests. Van Houweling, supra. 
315 17 U.S.C. § 201(a), https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6.  
316 17 U.S.C. § 410, https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6.  
317 See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commun. Servs., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1241 (N.D. Cal. 1995), 
https://casetext.com/case/religious-tech-v-netcom-on-line-com (helpful explanation of the process of proving 
title) (citing 3 NIMMER, supra note 246 § 12.11 [C] (1995)); see also Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 654 
F.3d 958, 962 (9th Cir. 2011), https://casetext.com/case/fleischer-studios-v-avela.  
318 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2), https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6.  
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mean the right to control reproduction and distribution online. A digitizer with a grant of rights 
from the author would enjoy the presumption that those rights are valid absent evidence to the 
contrary.  
Beyond challenging ownership, quitclaim grants of rights can be helpful (absent knowledge of con-
trary evidence that rights are held by another party) in bolstering equitable defenses and fair use 
defenses, by demonstrating a good faith pursuit of permission from the only likely rightsholders 
who were available at the time of use.319 A quitclaim can also reinforce claims of innocent in-
fringement320 by showing that the digitizer had a good-faith, reasonable belief that its activities 
were noninfringing. If nothing else, a quitclaim can help support a defense that infringement was 
not “willful”321 and therefore not subject to enhanced damages awards.  
I could find no public examples or forms for digitizers that seek to use quitclaim deeds, but one 
should be a simple document to create. The essential elements of a quitclaim grant would merely 
be 1) a release of whatever rights are held by the grantor for the uses specified by the digitizer 
(which might also include broader public grants), and 2) an explicit statement that the quitclaim 
grantor makes no warranties about ownership. To help give further guidance, the New York Public 
Library has agreed, for this report, to share the quitclaim that it uses (attached in full as an appen-
dix to this report). That document is a simple one-page form, signed by an individual or organiza-
tion associated with a given work which  “grants to the Library a worldwide quitclaim of any rights 
it has in the Material for any of the following purposes: (i) on the Library’s website for access by 
researchers, scholars and other members of the general public;  (ii) on the Library’s electronic 
preservation system; and (iii) in educational materials related to the Library’s collections, exhibi-
tions, programs, events, related publicity, promotional materials and publications.” The quitclaim 
explicitly provides that “[t]his grant is without representation or warranty of any kind by the un-
                                                 
319 Courts have long held that equitable defenses demand “clean hands” for the party asserting the defense.  See, 
e.g., He Who Comes into Equity Must Come with Clean Hands, 4 A.L.R. 44 (originally published in 1919) (collecting 
cases). For fair use, good faith is considered by courts but is likely not determinative. See NXIVM Corp. v. Ross 
Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 484 (2d Cir. 2004), https://casetext.com/case/nxivm-corp-v-ross-institute (citing Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 n.18 (1994), https://casetext.com/case/campbell-v-acuff-rose-music-inc.  
320 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2), https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6.  
321 Id. This would seem to be so even, or maybe especially, where there is confusion about ownership of rights. 
See Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 959 (9th Cir. 2001), https://casetext.com/case/danjaq-llc-v-sony-
corporation (“The complexity of the chain of title to the various elements of the Bond stories further precludes a 
jury finding of willful infringement.”) (citing Peer Int'l Corp. v. Pausa Records, Inc., 909 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th 
Cir.1990), https://casetext.com/case/peer-intern-corp-v-pausa-records-inc (approving the district court’s refusal 
to find willfulness where the defendant was acting under color of rights granted by a license); Frank Music Corp. v. 
MGM, Inc., 772 F.2d 505, 515 (9th Cir. 1985), https://casetext.com/case/frank-music-corp-v-metro-goldwyn-
mayer-inc (holding that, where defendants reasonably could have believed that they had a valid license to use 
plaintiffs’ works, it was not clearly erroneous for the district court to find no willful infringement)). 
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dersigned as to the ownership, validity or subsistence of copyright or any other intellectual proper-
ty rights in the Material.”  
BROAD PERMISSIONS THROUGH VOLUNTARY AGREEMENTS 
Digitizers may also reduce risks by seeking permissions on a larger scale. Legal scholarship discusses 
a variety of large-scale “private ordering” solutions (agreements among private parties) to the or-
phan works problem,322 which can take on varying degrees of complexity, from a simple Memo-
randum of Understanding, or agreements not to sue among a set of organizations,323 to class action 
settlement agreements that have a broad, binding effect on absent parties, including orphan works’ 
owners.324 These solutions are all suggested in the context of mass digitization of collections that 
contain orphan works.  
The Copyright Office’s favored solution for mass digitization projects adopts aspects of this broad 
agreement approach. The Office proposes to deploy a collective licensing system, enhanced by leg-
islation which would “extend” license terms negotiated between digitizers and large collective 
rights organizations (CROs) to bind all rightsholders who are similar to those represented by the 
CRO.325 The Office’s extended collective licensing (ECL) proposal patterns several of its features 
on the failed settlement agreement and amended settlement agreement that was negotiated in the 
class action lawsuit against Google for its Google Books project.326  
The value of the ECL system proposed by the Copyright Office and in the class action settlement 
agreements negotiated in the Google Books litigation is that class actions and legislation can be 
used to bind parties who are not present, which would include owners of orphan works. It is be-
yond the scope of this report to fully address how ECL or class action settlements can be used to 
facilitate mass digitization, or more generally whether using such tools is a good idea as a matter of 
policy. Several commenters have already spoken to the shortcomings of specific aspects of both 
ECL legislation and the Google Books Amended Settlement Agreement.327 The more general 
                                                 
322 See Keith Porcaro, Private Ordering and Orphan Works: Our Least Worst Hope?, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 15, 
https://perma.cc/2L8E-Q986. 
323 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 15, at 79–82 (discussing various voluntary agreement proposals raised 
in the course of the Copyright Office’s mass digitization study).  
324 See Pamela Samuelson, supra note 303, at 522; Randal C. Picker, The Google Book Search Settlement: A New Or-
phan Works Monopoly? (John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 462 (2d series), 2009), 
https://perma.cc/5F88-YE3S.; see also Ryan Andrews, Contracting Out of the Orphan Works Problem: How the 
Google Book Search Settlement Serves as a Private Solution to the Orphan Works Problem and Why It Should Matter to 
Policy Makers, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 97 (2009), https://perma.cc/T2SB-FVGA; Costanzo, supra note 134.  
325 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 15, at 82–104. 
326 Id. at 83. 
327 See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 303, at 539 (suggesting that the Google Books settlement agreement should 
not be approved). The district court ultimately rejected the negotiated settlement agreement, in part because of 
 
 LEGAL STRATEGIES FOR DIGITIZING ORPHAN WORKS | 76 
point, that those types of mechanisms might be used to bind non-parties (including orphan works 
owners) to an agreement about uses of their works is worth exploring, but ultimately poses a diffi-
cult strategy for all but the most well-resourced orphan works access projects.   
A more modest option for broad permissions might follow the pattern set out in the EU-developed 
Memorandum of Understanding on Key Principles on the Digitization and Making Available Out 
of Commerce Works (EU MoU). 328 That document, shepherded by the European Commission 
and the result of an extensive stakeholder dialogue, brought together key parties to develop a 
framework on developing agreements between rightsholder groups and library and archives digitiz-
ers who want to provide open access, noncommercial uses of out of commerce works. Signatories 
included European Writers’ Council (EWC), the Federation of European Publishers (FEP), the 
European Publishers’ Council (EPC), the International Association of Scientific, Technical and 
Medical Publishers (STM), the European Bureau of Library, Information and Documentation As-
sociations (EBLIDA), the Conference of European National Librarians (CENL), the Association of 
European Research Libraries (LIBER), European Visual Artists (EVA), the European Federation of 
Journalists (EFJ) and the International Federation of Reprographic Rights Organisations (IFRRO). 
The EU MoU has a limited scope (it only applies to books and journals published in subject coun-
tries that digitizers seek to use) and addresses only out of commerce works (works with known 
owners but that are no longer in print or otherwise commercially available) as distinguished from 
orphan works. Nevertheless, its terms are instructive. The EU MoU gives high-level guidance on 
how to structure agreements, focusing on three principles, (1) that agreements should be voluntary; 
(2) that agreements should cover practical implementation matters and (3) that agreements should 
make special considerations for cross border uses (something of more importance in the EU than 
in U.S. applications).   
In the United States, digitizers of orphan works could take a number of approaches to voluntary 
agreements. One might be to follow the model of the EU MoU and to collectively develop a broad 
consensus document with major national rightsholder groups. The Copyright Office has raised 
such a possibility, with it taking a role as facilitator.329 Such an MoU, one might imagine, would 
contain guidance regarding on what matters digitizers and relevant rightsholder groups should 
agree. For example, minimum diligent searches for rightsholders, uses made by digitizers, commu-
                                                                                                                                                             
its treatment of orphan works. See Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), 
https://casetext.com/case/guild-v-google-inc. See also Thomas Riis & Jens Schovsbo, Extended Collective Licenses 
and the Nordic Experience: It's a Hybrid but Is It a Volvo or a Lemon?, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 471, 474–76 (2010), 
https://perma.cc/B559-JH3E (reviewing the Nordic ECL model on which the Copyright Office’s proposal is 
based).  
328Memorandum of Understanding on Key Principles on the Digitization and Making Available Out of Com-
merce Works, European Commission, Sept. 20, 2011,  http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/out-of-
commerce/index_en.htm (hereinafter EU MoU).  
329 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 15, at 80. 
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nication with rightsholder groups, and procedures for addressing uses of works should an owner 
come forward might all be addressed. Even without a high level MoU, digitizers may be able to 
work with associations and other groups to negotiate broad guidelines for specific uses and for 
specific works, such as digitization of films thought to be orphaned in special collections.   
The value of such agreements is primarily that they would limit exposure to suit from those parties 
that voluntarily agreed to them. Thus, risk of suits from those associations of rightsholders or 
CROs that sign on would be minimized. Voluntary agreements, of course, would not bind 
rightsholders who are not a party, leaving open the possibility of suit from a yet-to-emerge individ-
ual rightsholder of an orphan work.  
Negotiated guidelines of this sort can be problematic for other reasons. They can become out of 
date and stifle uses of works as practices change. This is especially true when those guidelines at-
tempt to define the scope of specific legal doctrines, such as fair use. The Classroom Guidelines, 
for example, were negotiated with rightsholders as part of an understanding about fair use of ma-
terial reproduced for teaching uses. But, created in the 1970s, the Guidelines contain limits on 
copying that are now largely out of sync both with fair use law and modern teaching practices.330 
Consensus for creating negotiated guidelines for uses of copyrighted works can be, as recent histo-
ry has shown, time consuming and difficult to effectively achieve.331 Thus, digitizers who seek out 
broader permissions in an orphan works project should exercise caution, assessing both the time 
and effort devoted to such a project and the potential long-term consequences of establishing ne-
gotiated agreements.  
BROAD PERMISSIONS THROUGH CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT 
Initiating a class action lawsuit for the purposes of obtaining a binding settlement agreement is 
another way to clear rights on a mass scale. Such a strategy is highly aggressive (it certainly isn’t 
minimizing the likelihood of a dispute, but walking into one, albeit on one’s own terms) and cost-
ly. If anything, this is a strategy that is unlikely to be used except by well-resourced digitizers who 
seek broad agreements covering large numbers of works. Only one digitizer, Google, has tried it, 
with mixed results. Because of the significance of that effort, I review it here and outline some of 
the substantial challenges to this approach.  
Class actions are a procedural tool available under current law to consolidate common questions 
of fact or law into a single case. Among other things, class actions promote efficiency by avoiding 
duplicitous suits and promote justice by avoiding inconsistency among many suits addressing simi-
                                                 
330  See Kenneth D. Crews, The Law of Fair Use and the Illusion of Fair-Use Guidelines, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 599 (2001), 
https://perma.cc/B66W-XQ48.   
331 THE CONFERENCE ON FAIR USE, FINAL REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER ON THE CONFERENCE ON FAIR 
USE (1998), https://perma.cc/P93N-GDSX. 
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lar questions.332 Because class actions can bind parties who are not actually present in the suit, the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain several safeguards to ensure that the process protects 
those absent parties’ interests.  Two aspects of those rules are relevant here. First, the class action 
mechanism may be used, if at all, only in cases where “(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of 
all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;(3) the 
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; 
and(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”333   
Second, for class action settlements that will bind absent parties, the Rules provide that the court 
must approve the proposed settlement “only after a hearing and on finding that it is fair, reasona-
ble, and adequate.”334 
In light of those safeguards, it remains unclear whether a class action could be used for a case in-
volving a class made up of a large number of orphan works’ rightsholders. The only case so far to 
test this is Authors Guild, Inc. v Google Inc., which offers mixed signals on how such a suit would 
proceed.  That case was filed in 2005 by the Authors Guild, a membership association of more 
than 8000 authors, mostly trade book authors, and several individual authors as representatives of 
a class defined broadly as “[a]ll persons residing in the United States who hold a United States 
copyright interest in one or more Books reproduced by Google as part of its Library Project, who 
are either [individual authors or their heirs]”335 The suit was centered around Google’s massive dig-
itization project, which involved copying millions of in-copyright books from academic and re-
search libraries for the creation of Google Books, a service that allows users to conduct text search-
es of the content of those books and, in some cases, view “snippets” showing search results in con-
text with the surrounding text.336   
The case had a long and complex history leading up to settlement negotiations and, eventually,337 a 
proposed class action settlement agreement. That agreement would have allowed Google, among 
other things, to make full-text display uses of some works, including works that were identified as 
“unclaimed.”338 An amended version of the settlement agreement went before the district court in 
                                                 
332 See 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 1751 (3d ed. 1998). 
333 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), https://perma.cc/M9BR-T9SD.  
334 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
335 Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 721 F.3d 132, 133–34 (2d Cir. 2013), https://casetext.com/case/authors-
guild-inc-v-google-inc.  
336 Id. 
337 See Jonathan Band, The Long and Winding Road to the Google Books Settlement, 9 JOHN MARSHALL REV. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 227 (2009), https://perma.cc/2AX5-ZSAZ. 
338 Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), https://casetext.com/case/guild-v-
google-inc.  
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2009, and the required “fairness hearing” on final approval was held in 2010.339 Ultimately, the 
district court rejected the amended settlement agreement, citing as a major factor the concerns ex-
pressed by class members, several of which related specifically to uses of orphan works.340 The 
court worried, for one, that using the class action to in essence license orphan works to Google 
would be usurping the role of Congress: “the questions of who should be entrusted with guardian-
ship over orphan books, under what terms, and with what safeguards are matters more appropri-
ately decided by Congress than through an agreement among private, self-interested parties.”341   
The court also expressed concerns that the representatives in the suit, named class members, could 
not adequately represent the interest of owners of unclaimed works, particularly because the set-
tlement agreement would have authorized forward-looking relief: “While it is true that in virtually 
every class action many class members are never heard from, the difference is that in other class 
actions class members are merely releasing “claims” for damages for purported past aggrievements. 
In contrast, here class members would be giving up certain property rights in their creative works, 
and they would be deemed—by their silence—to have granted to Google a license to future use of 
their copyrighted works.”342 Similarly, the court noted that antitrust concerns (Google would effec-
tively have a license to orphan works that no other party could reasonably obtain) were problemat-
ic.343 Ultimately, the court rejected the settlement agreement as not fair, adequate, or reasona-
ble.344  
What is telling about the court’s conclusions on orphan works is that, unlike other objections not-
ed in the opinion, none are particularly unique to Google’s use or the specific terms of the settle-
ment agreement. Almost any effort to use a class action to obtain broad permissions for forward-
looking relief for uses of orphans—effectively permission to use the orphan works on an ongoing 
basis—would raise questions about Congress’s role in crafting a broad orphan works licensing solu-
tion and about the adequacy of named parties to represent absent orphan works’ owners.  
Beyond the challenges with a settlement agreement, simply maintaining a class action suit might be 
difficult under the four general class action requirements spelled out in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which require (1) numerosity of parties; (2) common questions of law and fact; (3) typi-
cality of claims and defenses; and (4) adequacy of representation.345 Again, the Authors Guild v. 
Google, Inc. lawsuit gives probably the best preview of how a court would reason through these re-
                                                 
339 Id.  
340 Id. at 676.  
341 Id. at 677. 
342 Id. at 680.  
343 Id. at 682.  
344 Id. at 686.  
345 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), https://perma.cc/M9BR-T9SD.  
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quirements for a class action regarding orphan works. After rejecting the settlement, the court was 
asked to rule on a motion to certify the class, which it did while addressing each of these factors in 
turn. Because of the size of the project and the singular use, the court had little difficulty determin-
ing that the class me the first three requirements, that it was sufficiently numerous and that com-
mon questions prevailed, and that the claims and defenses raised were typical of the class.346 The 
court dwelled on the question of whether class representatives were representative and discussed 
evidence presented by Google that many class members were in favor of Google’s uses, and there-
fore had differing views from the class representatives who brought the suit opposing Google’s us-
es. The court ultimately  rejected that argument, holding that the class representatives were ade-
quate because their claims did not directly conflict with those of others in the class and stated that 
“some class members may prefer to leave the alleged violation of their rights unremedied” was not 
relevant for class certification.347 Thus, the district court certified the class.  
On appeal, however, the Second Circuit was less sanguine, stating that Google’s claims about in-
adequate representation of the class represented “an argument which, in our view, may carry some 
force.”348 It vacated the district court’s order and instead directed it to first consider Google’s fair 
use defense, which it then did, deciding in Google’s favor. Thus, it remains unclear how the courts 
would view the four class action requirements in an orphan works suit, particularly in a case with a 
class construed so broadly and with so many competing interests as the class in Authors Guild v. 
Google, Inc.349   
A final barrier is that initiating a class action suit may be difficult. A digitizer could, of course, wait 
for a class of plaintiffs to sue. As a proactive strategy, however, a digitizer would have to attempt to 
name a defendant as a representative of a class and seek a declaratory judgment from a court that 
                                                 
346  Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 282 F.R.D. 384, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), https://casetext.com/case/authors-guild-v-
google, vacated in part, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 721 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2013), 
https://casetext.com/case/authors-guild-inc-v-google-inc. Google argued strenuously that typicality was not met 
because the nature of copyright claims, which require proof of ownership, and fair use defenses, which require 
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lar work. See Defendant Google’s Opposition to the Motion for Class Certification, Authors Guild, 282 F.R.D. 
384 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 05 Civ. 8136), https://perma.cc/6BYY-JGUJ.  
347 Id. at 394.  
348 Authors Guild, Inc, 721 F.3d at 134.  
349 See, e.g., Football Ass'n Premier League Ltd. v. YouTube, Inc., 297 F.R.D. 64, 65–66 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), 
https://casetext.com/case/football-assn-premier-league-ltd-v-youtube (“Generally speaking, copyright claims are 
poor candidates for class-action treatment. They have superficial similarities.”).  
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the digitizer’s uses are permissible. Such “reverse” defendant-class suits are relatively rare, and in 
some jurisdictions it remains unclear whether the class action rules permit such actions.350  
CHALLENGING STANDING OF POTENTIAL LITIGANTS 
As the Authors Guild v. Google case illustrates, one of the risks faced by orphan works digitizers may 
not come from suits by orphan works’ rightsholders themselves but from other parties who claim 
to represent the interests of orphan works’ owners. Indeed, the only litigated cases that address 
orphan works as such were not initially filed by owners of orphan works, but by the Authors 
Guild, an association which holds some copyrights itself but brought suit largely on behalf of its 
members and through individuals asserting class-representative status in a class action lawsuit. 
Voluntary agreements may be one way to stem disputes with large groups or associations. Chal-
lenging the standing of those organizations to sue can also be a worthwhile strategy to cut off their 
ability to litigate.  
To get a sense of what standing is and how to challenge it, it’s helpful to start with how U.S. courts 
decide what cases they may hear.  The U.S. Constitution extends the authority of the federal judi-
ciary only to actual “cases and controversies,”351 which means that courts only resolve live disputes. 
One of the ways federal courts go about determining what constitutes a “case or controversy” is to 
look at whether the plaintiff has “standing” to sue. In general, as a constitutional matter, a plaintiff 
only has standing if he or she can “allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s alleged-
ly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.”352 For “injury” that means 
that the plaintiff has or will imminently suffer an “invasion of a legally protected interest which is 
(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical’.”353 
In other words, the plaintiff must allege actual harm that stems from something that the defendant 
did and for which the requested relief would remedy.  
In addition, courts have recognized that third-party plaintiffs may satisfy constitutional standing 
requirements in some circumstances. “Associational standing carves only a narrow exception from 
the ordinary rule that a litigant must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his 
claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.”354 To define that narrow exception, 
                                                 
350 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 5:20 (5th ed.). See also Henson v. E. Lincoln Twp., 
814 F.2d 410, 414 (7th Cir. 1987), https://casetext.com/case/henson-v-east-lincoln-tp (discussing how a defen-
sive-class suit might be permissible when filed as a declaratory judgment action suit).  
351 U.S. CONST. art. III, https://perma.cc/5D3Z-VC9X.  
352 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750–51 (1984), https://casetext.com/case/allen-v-wright-regan-v-wright.  
353 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992), https://casetext.com/case/lujan-v-defenders-of-
wildlife.  
354 Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 361 F.3d 696, 715 (2d Cir. 2004), https://casetext.com/case/bano-v-union-
carbide-corp.  
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courts follow a three part test, looking at whether “(a) [the association’s] members would otherwise 
have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the or-
ganization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the partic-
ipation of individual members in the lawsuit.”355 An association need not prove that all members 
meet standing requirements, but only that at least one member has standing in his or her own 
right.356  
In addition to those standing rules, courts have occasionally recognized the concept of “statutory 
standing,” which focuses on statutory commands as to who is the appropriate party to assert rights 
in courts under that particular statute.357 The Supreme Court has on several occasions referred to 
“statutory standing” with apparently varying meanings, but frequently in the context of whether 
the plaintiff falls within the class of people for whom Congress intended to create a private right of 
action to sue under the given statute.358  It remains unclear, however, what effect “statutory stand-
ing” has on the overall disposition of a case. Constitutional standing is considered a threshold is-
sue which determines whether the court has jurisdiction. If raised, it must be answered first and 
presents an opportunity to cut short litigation. Whether statutory standing requirements also pre-
sent a threshold jurisdictional issue is an open question.359 
In the copyright context, at least two statutes speak to the ability of a plaintiff to bring an in-
fringement suit in federal court. First, 28 U.S.C. § 1338 explicitly provides that federal district 
courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction over copyright suits.360 Section 501(b) of the Copyright Act 
                                                 
355 Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977), https://casetext.com/case/hunt-v-
washington-state-apple-advertising-commission.  
356 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975), https://casetext.com/case/warth-v-seldin (“The association 
must allege that its members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the 
challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members themselves brought suit.”). 
357 For a good explanation of how “statutory standing” is used in federal case law, see Radha A. Pathak, Statutory 
Standing and the Tyranny of Labels, 62 OK. L. REV. 89, 91 (2009), https://perma.cc/3SJB-F6CK (reviewing the va-
riety of ways that statutory standing questions arise but generalizing that the central inquiry is “whether a statute 
creating a private right of action authorizes a particular plaintiff to avail herself of that right of action.”).    
358 See id.  
359 See Authors Guild, Inc. v. Hathitrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), 
https://casetext.com/case/authors-guild-inc-v-hathitrust (concluding that statutory standing requirements in 
copyright are not jurisdictional). See also Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 161 (2010), 
https://casetext.com/case/reed-elsevier-v-muchnick (distinguishing “jurisdictional” and “claims processing” 
rules); Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 n.4 (2014), 
https://perma.cc/DYW3-5MRH.  
360 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2015), https://perma.cc/L477-87ZS (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of 
any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and 
trademarks. No State court shall have jurisdiction over any claim for relief arising under any Act of Congress 
relating to patents, plant variety protection, or copyrights.”). Federal courts would have jurisdiction anyway 
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provides that only “the legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled, 
subject to the requirements of section 411 (registration), to institute an action for any infringe-
ment.”361  
For associations asserting rights on behalf of orphan works’ owners, the Google Books litigation 
and a related suit, Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, have helped answer whether those litigants can 
bring suit on behalf of their members. In both suits, the courts ultimately concluded that they 
could not.  The district courts in both cases were asked to decide whether the Authors Guild (and 
a handful of other co-plaintiff associations) had constitutional standing under the associational 
standing test outlined above.362 In both cases, the district courts concluded that the associations 
easily met the first two parts of the test, that (a) association members would have standing to sue in 
their own right and (b) that the interests the association seeks to protect are germane to the organi-
zation’s purpose). For the third part of the test, that “neither the claim asserted nor the relief re-
quested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit,” the courts likewise con-
cluded that the associations could meet that test, though with more difficulty. Both Google and 
HathiTrust argued that individual participation of association members would be necessary to 
prove which copyrights they owned and the evaluate the fair use defense.  
The court in Authors Guild v. Google, Inc. reasoned that individual member participation is not nec-
essary because copyright ownership information is publicly available through the Copyright Of-
fice’s registration records. For those instances where authors have assigned some rights to publish-
ers or others, limited individual participation would be required to determine the scope of the as-
signment, but not at a level that the court deemed would “make this case administratively incon-
venient or unmanageable.”363 The court also rejected Google’s contention that the fair use analysis 
requires individual participation. Rather, the court concluded that differences among authors and 
works could be accommodated by addressing each as defined sub-groups.364 “The Court could ef-
fectively assess the merits of the fair-use defense with respect to each of these categories without 
                                                                                                                                                             
(though not exclusively) under general federal question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331, https://perma.cc/L477-
87ZS (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, 
or treaties of the United States.”).   
361 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2015), https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6. See Saregama India Ltd. v. Mosely, 635 F.3d 1284, 
1290–91 (11th Cir. 2011), https://casetext.com/case/saregama-india-ltd-v-mosley (referring to Section 501(b) as 
the “statutory standing requirement” of the Copyright Act.); Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 
153 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 1998), https://casetext.com/case/itar-tass-russian-news-v-russian-kurier (“[A]n owner . . . 
may sue for infringement in a United States court only if it meets the standing test of 17 U.S.C. § 501(b).”).  
362 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 282 F.R.D. 384, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), https://casetext.com/case/authors-guild-v-
google; Authors Guild, Inc. v. Hathitrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), 
https://casetext.com/case/authors-guild-inc-v-hathitrust.  
363 Google, Inc., 282 F.R.D. at 390. 
364 Id. at 390.  
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conducting an evaluation of each individual work.”365 Addressing the same issue, the court in Ha-
thiTrust largely adopted the same reasoning of the district court in Authors Guild v. Google.366 While 
both cases were appealed, neither appeal specifically revisited this constitutional standing question.  
The only other recent case to directly address constitutional standing of an association in a copy-
right suit is Association for Information Media & Equipment v. Regents of the University of California. 
That court in that case similarly honed in on the need for individual participation to prove owner-
ship. In contrast to the Google and HathiTrust cases, however, it found that the association in that 
case could not meet the test because copyright infringement always require individualized proof of 
ownership. “In order to establish a claim for copyright infringement, individual copyrights owners' 
participation is necessary. This is because having the rights over a copyright is essential to establish-
ing a copyright infringement claim. . . . relief would be limited by the rights that members have 
over the copyrights. Therefore, [the association] as a matter of law, has failed to establish associa-
tional standing because it cannot meet the third prong of the [associational standing test].”367 
For statutory standing, the court in Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, was asked to assess statutory stand-
ing under Section 501(b), which states that “the legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right un-
der a copyright is entitled ... to institute an action for any infringement of that particular right 
committed while he or she is the owner of it” and not third-party associations.368 The district court 
held that Section 501(b) was exclusionary; it “explicitly limits who may enforce copyright claims.” 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in a short declaration, stating that “the Copyright 
Act does not permit copyright holders to choose third parties to bring suits on their behalf.”369 No 
other court has yet directly addressed this question.  
                                                 
365 Id. The court did not discuss how determining copyright ownership can be a tangled process that requires 
individual participation of many parties, including the author. See, e.g., Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. 
Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Ga. 2012), https://casetext.com/case/cambridge-univ-press-v-becker (dismissing seventeen 
of seventy-four infringement claims for failure to prove ownership after a weeks-long trial); see also Art of Living 
Found. v. Doe, No. 5:10-cv-05022-LHK, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61582 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2012), 
https://casetext.com/case/art-of-living-found-v-does-1-1 (discussing three alternative theories of plaintiff’s owner-
ship and finding that plaintiff had failed to adduce evidence necessary to prove any of the three theories correct); 
Getty Images (USA), Inc. v. Advernet, 797 F. Supp. 2d 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), https://casetext.com/case/getty-
images-us-inc-v-advernet-inc (dismissing thirty-five of thirty-seven infringement claims for failure to produce evi-
dence of ownership via exclusive licenses or other transfers of rights).   
366 Authors Guild, Inc. v. Hathitrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), 
https://casetext.com/case/authors-guild-inc-v-hathitrust.  
.367 Ass'n for Info. Media & Equip. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. CV 10-9378 CBM (MANx), 2011 WL 
7447148, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2011). 
368 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2015), https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6.  
369 Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 94 (2d Cir. 2014), https://casetext.com/case/authors-guild-inc-
v-hathitrust-1.  
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For open access orphan works projects that may be threatened with litigation by an association, 
particularly for mass digitization projects, the analysis is likely to be similar to that in the Google 
and HathiTrust cases. For the constitutional test, assuming that the associations could meet the 
first two requirements regarding their members’ interests and the purpose of the association, the 
argument would center on whether the association members would need to participate individual-
ly. The Authors Guild v. Google and HathiTrust courts concluded that they did not in those cases, 
suggesting that there is enough publicly available information to glean sufficient information about 
individual copyright ownership claims. While those assertions may be optimistic, even for the 
largely published print book collections that Google and HathiTrust include, the case for individ-
ual participation for projects with works that have almost no public ownership information (e.g., 
special collections of unpublished and unregistered works) would be stronger. Challenging consti-
tutional standing is also important because it is a threshold jurisdictional issue and may be used to 
cut off the suit early. Even if that challenge fails, however, the statutory standing requirement is a 
helpful backstop.  
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REDUCING RISK: MINIMIZE NEGATIVE REMEDIES 
Because the risk of infringement liability is thought to be the driving reason why some users avoid 
orphan works, minimizing remedies has remained one of the central themes of orphan works pro-
posals, especially legislative proposals. The Copyright Office’s proposal for orphan works legisla-
tion and the bills considered by Congress were all based on a model that sought to statutorily limit 
remedies available against users of orphan works who had made good faith diligent searches for 
owners.370 One of the reasons why remedy limitation has retained so much appeal in the United 
States (while it has been largely ignored in the rest of the world) is that certain remedies, particular-
ly statutory damages awards, significantly elevate the risk exposure associated with using copyright-
ed works. Unlike in many other nations,371 in the United States, successful plaintiffs may be 
awarded statutory damages, which are damages elected by the plaintiff without requiring proof of 
actual harm, falling within a statutory range of up to $150,000 per work infringed.372 In several 
cases, statutory damage awards have had seemingly little relationship to the actual damages in-
curred,373 and so even for uses of works with limited commercial value, users may fear exposure to 
heavy handed consequences for their uses.374  
For open access orphan works uses, digitizers can take a variety of steps under existing law to min-
imize the likelihood of negative remedies. As noted in the Current Practices section of this report, 
librarians have suggested focusing projects on works that are ineligible for statutory damages (such 
as unregistered works) or making uses for which statutory damages are unavailable (such as good 
faith assertions of fair use). Others, such as Professor Ariel Katz, have proposed, for example, that 
orphan works are ideal vehicles for “remedy tweaking” by the courts to minimize negative conse-
quences for uses. This Section outlines strategies, again roughly in order of most practically useful 
and most important to least, for reducing risk in the four primary areas where remedies are in-
curred: 1) monetary damages, 2) injunctive relief, 3) attorney fees and costs, and 4) criminal penal-
ties. 
                                                 
370 See infra Appendix A.   
371 Pamela Samuelson, Phil Hill, & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages: A Rarity in Copyright Laws Internationally, 
But For How Long?, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A 529, 536–44 (2013), https://perma.cc/NT97-TC7Z.  
372 17 U.S.C. § 504, https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6. 
373 See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008), 
https://casetext.com/case/capitol-records-inc-v-thomas. See also Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory 
Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 480 (2009), 
https://perma.cc/9PEM-7ZUZ (discussing examples of cases in which awards were excessive or arbitrary).  
374 This may be why even for organizations such as the Association of Research Libraries, which largely oppose 
broader orphan works legislation, the specter of large damages awards has caused them to continue to support 
limited legislative amendments for relief from statutory damages and other awards. See Library Copyright Alli-
ance, supra note 55.  
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MINIMIZING MONETARY DAMAGES 
Digitizers have a number of options available to minimize monetary damages awards against them. 
For monetary damage awards, the Copyright Act provides for two types.  “[A]n infringer of copy-
right is liable for either-- (1) the copyright owner's actual damages and any additional profits of the 
infringer . . .  or (2) statutory damages.”375 Among the strategies digitizers can use to minimize the 
risk of these damages are (1) asserting sovereign immunity, when available, to avoid all damages 
awards; (2) minimizing actual damages by using works of low commercial value; and (3) minimiz-
ing statutory damages by making good-faith assertions of fair use, effectively using other defenses to 
create a plausible innocent infringer defense and avoid “willful” infringement.  
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND RETROACTIVE MONETARY RELIEF 
One of the most significant shields from monetary relief is sovereign immunity. Since the 1990s, 
the Supreme Court has decided a number of cases regarding the role of the 11th Amendment and 
how it relates to the ability of federal courts to impose monetary damages awards on state govern-
ments.376 The result of those decisions is that state governments are now largely immune, under 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity, from almost all retrospective monetary relief ordered by feder-
al courts. The courts have held that this even holds true in cases, such as with the Copyright Act, 
where Congress has explicitly expressed its intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity.377  
In intellectual property cases, courts have confirmed that this principle applies to state universities 
and state-run schools and hospitals.378 Perhaps because of sovereign immunity, plaintiffs in several 
recent infringement lawsuits against state educational institutions have not sought monetary dam-
                                                 
375 17 U.S.C. § 504(a), https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6.  
376 U.S. CONST. amend. XI, https://perma.cc/3ZBV-68KX; Fla. PrePaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. 
Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), https://casetext.com/case/florida-ppd-postsec-ed-exp-bd-v-college-sav-bk (Con-
gress cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity using its powers under the intellectual property clause). 
377 17 U.S.C. § 511, https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6. Several courts have now held that this attempt at abroga-
tion was ineffective. See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Bds. of Pharmacy v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga. 633 F.3d 1297 
(11th Cir. 2011), https://casetext.com/case/natl-assn-of-bd-v-bd-of-regents; Rodriguez v. Tex. Comm'n on the Arts, 
199 F.3d 279, 53 (5th Cir. 2000), https://casetext.com/case/rodriguez-v-texas-commission-on-the-arts; Mktg. Info. 
Masters, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ. Sys., 552 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (S.D. Cal. 2008), 
https://casetext.com/case/marketing-information-masters-v-cal-state-univ. 
378 See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102–03 (1984), 
https://casetext.com/case/pennhurst-state-school-hospital-v-halderman (“[W]hen a plaintiff sues a state official 
alleging a violation of federal law, the federal court may award an injunction that governs the official's future 
conduct, but not one that awards retroactive monetary relief . . . [R]etroactive relief was barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment.”); Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601, 603 (5th Cir. 2000), https://casetext.com/case/chavez-
v-arte-publico-press-5; Mktg. Info. Masters, Inc. 552 F. Supp. 2d at 1095. 
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ages.379  Sovereign immunity may also explain why some state university libraries and archives have 
felt emboldened enough to participate in major mass digitization initiatives, such as Google 
Books,380 that would otherwise represent great exposure to liability.  
There are some significant limits on the extent of sovereign immunity. Not all state government 
actors qualify. Only arms of the state enjoy immunity; branches of local and municipal govern-
ments do not.381  Thus, public libraries, local archives, and locally-run historical societies that are 
part of the local government are not immune. Further, sovereign immunity only shields the state 
from monetary awards. Federal courts remain free to award prospective relief in appropriate cases, 
such as entering an injunction ordering state officials to do or not do a particular act.382  
In terms of a strategy for applying sovereign immunity to orphan works, institutions either have 
sovereign immunity or they do not. As a matter of risk assessment, digitizers should be well aware 
before undertaking projects whether they have access to sovereign immunity and whether there are 
any special considerations in their state that would limit that immunity in copyright suits.383 For 
digitizers that do not have sovereign immunity, one suggestion might be to think about whether it 
would be possible to develop agreements to shift particularly risky collections to state institutions 
for digitization and digital access.384  
                                                 
379 See First Amended Complaint, Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 868 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (No. 
1:08-CV-1425-ODE), https://perma.cc/6YF3-GEKK (requesting only injunctive relief and attorney’s fees and 
costs), rev’d, Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F. 3d 1232 (11th Cir. Ga. 2014); Amended Complaint, Authors 
Guild, Inc. v. Hathitrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No.11 CV 6351 (HB)),, 
https://perma.cc/9VWD-MGEH (demanding an injunctive relief and attorneys’ fees and costs), aff’d in part, va-
cated in part and remanded, Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2014) . But see Second 
Amended Complaint, Ass’n for Info. Media & Equip. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
154011 (C.D. Cal. filed Oct. 24, 2011) (No. CV 10-9378 CBM (MANx)), https://perma.cc/7HML-BD2U (de-
manding an injunction in addition to statutory damages, punitive damages, lost profits, licensing fees, pre- and 
post-judgment interest, and attorneys’ fees and costs).  
380 See Samuelson, supra note 303, at 484. 
381 Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977), https://casetext.com/case/mt-
healthy-city-school-district-board-of-education-v-doyle (sovereign immunity extends to “States and state officials in 
appropriate circumstances . . . but does not extend to counties and similar municipal corporations.”).  
382 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp, 465 U.S. at 102-03.  
383 The Supreme Court has always held that states may voluntarily waive their immunity. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821), https://casetext.com/case/cohens-v-virginia.   
384 Such an arrangement would need to be careful to avoid secondary liability on the part of the original, non-
sovereign digitizer.  
 LEGAL STRATEGIES FOR DIGITIZING ORPHAN WORKS | 89 
ACTUAL DAMAGES  
A successful copyright plaintiff may elect to receive either actual damages or, if eligible, statutory 
damages. For actual damages, the statute provides that the copyright owner is also entitled to re-
ceive “profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into ac-
count in computing the actual damages.”385 Actual damages, as the term implies, must be based on 
actual harm, not speculative harm. They can include things such as lost licensing fees,386 loss of 
goodwill,387 and market value of the work,388 among other things. The same is true for profits – 
they must be profits attributable to the work and not other aspects of the infringer’s business.389 .  
For open access orphan works projects, actual damages are likely to be minimal. For most orphan 
works, lost licensing fees and market value would be close to zero. For profits, some open access 
projects may generate revenue (e.g., though an ad-supported delivery platform), but the profits at-
tributable to a given work would likely be minimal as well.  
STATUTORY DAMAGES 
Statutory damages are among the greatest concern for orphan works digitizers. In cases when they 
are available, these damages can be high. The Copyright Act provides that the ordinary range for 
statutory damages awards is between $750 and $30,000 per work infringed, “as the court considers 
just.”390 Statutory damages can be reduced to as low as $200 in cases of innocent infringement and 
can be extended to as high as $150,000 per work infringed for willful infringement.391  
There are several important limitations on statutory damages that digitizers should consider.  First, 
statutory damages are only available for infringements of works that were registered with the Copy-
right Office before the time of the infringement.392  
                                                 
385 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2015), https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6.  
386 Kleier Advert., Inc. v. John Deery Motors, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 311 (N.D. Iowa 1993), 
https://casetext.com/case/kleier-advertising-inc-v-john-deery-motors-inc.  
387 TVT Records v. Island Def Jam Music Grp., 279 F. Supp.2d 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
388 Eales v. Envtl. Lifestyles, Inc., 958 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1992), https://casetext.com/case/eales-v-environmental-
lifestyles-inc.  
389 See, e.g., Polar Bear Prods., Inc. v. Timex Corp., 384 F.3d 700 (9th Cir. 2004), https://casetext.com/case/polar-
bear-prod-v-timex-corp-03-35188-9th-cir-9-3-2004.  
390 17 U.S.C.§ 504(c)(1), https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6.  
391 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2), https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6.  
392  17 U.S.C. § 412, https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6 (“ . . . no award of statutory damages or of attorney’s fees, as 
provided by sections 504 and 505, shall be made for—(1) any infringement of copyright in an unpublished work 
commenced before the effective date of its registration; or (2) any infringement of copyright commenced after 
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Second, that statute provides that “[t]he court shall remit statutory damages in any case where an 
infringer believed and had reasonable grounds for believing that his or her use of the copyrighted 
work was a fair use . . . if the infringer was . . .  an employee or agent of a nonprofit educational 
institution, library, or archives acting within the scope of his or her employment who, or such in-
stitution, library, or archives itself, which infringed by reproducing the work in copies or 
phonorecords.”393 That provision is helpful for digitizers of those types, though it’s important to 
know that this provision has never been tested in court. 
Third, statutory damages are subject to an “innocent infringer” provision, which provides that if 
an infringer can prove that she “was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts 
constituted an infringement of copyright” the court may reduce to award to a sum not less than 
$200.394 In practice, innocent infringement has been somewhat difficult to prove, requiring the 
defendant to show that she “was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts consti-
tuted an infringement of copyright.”395 Courts have interpreted this narrowly, insisting that de-
fendants show not only a good faith belief that their conduct was noninfringing, but also that 
there was a reasonable basis for that belief.396 For sophisticated users with knowledge of the copy-
right system, such as many digitizing libraries and archives, this standard may be difficult to meet. 
Notice of copyright ownership also plays a special role in determining the availability of the inno-
cent infringer defense. In cases where notice is properly affixed on copies of the work, courts are 
instructed that “no weight shall be given to such a defendant’s interposition of a defense based on 
innocent infringement in mitigation of actual or statutory damages, except as provided in the last 
sentence of section 504 (c)(2) [an educational user’s good faith reliance on fair use].”397  
For orphan works digitizers, one strategy might be to favor works that are unlikely to be registered 
with the Copyright Office and thus ineligible for statutory damages. Unpublished material, home 
photographs, letters, and ephemera are all unlikely to be eligible for statutory damages because 
those types of works are not ordinarily registered with the Copyright Office. Digitizers should also 
give careful consideration to their fair use defense rationale, as that takes on extra weight not just 
as a defense but as a tool, when relied upon in good faith, to mitigate a statutory damages award. 
Note too that relief from statutory damages in cases of reasonable reliance on fair use would be 
absolute; the statute provides that courts “shall remit” statutory damages, not “may.” For access to 
an innocent infringement defense, again, the reasonableness of one’s defenses would be im-
                                                                                                                                                             
first publication of the work and before the effective date of its registration, unless such registration is made 
within three months after the first publication of the work.”)  
393 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2), https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6.  
394 Id.  
395 See 5–14 NIMMER, supra note 246 § 14.04[B] [2] [a] (2015). See also R. Anthony Reese, Innocent Infringement in 
U.S. Copyright Law: A History, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 133 (2007), https://perma.cc/2EU6-V44A.  
396 Id. 
397 17 U.S.C. § 401(d), https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6. 
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portant. Likewise, recall that laches and more general delay in bringing suit is something that the 
courts may consider when reducing damage awards. Because innocent infringement is limited to 
uses of works that do not contain a copyright notice, the most likely candidate works would be 
those types of works that have never been commercialized and for which owners never saw the 
need to affix a copyright notice.  
Limit Injunctive relief  
The Copyright Act allows courts broad discretion in granting injunctive relief, providing that a 
court “may” grant injunctive relief “on such terms as it may deem reasonable.”398 It also specifically 
allows courts to order the seizure and destruction of copies, again, if the court deems such steps 
necessary in its discretion.399 Injunctive relief may not be a major concern in orphan works cases 
involving suits by individual rightsholders. Presumably, libraries or archives would be happy in 
many cases to voluntarily take down works that have been identified by legitimate owners. Never-
theless, there may be circumstances when a digitizer wants to avoid injunctive relief requiring re-
moval or even destruction of copies of the work.   
Injunctions are within the discretion of the court and are not automatic. To obtain a permanent 
injunction, the Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff must show “(1) that it has suffered an ir-
reparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to 
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and 
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved 
by a permanent injunction.”400 In the past, courts had almost automatically granted injunctions in 
copyright suits. Since the Supreme Court announced that four part rule, not much has changed, 
though there are some signs that courts are now carefully weighing whether injunctions are neces-
sary.401  
For digitizers, orphan works present a special situation under that four part test and should be fa-
vored against injunctions, especially when orphan works are incorporated into other works used as 
an integral part of some socially valuable work.402 Take for instance a plaintiffs’ proposed injunc-
tion to dismantle or destroy a large database of orphan works that has been used for research or 
                                                 
398 17 U.S.C. § 502(a), https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6.  
399 17 U.S.C. § 503, https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6.  
400 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006), https://casetext.com/case/ebay-inc-v-
mercexchange-l-l-c-2.  
401 Jairui Liu, Copyright Injunctions After eBay: An Empirical Study, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 215 (2012), 
https://perma.cc/RQ3A-XQ52 (analyzing cases to 2010); Jake Phillips, Ebay’s Effect on Copyright Injunctions: When 
Property Rules Give Way to Liability Rules, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 405, 420 (2009), https://perma.cc/6W88-
YW57 (courts still regularly grant injunctions). 
402 Katz, supra note 163; Phillips, supra note 401.  
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scholarship, assembled only after efforts to notify rightsholders were met with a long delay between 
notification and suit. The delay in suit, just as in the “exceptional” cases cited above in the discus-
sion of laches, suggests that a court should not grant such a destructive request because the balance 
of hardships would weigh against the digitizer and because it would not serve the public interest.  
ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS 
For digitizers on the losing end of a lawsuit, attorney’s fees and costs are another significant con-
sideration. As discussed above, federal copyright litigation is expensive and can run into the hun-
dreds of thousands or even millions of dollars in legal fees. The Copyright Act includes a provision 
that allows courts to, “in its discretion” grant allow a party to recovery of “costs” which can include 
an award of reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party.403 Such an award is not entirely 
anomalous in the U.S. legal system, but it is at odds with the ordinary U.S. rule that each party 
bears his own costs of litigation.  
The courts are currently split on exactly who a “prevailing party” is in a copyright suit, and thus 
when attorney’s fees and costs are appropriate to award.404 In December 2015, the Supreme Court 
granted a petition for certiorari to resolve the dispute.405 Regardless of the rule adopted by the Su-
preme Court, however, defendants who lose will not be entitled to attorney’s fees and costs in any 
case.  
One strategy to consider to actually obtain attorney’s fees and costs, even as the losing party, is to 
use an “offer of judgment” early on in the litigation.406 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, Rule 68, a defendant may at any time earlier than 10 days before trial make an “offer of 
judgment” to the plaintiff. If the plaintiff rejects the defendant’s offer and then the final judgment 
in the case for the plaintiff is not more favorable than the defendant’s offer, the plaintiff must pay 
the defendant’s costs. As one court explained,  “Rule 68 is designed to ‘require plaintiffs to think 
very hard about whether continued litigation is worthwhile,’ and compensate defendants for costs 
they ought not have had to incur.”407  
                                                 
403 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2015), https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6. 
404 See also Peter S. Menell & Ben Depoorter, Using Fee Shifting to Promote Fair Use and Fair Licensing, 102 CALIF. 
L. REV. 53 (2014), https://perma.cc/28A7-Z4SU.  
405 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2016 U.S. LEXIS 629 (U.S. 2016) (No. 
15-375), https://perma.cc/7SAZ-VCZT.  
406 FED. R. CIV. P. 68 (2015), https://perma.cc/M9BR-T9SD.  
407 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1033 (9th Cir. 2013), 
https://casetext.com/case/umg-recordings-inc-v-shelter-capital-partners-llc.  
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Rule 68 is not available in every jurisdiction. Several circuit courts have now ruled that because 
Rule 68 and the Copyright Act’s provision of attorney’s fees conflict (Rule 68 allows for awards to 
the losing party, while the Copyright Act favors awards to, if anyone, the prevailing party), the 
Copyright Act will take precedence and Rule 68 offers of judgment will not be awarded.408 So far, 
only the Eleventh Circuit and one district court have published opinions ruling that Rule 68 offers 
of judgment can award attorney’s fees and costs to a losing defendant in a copyright case.409  
 
AVOID CRIMINAL PENALTIES 
Finally, criminal penalties for open access orphan works projects are highly unlikely. To be thor-
ough though, digitizers should understand that criminal copyright penalties are available against 
infringers who committed the infringement “for purposes of commercial advantage or private fi-
nancial gain” or who committed the infringement “by reproduction or distribution . . . during any 
180 day period, of 1 or more copies works. . . of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total 
retail value of more than $1,000 . . .”410 Thus, digitizers concerned about criminal liability for or-
phan works’ uses should be careful to avoid gaining commercial advantage through their orphan 
works’ access projects and limit reproduction of works of significant value.  
 
  
                                                 
408 6 PATRY, supra note 212 § 22:215 (Attorney's fees and Rule 68 offer of judgment—Is there a conflict between 
section 505 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 68?) (listing cases).  
409 Jordan v. Time, Inc., 111 F.3d 102, 105 (11th Cir. 1997), https://casetext.com/case/jordan-v-time-
incorporated; Lucas v. Wild Dunes Real Estate, Inc., 197 F.R.D. 172, 175 (D.S.C. 2000). 
410 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2015), https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6.  
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CONCLUSION AND PRACTICAL APPLICATION 
There are many ways to reduce the risks associated with providing open access to orphan works. 
Libraries and archives already use fair use, diligent searches, notice-and-takedown policies, and 
more general risk-management techniques in practice to provide online access to many orphan 
works. Those strategies deserve recognition as being effective; so far, despite many example collec-
tions online containing orphan works, the numbers for reported copyright disputes are strikingly 
low.  
For defenses to infringement, digitizers have several options alongside fair use, to defend their ac-
tions. Two of the most significant are:  
• For projects that include material already digitized under some other legal justification 
o Conducting required investigations under Section 108(e) to provide full-text copies 
of textual works to patrons;  
o Conducting required investigations under Section 108(h) to provide full-text copies 
of older (1923-1941) published works to patrons; 
• Develop a laches defense for all types of works  
o By providing broad notification to potential rightsholders through publicity efforts; 
o By using the Copyright Office’s recordation system for works that are eligible for 
constructive notice-by-recordation; 
o By delaying use for a sufficient period of time to allow notification to be effective 
Digitizers seeking additional ways to reduce risk should consider applying some of the many strate-
gies described in this report. For minimizing the risk of suit or cutting off suits quickly, digitizers 
can consider using:  
• Quitclaim grants of rights in cases where some individuals or organizations associated with 
orphan works are locatable;  
• Broader grants of permission for large-scale projects through voluntary agreements or (for 
particularly aggressive digitizers) through class actions; 
• For digitization projects that draw concerns about lawsuits from associations, a developed 
argument in opposition to those organizations’ standing to sue 
To minimize remedies, digitizers should consider: 
• Structuring digitization projects so that the riskiest materials are held and digitized by or-
ganizations with sovereign immunity; 
• Recognize when projects are using works that are likely to be unregistered and thus not 
subject to statutory damages; 
• Develop a good-faith fair use argument for uses to fall within the statutory damages safe 
harbor in Section 504(c)(2); 
• Focus on projects that use works that do not contain a copyright notice, thus making the 
innocent infringement defense available;  
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• For avoiding injunctive relief, be prepared to articulate the public benefit of the digitization 
project; 
• For avoiding attorney’s fees, consider making an offer of judgment under Rule 68 early on 
in a dispute; 
• Avoid criminal penalties by not commercializing digitization projects.  
Each of these strategies considered individually can be valuable for digitizers, and together can 
serve as a powerful set of defenses and risk management devices. For example, a digitizer could use 
these defenses for a group of works, which it believes with some reasonable confidence to be or-
phaned, to create a sort of “waiting list” of orphans, publicized widely and perhaps even registered 
with the Copyright Office Doing so for a period of time without hearing from a rightsholder—say 
three years (the Copyright Act’s statute of limitations period)—before making any sort of use would 
tend to positively affect an assertion of an equitable, laches-style defense. It would also tend to re-
inforce the idea that a market does not exist, which would weigh positively in a fair use analysis. A 
cautious digitizer might also want to invoke Section 108 protections by first making the work 
available only on an as-requested basis, complying with the “one copy” and “non-systematic repro-
duction and distribution” requirements of Section 108 by only offering access to the work for a 
period of time through a virtual reading room or (for 108(e)) through a system in which users can 
make requests. After doing so for another period of time—say, another three years—the digitizer 
might consider lifting that restriction and allow for downloading copies of the work.  
The risk management strategies outlined above could also be used on such a project. Such a pro-
ject might spend some time trying to obtain quit-claim grants where possible, working with major 
rightsholder organizations to inform them of the scope of such a project, and obtaining agree-
ments from them not to sue. Such a project could also use the tools that libraries and archives cur-
rently employ—limited searches for rightsholders and a functioning notice-and-takedown policy—to 
avoid disputes as they arise.  Finally, the project might consider some of the other risk manage-
ment strategies outlined above to limit the likelihood of negative consequences. Works associated 
with more uncertainty and risk might be handled by an organization with sovereign immunity.  
The project might also first focus on works that it believes are unregistered and therefore not sub-
ject to statutory damage awards, and on works for which no notice was attached, and therefore po-
tentially subject to the innocent infringer defense.  
This is just one example of how to combine these defenses and risk management strategies to pro-
vide open access to orphan works. Uncertainty about the law and the factual status of works in 
their collections, combined with a professional culture “imbued with a desire to respect the 
law,”411 has led many potential digitizers to take a cautious approach to using these works. The 
prevailing view among both policymakers and libraries and archives has been that digitization and 
online access to orphan works is too risky under current law; they have in the past described or-
                                                 
411 Hirtle, supra note 120, at 59.  
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phans as copyright “landmines,” 412 and have sometimes avoided digitizing them in the face of any 
risk, “however remote.”413  As this report has shown, libraries and archives have lots of options 
both to defend their uses and to minimize risk.  
                                                 
412 Library Copyright Alliance, Comments Re: Orphan Works Notice of Inquiry (Mar. 25, 2005), 
https://perma.cc/E824-LYNS.  
413 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 8, at 36. 
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APPENDIX A - HOW ORPHAN WORKS BECAME A PROBLEM 
For the last 20 years or so, libraries, archives, and other organizations that care about preserving 
and providing online access to cultural works have struggled with how to digitally preserve and 
provide access to their collections in the face of copyright restrictions. The orphan works prob-
lem—how to use works with unlocatable or unidentifiable rightsholders—raises special issues be-
cause of the compounded factual uncertainty about who might assert rights in these works and 
legal uncertainty about what consequences might await those who use these works without permis-
sion. The cause of the orphan works problem, or at least its exacerbation, can be traced to three 
developments since the 1970s: 1) the expansion of copyright protection, 2) the rapid increase in 
the number of copyrighted works produced over the last century and collected by cultural heritage 
institutions, and 3) the desire to shift works collected by libraries and archives from print to digital 
formats.414  
U.S. copyright protection has expanded over the last forty years in several significant ways. Under 
prior law, protection for published works was for a shorter term; protection was not automatic, 
and consequences for infringement were not as dramatic as they are today. Copyright terms lasted 
only twenty-eight years after the first publication of the work, with an additional twenty-eight-year 
term available to owners who complied with certain copyright renewal formalities.415 Today, copy-
right protection for most new works lasts for the life of the author plus seventy years.416 In the past, 
rightsholders were also required to take some affirmative action—compliance with “formalities”—to 
obtain and maintain their rights.417 They were required, for instance, to include a copyright notice 
on the front of their work indicating the owner, the date of publication, and a copyright symbol or 
mark.418 To maintain protection for the second twenty-eight-year term, rightsholders were required 
                                                 
414For a more thorough outline of the causes of the orphan works problem, see David R. Hansen, Orphan Works: 
Causes of the Problem (Berkeley Digital Library Copyright Project, White Paper No. 3, 2012), 
https://perma.cc/SWJ8-EHMW. Some of the material in this section is adapted from that paper. See also U.S. 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 15, at 34–39.  
415 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1977).  By the time the 1976 Copyright Act was enacted, the twenty-eight plus twenty-eight- 
year terms had, however, been modified by almost yearly short-term legislative extensions from 1962 to 1976, 
leading to a maximum term of 70 years for some works even before the more general extension of terms in the 
1976 Copyright Act. See Editor’s Note, Title 17 U.S.C. (1977). See also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 139–40 
(1976), https://perma.cc/ZU93-JG87. For a helpful collection of prior versions of compiled U.S. copyright law, 
see Index, COPYRIGHTDATA, http://law.copyrightdata.com/index.php (last visited June 11, 2016). 
416 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2015), https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6.  
417 Legal scholars have increasingly looked to the reintroduction of formalities as a way to help minimize the or-
phan works problem for works created in the future. See STEF VAN GOMPEL, FORMALITIES IN COPYRIGHT: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THEIR HISTORY, RATIONALES, AND POSSIBLE FUTURE (2011);  Christopher Sprigman, Re-
form(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485 (2004), https://perma.cc/72AK-87NJ; Symposium: Reform(aliz)ing 
Copyright in the Internet Age, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1415 (2013), https://perma.cc/WB47-XWAM.  
418 17 U.S.C. §§10, 19 (1977).  
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to file a renewal registration with the U.S. Copyright Office (though very few ever did).419 The no-
tice requirement was eliminated completely in 1989420 and the last vestiges of the renewal registra-
tion requirement were eliminated in 1992.421  
In recent years, Congress also expanded the infringement remedies available to copyright own-
ers.422 Statutory damages, a mechanism whereby owners need not prove actual damages but can 
instead elect to receive an award based on a pre-set statutory range, have expanded dramatically. 
Prior to the 1976 Copyright Act revision, owners could elect to receive a statutory damage award 
in lieu of actual damages and lost profits, with a range between $250 and $5,000 per infringing 
transaction.423 Current law expands that range up to $150,000 per work infringed.424 While statu-
tory damages will not always apply—only works registered with the Copyright Office before the date 
of the infringement are eligible425—the large potential damages awards for even some works repre-
sents major risk exposure for many digitizers.  
                                                 
419 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1977). See WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND COPYRIGHT WARS (2014) (for a 1958–59 
sample, less than 12% of most types of works [aside from aside from movies, maps, and music] were ever re-
newed for a second 28 year term); Landes & Posner, supra note 148, at 499 (finding that the ration of renewal 
registration to initial registration was between 10% to just over 20% for works initially registered between 1910 
and 2000); Deirdre K. Mulligan, & Jason M. Schultz, Neglecting the National Memory: How Copyright Term Exten-
sions Compromise the Development of Digital Archives, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 451, 458 (2002), 
https://perma.cc/6FSX-DDTD (only 12.86% of the works registered in 1930 were renewed when their first term 
expired in 1957). 
420 Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 7, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988), 
https://perma.cc/MM64-RALC.  
421 Copyright Renewal Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106 Stat. 264 (1992),  https://perma.cc/6HMG-
MDPC.   
422 In addition to statutory damages, Congress has also added other new and more exotic liabilities, including 
strong criminal infringement provisions and liability for circumventing digital locks that protect copyrighted con-
tent. For example, copying works, such as DVDs, in circumvention of technological protection measures (TPMs) 
can now result in fines and criminal prosecution. 17 U.S.C. § 1203(c)(3)(A) (2015), https://perma.cc/BK8Y-
TAU6 (statutory damage award of between $250 and $2500 for unauthorized circumvention of technological 
protection measures); § 1204(a) (criminal penalties for circumvention for commercial gain, up to five years im-
prisonment); § 1204(b) (limiting criminal liability for nonprofit libraries, archives, educational institutions, and 
public broadcasting entities). 
423 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1977).  
424 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2015), https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6. Reforming excessive statutory damage awards 
has been identified as an important part of broader copyright reform efforts. See Copyright Remedies: Hearing before 
the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop. & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113 Cong. (2014), 
https://perma.cc/LB23-GZ6S; Samuelson &Wheatland, supra note 373, at 497–510 (proposing reforms). The 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office recently suggested reforms. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, WHITE 
PAPER ON REMIXES, FIRST SALE, AND STATUTORY DAMAGES (2015), https://perma.cc/6X43-QRPN.  
425 17 U.S.C. § 412, https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6.  
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How do these changes exacerbate the orphan works situation? Elimination of mandatory copyright 
formalities means that more works, almost every creative work that is fixed in almost any format—
the email written this morning, or the notes jotted down on a napkin over lunch—is protected,426 
and that owners, particularly those who never knew or had an interest in protecting their work, are 
now more difficult to identify and locate. Added to that is a term that can easily extend over more 
than 100 years, meaning that more works remain protected for longer and that there are more op-
portunities for protected works to become separated from their owners over time.427 Exaggerated 
penalties for infringement make using this enlarged universe of copyrighted works potentially cost-
ly.  
Changes in practice have also worsened the situation. Just as copyright protection was expanding, 
so too were the number of works produced. Electronic publishing over the last twenty years has 
resulted in an explosion of new content. Even in the traditional world of book publishing, the 
number of new titles and editions “in print” has grown at an astounding rate; much of the most 
recent growth comes from the publication of e-books.428 Libraries and archives have diligently col-
lected and preserved this expanding universe of materials. Members of the Association of Research 
Libraries (ARL) reported holding just over 238 million volumes in their collections for the 1976–
77 year (the year of the first major Copyright revision noted above),429 while in 2013–14 ARL li-
braries reported collections nearly three times as large, at 687 million volumes total.430 Added to 
those collections are large and rapidly expanding collections containing photographs, manuscripts, 
                                                 
426 17 U.S.C. § 106, https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6.   
427 Some proponents of orphan works legislation point to lengthened terms as the main culprit of the problem. 
Lawrence Lessig, for example, once proclaimed that “real problem of orphaned works is tied to old works.” Letter 
from Stanford Law Professor Lawrence Lessig to the Hon. Zoe Lofgren 4 (Mar. 6, 2006), reprinted in Report on 
Orphan Works by the Copyright Office: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary,  109th Cong. 123 (2006), https://perma.cc/3TLD-F2PE. See also U.S. REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS, REPORT ON COPYRIGHT AND DIGITAL DISTANCE EDUCATION, at xxiv (1999), 
https://perma.cc/F7CH-G2LN (“the problem of such ‘orphan works’ may become more acute due to longer 
copyright terms and the expanded audience for older works made possible by digital technology”).  
428 See New Book Titles and Editions, 2002–2010, BOWKER, https://perma.cc/X6T3-TDRX (last visited June 7, 
2016) (showing growth from 2002 to 2010 of near 1000%); see also FACEBOOK, ERICSSON & XL AXIATA, MEAS-
URING AND IMPROVING NETWORK PERFORMANCE (Sept. 2013), https://perma.cc/42R7-ELKF (Internet.org 
white paper) (rapidly expanding photo archives online); PETER LYMAN & HAL R. VARIAN, HOW MUCH INFOR-
MATION? (2003); Peter Lyman & Hal R. Varian, How Much Information?, 18–3 J. ELECTRONIC PUB. (Dec. 2000), 
https://perma.cc/V7PE-66V5. More recent efforts to answer this same question (particularly, with respect to 
information flows) have, unsurprisingly, concluded with much higher estimates. See ROGER E. BOHN & JAMES E. 
SHORT, HOW MUCH INFORMATION? 2009: REPORT ON AMERICAN CONSUMERS (2009). 
429 ASSOCIATION OF RESEARCH LIBRARIES (ARL), ARL STATISTICS 1976–1977, at 14 (1977), 
https://perma.cc/5BTA-PLCP.  
430 ARL, ARL STATISTICS 2013–2014, at 13 (2014), https://perma.cc/32Z3-YFSG. Note that the 1976–77 statis-
tics report on 105 ARL members, while the 2014–2015 statistics report on 123 ARL members.  
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audiovisual material and hybrid content types, such as webpages, that are preserved by the Internet 
Archive, among others.431.  
The combined effect of expanded copyright protection and an expanding universe of copyrighted 
works is that there are now many works in libraries and archives for which copyright owners are 
difficult or impossible to locate. There are few precise estimates of the true number of orphan 
works, but there is general agreement that there are likely lots of them. U.S. libraries have done 
small-scale studies of their core published collections. In 2005, Cornell University Libraries report-
ed that it had conducted its own rights clearance study of a sample of 343 in-copyright, out-of-print 
monographs. After spending more than $50,000 in staff time, Cornell was only able to identify or 
locate rightsholders for 198 (58%) of those books.432 Carnegie Mellon Libraries, for a similar study 
of a random selection of published monographs in its collection, reported similar results.433 
For special collections, the question of how many works are orphans is equally as uncertain, 
though it seems clear that the problem is much worse. A 2010 University of North Carolina study 
is one of the most vivid examples of the futility and expense associated with clearing rights for 
these types of collections.434 The study focused on a collection of more than 8,400 documents re-
lating to early 19th century correspondence of a prominent politician. After spending more than 
450 hours attempting to obtain copyright permissions, the researchers were able to identify over 
3,000 individual authors, but could identify dependable contact information for only four 
rightsholders.435 A similar study, focused on more recently produced material from the University 
of Michigan Libraries John Cohen AIDS collection, reported similar results. Of 5,463 potentially 
in-copyright works in the collection with copyright held by 1,377 unique rightholders, project staff 
were able to identify or obtain responses for only half of the works in the collection.436  
                                                 
431 Internet Archive reports preserving 445 billion webpages since it began operation. INTERNET ARCHIVE, 
STATS, https://archive.org/about/stats.php (last visited Feb. 13, 2016); DOOLEY & LUCE, supra note 48, at 25. 
432 Cornell University Library, Response to the Notice of Inquiry Concerning Orphan Works (Mar. 23, 2005), 
https://perma.cc/NZ8W-UWMK; see also John P. Wilkin, Bibliographic Indeterminacy and the Scale of Problems and 
Opportunities of “Rights” in Digital Collection Building, RUMINATIONS (Feb. 2011), https://perma.cc/S6NJ-2N7H 
(estimating that up to 50% of the five million works then held in the HathiTrust digital collection could be con-
sidered orphan works). Estimates from collections in other countries match these conclusions. See INTELLECTU-
AL PROP. OFFICE, IMPACT ASSESSMENT (FINAL), ORPHAN WORKS 10–11 (June 2012), https://perma.cc/Y36E-
HTHG (UK).   
433 Carnegie Mellon University Libraries, Response to Notice of Inquiry about Orphan Works 2 (Mar. 22, 2005), 
https://perma.cc/95XW-TV4Z.   
434 Dickson, supra note 29.  
435 Id. at 630.  
436 Akmon, supra note 29. Studies of other special collections studies have come to similar conclusions. See, e.g., 
Mike Cave, Marilyn Deegan & Louise Heinink, Copyright Clearance in the Refugee Studies Centre Digital Library Pro-
ject, RLG DIGINEWS, (Oct. 2000), https://perma.cc/H2RM-QUQZ (for clearances of over 8,000 special collec-
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The third change that has worsened the orphan works problem is that users want access to materi-
als online, which requires digitizers to make uses that fall within copyright owners’ exclusive rights. 
Even with large numbers of orphan works in the collections of libraries and archives, they don’t 
pose a special challenge unless their uses implicate the rights of copyright owners. When Congress 
expanded copyright protection starting in the 1970s, at least some members of Congress believed 
that those expansions would not pose a problem because users could still access these materials as 
they had before. The House Report that accompanied passage of the Act explained, “it is im-
portant to realize that the bill would not restrain scholars from using any work as source material 
of from making ‘fair use’ of it; the restrictions would extend only to unauthorized reproduction or 
distributions . . . .”437  
That statement, as it turns out, vastly underestimated the technological changes that have altered 
user expectations about access. While it remains true that users can continue to access physical, 
original copies of orphans, they cannot gain access to those works in the digital formats that they 
increasingly expect. Nor can libraries effectively preserve and maintain access for born-digital mate-
rials that, by the very nature of their format, must be copied to be preserved and accessed. Sitting 
on the library shelf, none of the copyright owners’ rights are implicated,438 and owners of legally-
acquired copies of a work are generally free to display, lend, or sell those copies under the well-
established rule that the rightsholder’s public distribution rights to a particular copy are exhausted 
upon the “first sale” of that copy.439   
                                                                                                                                                             
tion documents, explaining that “[l]ocating authors is our single biggest problem, and we get many of our com-
munications returned as ‘unknown.’”); Lynn Pritcher, Ad*Access: Seeking Copyright Permissions for a Digital Age, 6 
D-LIB MAG. (2000), https://perma.cc/EH6F-AUCQ. 
437 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 136 (1976), https://perma.cc/ZU93-JG87. 
438 However, two Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal have indicated that merely listing a work in a library catalog 
and making it available to the public is sufficient to exercise the owner’s public distribution right. See Diversey v. 
Schmidly, 738 F.3d 1196, 1201 n.7 (10th Cir. 2013), https://casetext.com/case/diversey-v-schmidly; Hotaling v. 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 1997), https://casetext.com/case/hotaling-
v-church-jesus-christ-latter-day (“When a public library adds a work to its collection, lists the work in its index or 
catalog system, and makes the work available to the borrowing or browsing public, it has completed all the steps 
necessary for distribution to the public.”). Both opinions are controversial. See 4 PATRY, supra note 212 § 13:9 
(“Hotaling should be viewed as a deeply flawed opinion.”). Compare Peter Menell, In Search of Copyright’s Lost Ark: 
Interpreting the Right to Distribute in the Internet Age, 59 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1 (2012), 
https://perma.cc/EM4C-EBLR (arguing, largely from legislative history, that the right of public distribution co-
vers mere “offers” to distribute) with U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE MAKING AVAILABLE RIGHT IN THE UNITED 
STATES (2015),  https://perma.cc/KP88-TK9P (citing Menell with approval).  Note that in both Diversey and Ho-
taling, public distribution was only raised because the works at issue were not “lawfully made” under the copy-
right act and therefore not subject to the first sale § 109(a) limitations on the public distribution right. Listing 
lawfully-made works in a catalog should not impinge distribution rights.  
439 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2015), https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6.     
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Digitization, regardless of whether it is for access or simply dark-archiving for preservation, requires 
making new copies, sometimes many new copies,440 which implicate the rightsholder’s reproduc-
tion rights. Making those new copies available to the public implicates either the owners’ public 
distribution right, or public display or performance right. Although some digital libraries have ex-
perimented with digital lending analogous to the traditional lending model permitted under the 
doctrine of first sale,441 the application of that doctrine to digital uses is not yet clearly estab-
lished.442  
As recognition of the problem became more widespread, the term “orphan works” was established 
by the late 1990s as the preferred way to describe the situation in which a work’s copyright owners 
could not be located or identified.443 Orphan works have continued to generate interest from 
                                                 
440 Entire preservation programs are premised on the idea that decentralized and distributed preservation is the 
best way to ensure that preserved material is kept safe. Preservation Principles, LOTS OF COPIES KEEPS STUFF SAFE 
(LOCKSS) PRINCIPLES, https://perma.cc/3Q87-6JEP (last visited May 23, 2016).  
441 See Geoffrey A. Fowler, Libraries Have a Novel Idea, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2010, https://perma.cc/8YV3-
RARX; George Oates, Small Moves: Open Library Integrates Digital Lending, OPEN LIBRARY BLOG, June 29, 2010, 
https://perma.cc/M7W4-JLYV. 
442 Digital first sale defense would apply broadly to all digital uses—there is nothing exceptional about exhaustion 
as applied to orphan works—and so a lengthy analysis of the application of a digital first sale doctrine is beyond 
the scope of this report, though the issue deserves more attention. Should this principle be recognized as apply-
ing to digital distribution of copyrighted works, it could have far reaching implications for digital library services, 
including online distribution of orphan works. A case testing this proposition was resolved on partial summary 
judgment in favor of the record company, Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013) and has only recently resulted in a resolution that will likely put the issue before the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals. See Eriq Gardner, The Legality of Selling “Used” Digital Songs and Movies Headed to Appeals Court, THE 
HOLLYWOOD REP. Apr. 6, 2016, https://perma.cc/WQ3Q-W439. See also Jennifer Jenkins, Last Sale? Libraries’ 
Rights in the Digital Age, 75 COLL. & RES. LIB. NEWS 69 (2014) (explaining implications for libraries), 
https://perma.cc/L79Q-N6PF; Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 889 
(2010), https://perma.cc/JLE4-PFNE (explaining one rationale for courts to support digital first sale).  
443 By 1995, Register of Copyrights Marybeth Peters had publicly outlined these concerns and suggested that 
Congress study the development of a mechanism to resolve these issues. See Copyright Term Extension: Continued 
Hearing on H.R. 989 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th 
Cong. 19 (1995) (Statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights) (discussing the then recently created 
Canadian Orphan Works system) See also id. at 151 (letter from Robert Oakley, on behalf of the Am. Library 
Assoc.) (“Although institutions and researchers can, in theory, seek out the authors of individual copyrighted 
works and negotiate for their academic or other noncommercial use, that process is extremely time consuming 
and expensive.”). Definitions of the term vary. See David R. Hansen, Orphan Works: Definitional Issues (Berkeley 
Digital Library Copyright Project, White Paper No. 1, 2011), https://perma.cc/HHD2-4FT5. By 1999, this gen-
eral meaning for “orphan works” was already in use. See U.S. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 427, at 165–
66 (1999). Other early uses defined the term more broadly. See, e.g., Complaint ¶2, Kahle v. Ashcroft, 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 24090 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2004) (No. C-04-1127 MMC) (defining “orphan works” as “books that 
remain under copyright, but are out of print and therefore not widely available to the public.”), aff’d, Kahle v. 
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rightsholders, policy makers, academics, librarians, archivists, and other memory institution pro-
fessionals. In response to the Copyright Office’s public calls for comments in 2005444 and again in 
2012,445 the Office received over 1,200 written comments on the scope of the problem, the need 
for a solution, and how Congress or others might craft such a solution.446 Since the early 2000s, 
over 500 law review articles have used the term “orphan works” (and almost fifty with the term in 
the article’s title).447 The Library and Information Science Abstracts database identifies eighty-three 
articles using the term, and Google Scholar aggregates “about 4,450” results for articles or other 
scholarly works containing the term “orphan works,” and “about 280” with the term in the title.448  
Despite, or perhaps because of, the widespread interest and discussion of orphan works, very little 
U.S. law directly addresses uses of these works. No court has addressed what specific circumstances 
might allow for uses of orphan works under current copyright law. The only statutory recognition 
of the orphan works problem at all is Section 108(i), a provision titled the “Preservation of Orphan 
Works Act” 449 and added to the specific statutory limitations on copyright for libraries and ar-
chives. 450 While the title of that Act sounds promising, as explained in Section 4 of this report, 
these revisions have done relatively little to alleviate the orphan works problem.  
Congress considered and even came close to passing broader legislation on orphan works in 2006 
and 2008, but no bill was ever enacted.451 The three bills that it did consider were based on a 2006 
recommendation from the U.S. Copyright Office, which crafted its recommendation based on one 
of the most comprehensive studies of the problem to date.452 The Office’s 2006 recommendation 
was that Congress create a statute that would limit the remedies available against defendants who 
were unable to locate the copyright owner of a work after a “good faith, reasonably diligent 
                                                                                                                                                             
Gonzales, 474 F.3d 655 (9th Cir. Cal. 2007), withdrawn and substituted, Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 
Cal., May 14, 2007).          
444 Library of Cong., Copyright Office, supra note 25. 
445 Library of Cong., Copyright Office, supra note 26.  
446 The full set of public comments are available through the Copyright Office’s Orphan Works page, Orphan 
Works, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://copyright.gov/orphan/ (last visited May 23, 2016).  
447 Search run on May 23, 2016 on WestlawNext, Journals & Law Reviews, for the term “orphan work” and vari-
ants.  
448 Search run on May 23, 2016 using the term “orphan work.” 
449 See Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–9, tit. IV, § 402, 119 Stat. 227 (2005), 
https://perma.cc/CU5B-EZGP.  
450 17 U.S.C. § 108(h) (2015), https://perma.cc/BK8Y-TAU6.   
451 Some of the material in this section is adapted from David R. Hansen, Orphan Works: Mapping the Possible So-
lution Spaces (Berkeley Digital Library Copyright Project, White Paper No. 2, 2012), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2019121 (summarizing the proposed legislation). 
452 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 8.  
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search.”453 Rather than defining the specific method of search, however, the Copyright Office 
adopted what it suggested to be a “very general” search standard solicitous of the varying tech-
niques and resources used to investigate rights status in different industry contexts.454 For users 
who complied with these search requirements, the Copyright Office proposal would have provided 
limited protection from both monetary damages and injunctive relief.455 For monetary damages, 
the proposal eliminated all monetary exposure (including actual damages, statutory damages, and 
attorney’s fees and costs) for users that made non-commercial uses of the work, provided that the 
use ceased upon notice of a claim of infringement.456 
The three bills, The Orphan Works Act of 2006, The Orphan Works Act of 2008, and the Shawn-
Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008, closely resembled the Office’s proposal, but with several im-
portant changes. The 2006 bill,457 for example, attempted to clarify the wide-open reasonably dili-
gent search requirement. It would have required that users document their searches in a way that 
would satisfy later judicial review;458 it defined several factors to guide the search, explaining that a 
reasonable search would, for example, ordinarily consult the Copyright Office-maintained records, 
and might also require consultation of an expert,459 and it would have required that the Copyright 
Office make available to the public authoritative search information, such as Copyright Office rec-
ords, information on best search methods, technological tools to aid the search, and best practices 
for documenting the search.460  
                                                 
453 Id. at 96–108 (describing factors of the reasonably diligent search), 127 (proposed statutory language). The 
proposal also required that users provide “attribution to the author and copyright owner of the work, if possible 
and as appropriate under the circumstances.” Id. 
454 Id. at 98. The Copyright Office suggested that guidelines might be developed for particular market sectors, but 
that the ultimate reasonableness of a search must be determined by courts on a case-by-case basis. The report 
went on to explain that a broad standard “is needed because of the wide variety of works and uses identified as 
being potentially subject to the orphan works issues, from an untitled photograph to an old magazine advertise-
ment to an out-of-print novel to an antique postcard to an obsolete computer program. Each of these presents 
different challenges in trying to find a copyright owner, and what is reasonable in one circumstance will be un-
reasonable in another.” Id. 
455 Id. at 115–19 (describing the approach’s limitation on monetary relief), 119–21 (describing the limitation on 
injunctive relief).  
456 Id. at 127. 
457 Orphan Works Act of 2006, H.R. 5439, 109th Cong. (2006), https://perma.cc/AG7Z-D8ZZ (as forwarded by 
subcomm. to full comm. by voice vote).   
458 Id at 2–3, § 2 (proposed § 514(a)(1)(A)(i)). 
459 Id. at 3–4, § 2 (proposed § 514(a)(2)(B)). In commissioning an inquiry by the Copyright Office on the topic of 
small copyright claims, the bill also touched on the concern that the “reasonable compensation” standard would 
insufficiently compensate individual copyright owners. Id. at 10–11, § 4.  
460 Id. at 4–5, § 2 (proposed § 514(a)(2)(C)).  
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The 2008 House and Senate bills adopted the same approach as the 2006 bill but added to the 
diligent search requirements. These bills would have required the Office to certify the availability 
and reliability of a database for searches of visual works (whose owners are often most difficult to 
identify and locate),461 and both would have required the Office to take a more active role in de-
veloping best practices for diligent searches. In addition, the 2008 House Bill further tightened 
control over potential users by requiring those who planned to take advantage of the remedy-
limitation statute to first file a “Notice of Use” with the Copyright Office before using the work.462   
Continuing the evolution of these bills, the Copyright Office revisited the orphan works issue in a 
2012 study, which resulted in a 2015 report and statutory recommendation that largely mirrored 
the additions that were made during the 2006-2008 legislative process. The Office’s 2015 recom-
mendation was built around the same remedy-limitation model and included requirements that 
searches follow recommended practices promulgated by the Copyright Office and that searchers 
must first file a “Notice of Use” with the Office before use of the work.463  
As of this writing, Congress has not passed orphan works legislation, and there are no active bills 
before it. While the initial approach proposed by the Copyright Office in its 2006 report generated 
considerable support among library and archives groups,464 the additions in the subsequent bills 
and in the Office’s 2015 report elicited objections from both rightsholders and potential users, 
including libraries and archives.465 The libraries and archives’ strongest objection was that requir-
ing the Office to define and promulgate standards for “diligent search” would be onerous and in-
effective, as would the “Notice of Use” requirement. 466  
There is also no case law directly addressing orphan works as such. A search of U.S. cases for vari-
ants of the term “orphan works” produces a total of eight judicial opinions on point. Most do little 
more than acknowledge that the problem exists and that Congress has considered it.467 Two cases, 
                                                 
461 Orphan Works Act of 2008, H.R. 5889, 110th Cong., § 3 at 15–16 (2008), https://perma.cc/Y8K9-AS9P.  
462 Id. at 5, 9, § 2 (proposed § 514(b)(1)(A)(ii)–(iv), (b)(3)). 
463 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 15; Appendix A (orphan works legislation discussion draft).  
464 See, e.g., Press Release, Library Copyright Alliance, LCA Supports Orphan Works Act of 2006 (Sept. 7, 2006), 
https://perma.cc/2Z3U-AY7P.   
465 See, e.g., Library Copyright Alliance, Comments in Response to the Copyright Office’s Notice of Inquiry Con-
cerning Orphan Works and Mass Digitization (Jan.14, 2013), https://perma.cc/U8XH-6EFQ. .  
466 See, e.g., Kyle K. Courtney, The Copyright Office and the Orphan Works Report: Top Three Problems, KYLE K. 
COURTNEY BLOG (July 8, 2015), https://perma.cc/9VN4-AXH5. 
467 Search run on WestlawNext on May 23, 2016, searching “ALL CASES – State & Federal” for “orphan 
works.”  
The cases are: 
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Authors Guild v. Google, Inc.468 and Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust,469 do not directly address or-
phan works per se, but do give some clues as to how courts will approach these works, particularly 
with respect to who will be permitted to bring a suit on behalf of rightsholders of orphan works. 
They are discussed above. A handful of other cases, reviewed below, address orphan works-like is-
sues indirectly.  
  
                                                                                                                                                             
Peter Mayer Publishers Inc. v. Shilovskiy, No. 12 CIV. 8867 PGG HBP, 2015 WL 1399694, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 
2015) report and recommendation adopted in part, sub nom. Peter Mayer Publishers Inc. v. Shilovskaya, No. 12 CIV. 8867 
PGG HBP, 2015 WL 1408830 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015), https://casetext.com/case/peter-mayer-publishers-inc-
v-shilovskaya-1 (discussing the meaning of “reasonable compensation” for a copyrighted work restored under the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), and how the term was used in the context of congressional hearings 
on proposed orphan works legislation);  
Three opinions in the HathiTrust litigation: Authors Guild, Inc. v. Hathitrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), 
https://casetext.com/case/authors-guild-inc-v-hathitrust (concluding that Authors Guild’s claims against Ha-
thiTrust based on its orphan works identification project were not ripe for adjudication because HathiTrust 
ceased operating that project); Authors Guild, Inc. v. Hathitrust, No. 11 CV 6351 HB, 2013 WL 603193, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2013), https://perma.cc/V5LY-JR7P (refusing to award attorney’s fees to the prevailing de-
fendants because “on the larger question of how copyright law . . .  will account for changes in technology, the 
Authors Guild and the other plaintiffs acted reasonably. The purposes of copyright would not be furthered were 
I to discourage similar participation in the future. When the Orphan Works Project is ripe, for example, I fully 
expect authors to protect their rights, and I will not stand in their way by penalizing them here.”); Authors Guild, 
Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 105 (2d Cir. 2014), https://casetext.com/case/authors-guild-inc-v-hathitrust-1 
(concluding “that claims predicated upon the [University of Michigan Libraries] Orphan Works Project are not 
ripe for adjudication.”).  
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 894 (2012), https://casetext.com/case/golan-v-holder-2 (recognizing that the 
orphan works problem was likely made worse by Congress’s enactment of legislation restoring copyright to for-
eign works as part of an effort to comply with the Berne Convention treaty obligations, but holding that “no one 
has suggested that the orphan-works issue should be addressed through our [judicial] implementation of Berne, 
rather than through overarching legislation of the sort proposed in Congress and cited by the dissent.”) 
Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), https://casetext.com/case/guild-v-google-
inc (rejecting Google Books class action settlement agreement in part because of concerns about allowing Google 
and the class representatives control over how orphan works are used). 
Kahle v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 665 (9th Cir.), https://casetext.com/case/kahle-v-gonzales-2 opinion amended and su-
perseded on denial of reh'g, 487 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 2007), https://casetext.com/case/kahle-v-gonzales (acknowledg-
ing that the orphan works problem is the result of copyright revision over the last thirty years but dismissing 
plaintiff’s claim which alleged that “the change from an ‘opt-in’ to an ‘opt-out’ copyright system altered a tradi-
tional contour of copyright and therefore requires First Amendment review under [Supreme Court precedent.”)   
468 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015), https://casetext.com/case/guild-v-google-inc-1.  
469 Authors Guild, Inc., 755 F.3d at 87. 
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APPENDIX B – EXAMPLE OF QUITCLAIM  
QUITCLAIM SPECIFIED PURPOSES  The New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox and Tilden Foundations (the “Library”) has ac-quired the material described below (the “Material”) and the Library wishes to reproduce and make other uses of the Material in furtherance of the Library’s tax-exempt educational mission of provid-ing access to information and knowledge.  Accordingly, the undersigned hereby acknowledges and agrees as follows: A. The Library, as the owner of the tangible property constituting the Material and as a qualifying library, shall enjoy all exempted uses, rights and privileges accorded to it under the U.S. Copyright Law, as amended, and associated regulations. B. The undersigned hereby grants to the Library a worldwide quitclaim of any rights it has in the Material for any of the following purposes: (i) on the Library’s website for access by researchers, scholars and other mem-bers of the general public;  (ii) on the Library’s electronic preservation system; and (iii) in educational materials related to the Library’s collections, exhibitions, pro-grams, events, related publicity, promotional materials and publications.  C. This grant is without representation or warranty of any kind by the undersigned as to the ownership, validity or subsistence of copyright or any other intellectual property rights in the Material.   Material: <insert list of photographs by the artist in the collection> 
 Accepted and agreed: _____________________________________________________    _______________________________________ (Signature)       (Date) Name: Address: Email Address:   
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APPENDIX C – ORPHAN WORKS INTERVIEWEES 
 
Heather Briston, UCLA Library 
Mikka Gee Conway, The J. Paul Getty Trust 
Greg Cram, New York Public Library 
Sharon Farb, UCLA Libary 
David Farneth, The J. Paul Getty Trust 
Katie Fortney, California Digital Library, University of California  
Anne Gilliland, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Libraries 
Peter Hirtle, Cornell University Library 
Polina Ilieva, University of California – San Francisco Library  
Emily Lin, University of California – Merced Library 
Anonymous librarian at a large public research library in the United States 
Anonymous archivist at large cultural heritage institution in the United States 
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APPENDIX D – INTERVIEW PROTOCOL AND QUESTIONS 
 
Orphan Works Digitization: Interview Protocol  
Date: 
Time:  
Method of Interview (e.g., phone, in person): 
Interviewer:  
Interviewee:  
Interviewer introduction: 
Hello _______, 
As you know, digitization of copyrighted works in library and archives raises hard questions copyright 
liability risk, particularly for use of copyrighted works whose owners cannot be identified or located—
i.e., orphan works. Digitizing organizations have pointed to fair use as the lodestar of risk management 
for orphan works, but other legal and practical strategies also exist to minimize the risk of a lawsuit in 
the first place, to bolster the fair use defense, and to make available other legal and equitable defenses.  
I’m working to produce a report that thoroughly reviews the best approaches to minimizing legal risk 
when making orphan works available on an open access basis. I’m hoping to build in to that document 
information about what policies, best practices, and experiences organizations like yours have that 
would be beneficial for other digitizing organizations to consider in reducing the risk of providing open 
access to orphan works.  
So thank you for agreeing to talk with me to share that information. I anticipate this should take about 
20 minutes. I will record this interview and have it transcribed.  
This study has been deemed exempt from review by UNC’s IRB because I’m talking to you as an expert 
on your institutional policies and practices, and I’m not asking questions about you, individually. Never-
theless, I’m sensitive to identifying you and attributing quotes to you publicly So, once the transcription 
is available, if you would like, I will share it with you. I plan to use excerpts from interviews in the result-
ing report, with attribution to you. If you are quoted in the resulting report, I will give you an opportuni-
ty to see the relevant sections of the draft. If necessary, I’m happy to consult with you about any chang-
es or redactions that you might like me to make before releasing the report publicly. 
Do you have any questions?  
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Questions:   
Preliminary: Can you describe your organizations’ involvement with digitization of copyrighted works?  
First, does your organization have a written policy or process in place for assessing copyright liability risk 
for digitization/digital access generally (or providing digital access to orphan works specifically, if such a 
document exists)?  
• Probe: If so, can you share it with me?  
• Probe: how was it developed?  
• Probe: if there is no policy or workflow, why not?   
Second, how does your organization identify orphan works or likely orphan works for purposes of risk 
assessment?  
• Probe: What are the factors that lead to such a determination?  
• Probe: Does your organization engage in a “reasonable search” for rightsholders? If so, please 
describe the process. 
• Probe: within the category or orphan works or likely orphan works, how does your organization 
triage or categorize “low risk” versus “high risk” works?  
o How much of that categorization is based on copyright risk vs. other risks (e.g., privacy, 
reputational, etc.) 
Third, what are the primary legal doctrines that your organization relies upon to justify making orphan 
works available on an open access basis online?  
• Probe: Does your organization make assertions of fair use for an entire collection?  
• Probe: How do codes of best practices, such as the ARL code of fair use best practices, the SAA 
Orphan Works: Best Practices or the Code of Best Practices in Fair Use of Collections Containing 
Orphan Works for Libraries, Archives, and Other Memory Institutions influence your reliance on 
fair use?  
• Probe: What else beyond fair use do you rely upon?  
Fourth, what are some examples of orphan works or collections containing orphan works that your or-
ganization has made available online? 
• What level of access do you provide? Open access? Restricted? 
Fifth, can you provide any examples of collections containing orphan works that your organization has 
held back from digitizing because of concerns about risk? Why was that decision made to hold those 
works back? 
Finally, has your organization ever had a rightsholder come forward to assert rights over a work that 
your organization determined to be orphaned? If so, please explain. 
Closing:  
• Thank you 
• Ask permission to follow up 
• Reminder about use of transcript and quotes in final document  
• Provide contact information again 
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APPENDIX E – EXAMPLES OF DIGITAL COLLECTIONS CONTAINING 
ORPHAN WORKS 
Institution Collection Link 
UCLA Library Walter L. Gordon, Jr./William C. Beverly, Jr. 
Collection 
http://digital2.library.ucla.edu/viewItem.do?ark=2
1198/zz002311rn 
UCLA Library AIDS Poster Collection http://digital.library.ucla.edu/aidsposters/  
UCLA Library Los Angeles Latino Families Photo Project http://digital2.library.ucla.edu/viewItem.do?ark=2
1198/zz002c4jzn 
UCLA Library Adams (Peggy Hamilton) Papers http://digital2.library.ucla.edu/viewItem.do?ark=2
1198/zz0008hs10  
UCLA Library Los Angeles Aqueduct Digital Platform http://digital.library.ucla.edu/aqueduct/ 
UCLA Library Retter-Vargas (Yolanda) Collection of Orphan 
Photographs 
http://digital2.library.ucla.edu/viewItem.do?ark=2
1198/zz0019q5n3 
Duke Libraries adViews http://library.duke.edu/digitalcollections/adviews/ 
Duke Libraries Vica Nazi Propoganda Comis http://library.duke.edu/digitalcollections/vica/ 
Duke Libraries Caribbean Sea Migration Collection http://library.duke.edu/digitalcollections/caribbea
nsea/ 
Duke Libraries Images of mainline Protestant children and 
families in the U.S. 
http://library.duke.edu/digitalcollections/protfam/ 
Duke Libraries Behind the Veil: Documenting African Ameri-
can Life in the Jim Crow South 
http://library.duke.edu/digitalcollections/behindth
eveil/ 
Library of Congress Prosperity and Thrift http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/coolhtml/ccres.ht
ml 
Library of Congress The Wilbur and Orville Wright Papers http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/wrighthtml/wrigh
tres.html 
Library of Congress American Women http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/awhhtml/awcopy
.html 
Library of Congress An American Time Capsule: Three Centuries of 
Broadsides and Other Printed Ephemera 
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/rbpehtml/peres.h
tml 
Library of Congress Alexander Graham Bell Family Papers http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/bellhtml/bellres.h
tml 
Library of Congress The Samuel F.B. Morse Papers http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/sfbmhtml/sfbmre
s.html 
Library of Congress The Moldenhauer Archives http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/molde
nhauer/moldres.html 
Library of Congress Emile Berliner and the Birth of the Recording 
Industry 
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/berlhtml/berlres.
html 
Library of Congress Newspaper Pictorials: World War I Rotogra-
vures 
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/rotogr
avures/rotorights.html 
Library of Congress Historic Sheet Music Collection http://memory.loc.gov:8081/cocoon/ihas/html/vo
lcano/volcano-copyright.html 
Library of Congress Library of Congress Concerts http://lcweb2.loc.gov/diglib/ihas/html/concerts/c
oncerts-copyright.html 
Library of Congress Dolly Parton and the Roots of Country Music http://lcweb2.loc.gov/diglib/ihas/html/dollyparton
/dollyparton-copyright.html 
Library of Congress The Gerry Mulligan Collection http://lcweb2.loc.gov/diglib/ihas/html/mulligan/m
ulligan-copyright.html 
Library of Congress Civil War Sheet Music Collection http://lcweb2.loc.gov/diglib/ihas/html/civilwar/civ
ilwar-copyright.html 
Library of Congress Patriotic Melodies http://lcweb2.loc.gov/diglib/ihas/html/patriotic/p
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atrioticcopyright.html 
New York Public 
Library 
New York World's Fair 1939-1940 Records http://digitalgallery.nypl.org/nypldigital/dgtitle_tr
ee.cfm?title_id=359208&level=1&imgs=20&snum=
0 
University of Cali-
fornia Santa Cruz 
Grateful Dead Archive Online http://www.gdao.org/ 
University of South-
ern Mississippi  
Civil Rights in Mississippi Digital Archive: Intel-
lectual Property 
http://digilib.usm.edu/crmda_ip.php 
 
